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THE GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
CROWDFUNDING:SOLVING THE SME
FUNDING PROBLEM AND DEMOCRATIZING
ACCESS TO CAPITAL
ALMA PEKMEZOVIC
GORDON WALKER*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a comprehensive review of the crowdfunding phenomenon. It argues that equity crowdfunding (ECF)
and, to a lesser extent, peer-to-peer lending (P2PL) offer the possibility of a global solution to the small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) funding problem. In the United States, the SME funding
problem is exacerbated by the markedly diminishing rate of startup
formation, a factor that injects a degree of urgency into resolving
the optimal means to implement ECF. Here, as with the fin-tech
revolution, the law lags behind technological developments. The
second main argument is that ECF enhances access to capital for
SMEs globally while simultaneously democratizing access to investments for ordinary citizens. The Article begins by providing
definitions, business models, and historical background before
outlining the SME funding problem and new constraints on SME
lending since the global financial crisis. ECF is placed within the
so-called financing escalator and is distinguished from venture
capital and angel financing. The global market for crowdfunding
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is reviewed in order to indicate growth trends in the sector. Some
common legal issues associated with crowdfunding are presented
before a review of crowdfunding globally. Dominant models in
some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)countries and the potential for crowdfunding to assist
SMEs in the undeveloped world are explored. The conclusion
outlines key considerations and choices for legislators considering
the regulatory puzzles presented by crowdfunding.
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INTRODUCTION
ThisArticle reviewscrowdfunding and considersitsim plicationsforsecuritiesregulation and fundraisinglaw.1 Weconsider
theutility ofcrowdfunding forsm alland m edium -sizeenterprises
(SMEs)and the regulatory approach taken in OECD jurisdictionssuch asNew Zealand, Australia, theUnitedStates, theEuropean Union, and the United Kingdom to equity crowdfunding
(ECF)and, to a lesser extent, peer-to-peer lending (P2PL).2
Thesealternativeform soffundraisinghavegrown asa resultof
technologicalinnovation and thefalloutfrom theglobalfinancial
crisis (GFC) in 200809, which resulted in tightened bank
creditand increased constraints on SMEsaccess to capital.3 Restrictionson SME accesstocapitalareespecially prevalentin the
early-stagerisk capitalm arket, and itisherethatECF and P2PL
areattractivesolutions.
These new sourcesofentrepreneurialfinance significantly expand the sources offinancing available to SMEs by perm itting
equityinvestingand lendingfrom m icroangeland retailinvestors
whocan now participatein venturecapitalorangelfinancing i.e.,
early startup financing to fledgling com panies with significant
potential.4 Crowdfunding has the potentialnotonly to im prove
access to finance for SMEs (thereby enhancing dom estic resource m obilization), but also to dem ocratize access to investm entopportunities. Crowdfunding investm entopportunitiesare
See, e.g., NeilParm ar, Crowdfunding is Opening Investment Doors, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.wsj.com /articles/crowdfunding-is-opening-in
vestm ent-doors-1415569542 [https:
/
/
perm a.cc/48HX-88UW];see also, e.g., Angus
Loten & Ruth Sim on, Small-Business Optimism Surges With Solid Economy,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2015, atB1.
2 See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CP13/
13:THE FCA
S REGULATORY APPROACH
TO CROWDFUNDING (
AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES)
, (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.fca
.org.uk/news/cp13-13-regulatory-approach-to-crowdfunding [https://perm a.cc
/K43X-9KXN].
3 AUSTL. GOV
T CORPS. & MKTS. ADVISORY COMM., CROWD SOURCED EQUITY
FUNDING REPORT (May2014).
4 See Cai
tlin Fitzsim m ons, Crowdfunding: How to become your own venture
capitalist, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Mar. 19, 2015), http:/
/www.afr.com /personal-finance
/
how-to-becom e-your-own-venture-capitalist-20150319-1m 2soe [https://perm a.cc
/UUW4-HYNM].
1
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now available to a largerpoolofinvestors, including retailand
noninstitutionalinvestors. Theyarenolongerrestricted toaccreditedinvestors, asisthecaseundersom elegislativefram eworks.5
ECF, in particular, should facilitate the flow offunding to
SMEs and m icrofirm s, which are unable to access traditional
sourcesoffinance.6 Although thiskind ofinvesting carrieswelldocum ented risks, it offers significant im provem ents in SME
accesstofinanceand thepotentialtoenhanceportfoliodiversification forretailinvestors.7 Asa result, we argue thatECF and
P2PL offerthe prospectofa solution to the SME funding problem in thosecountrieswith good com m unicationsinfrastructure,
includingInternetand m obiletelephony. Moreover, ECF hasthe
potentialtodriveeconom icrecoveryfrom theGFC bym obilizing
the sm allbusinessengineforjob creation.8 Governm entsarewell
aware ofthe potentialofthese new form s offundraising.9 For
Id. at29. Fora discussion ofthe U.S. position, see Darian M. Ibrahim ,
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 101 (forthcom ing2016).
6 Ithasbeen est
im ated thatm orethan 200 m illion SMEslack accesstotraditionalfinanceworldwide. Rep. oftheCom m . ofExpertson SustainableDev.
Fin., at25, U.N. Doc. A/69/315 (2014), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc
.asp?sym bol=A/69/315&Lang=E [https://perm a.cc/JQT6-VUWH]. The World
Bank Group states:
There are 420510 m illion m icro, sm all, and m edium enterprises worldwide, ofwhich 360440 m illion are in em erging
m arkets. When asked tolisttheirm ain constraintstogrowth,
access to finance tops the list for entreprenuers in lowerincom ecountries. Globally, fewerthan 30 percentofthesefirm s
use externalfinancing, ofwhich halfare underfinanced. The
totalunm etneedforcreditam ongMSMEsin em ergingm arkets
is estim ated atUS$2.12.5 trillion, approxim ately 14 percent
oftheGDP ofthesecountries.
WORLD BANK, FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT POST-2015 32 (Oct. 2013),
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam /Worldbank/docum ent/Poverty%20doc
um ents/WB-PREM%20financing-for-developm ent-pub-10-11-13web.pdf[https:/
/
perm a.cc/9LZ2-5T4L].
7 TIM K OLLER ET AL., VALUATION:MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE
OF COMPANIES 33 (
5th ed. 2010). See generally BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986).
8 Sara Hanks, Online capital-raising by small companies in the USA after
the JOBS Act compared to the same process in the European Union, 8(3)CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 261, 265 (2013).
9 Id.
5
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exam ple, the new ECF and P2PL regim e in New Zealand flows
directly from the so-called Business Growth Agendaofthe New
Zealand governm ent.10
Asweshallsee, however, thecentraldilem m a forregulators
ishow totailorsecuritieslawsand any applicableECF orP2PL
exem ptions to the financialneeds ofSMEs, while atthe sam e
tim e ensuring an adequate levelofinvestorprotection. Because
ECF and P2PL are susceptible to inform ation asym m etriesand
agency costs, the new regulatory fram eworkstypically m andate
certain safeguards designed to protectthe investor.11 We identify
threecom m on regulatorym echanism sthatfocuson (1)regulating
crowdfunding interm ediariesvia a licensing regim e;(2)regulatingtheinvestm entopportunitiesofthecrowd investor;and (3)ex
postgovernance regulation ofthe crowdfunded firm s. Thus, interm ediaries that operate ECF and P2PL platform s are often
required to obtain a license, m aintain a disclosure regim e, and
ensurethatinvestorsareabletoexercisean inform ed choice. An
alternative and com plim entary regulatory m echanism requires
crowdfunded firm stom akea disclosureand com ply with various
corporate governance requirem ents intended to enhance transparency. Anotherm echanism focuseson theregulation ofnonaccredited investorsinvestm entopportunities and typically results
in lim itations placed on the ability ofsuch investors to participate in ECF and P2PL cam paigns. Nonaccredited investors m ay
participate in crowdfunding subjecttocertain restrictions;forexam ple, theycan onlyinvestafraction oftheirnetwealth orassets
in ECF and P2PL and are hence subjectto investm entcapsim posed bythelegislature.12
Differentregulatory toolshave im plicationsforinvestorprotection and com pliance costsforfirm sseeking funding via ECF
See Alm a Pekm ezovic& Gordon Walker, Equity Crowd Funding in New
Zealand, 33(1)CO. & SEC. L.J. 63, 64(2015).
11 For a di
scussion on agency costs, see, for exam ple, Kickstarter Game
Scam: A Non-Starter, STUFF (May 3, 2012), http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology
/gam es/6846137/Kickstarter-gam e-scam -a-non-starter [https://perm a.cc/8HHZ
-JF39]. See generally M. C. Jensen & W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976).
12 AUSTL. GOV
T CORPS. & MKTS. ADVISORY COMM., CROWD SOURCED EQUITY
FUNDING REPORT §§6.4.16.4.2 (May2014).
10
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orP2PL. Weexplorevariousregulatory approachesand com m ent
on theirlikely effectiveness. Investorsafeguardsm ustbe balanced
against econom ic utility for exam ple, job creation and SME
dem and forcrowdfunding and peer-to-peerfinancing.13 Itis notoriousthatSMEsin allcountriesface funding constraints, but
alsothatsuch entitiesarea key driverofprivatesectorem ploym ent.14 Thus, there is a policy im perative to encourage funding
optionsforSMEs and craftexem ptions in securitiesregim es to
facilitatecrowdfunding.15
Id. §6.6.2.
§A4.1.
15 See id. § 2.1.2. In Decem ber of2014, t
he Com m onwealth ofAustralia
released itsFinancialSystem Inquiry:FinalReport. TheFinalReportstated
thatfunding forSMEs was essentialto facilitate productivity growth in the
Australian econom y. See generally DEP
T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL SYSTEM
INQUIRY:FINAL REPORT (2014)(Austl.), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final
_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf [https://perm a.cc/S8P8-MWV3]. Recom m endation 18 approved a graduated regim e for fund raising to facilitate
crowdfunding. Id. at 14392. The recom m endation was m et with approval
from theindustry. See Jam esEyers, Change laws to make crowdfunding easier,
AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 8, 2014, at 6;Nassim Khadem , Crowdfunding in
Australia goes under public microscope, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 9,
2014, at23;Richard Gluyas, Review falls short for P2P lenders, AUSTRALIAN,
Dec. 9, 2014. A discussion paperon crowdfunding wasprom ulgated in Decem berof2014;see DEP
T OF TREASURY, CROWD-SOURCED EQUITY FUNDING (
2014)
(Austl.), http://
www.treasury.gov.au/~/m edia/Treasury/
Consultations%20and%20
Reviews/Consultations/2014/Crowd%20Sourced%20Equity%20Funding/
Down
loads/PDF /CSEF%20Discussion%20Paper.ashx [https://perm a.cc/9YBF-D8TP].
The Australian federalgovernm ent
s 20152016 budgetintroduced an AU$5.5
billion GrowingJobsandSm allBusinesspackage, which includedaprovision for
crowdfunding. Thesem easureswerefurtherelaborated in DEP
T OF TREASURY,
FACILITATING CROWD-SOURCED EQUITY FUNDING AND REDUCING COMPLIANCE
COSTS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES (
2015) (Austl.), http://www.treasury.gov.au/~
/
m edia/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2015/Crowd
-sourced%20equity%20funding/Key%20Docum ents/PDF/Crowd-sourced-equity
-funding.ashx [https:/
/perm a.cc/
5CN9-9N2E]. The policy rationale behind these
initiatives was clear:to increase fundraising opportunities for SMEs and increaseem ploym ent. Sim ilarconcernsprom ptedtheintroductionofan ECF regim e
in Malaysia. The Malaysian Securities Com m ission (SC)and the Malaysian
BusinessAngelsNetwork (MBAN)sponsored theSynergy and Crowdfunding
Forum on Septem ber14, 2014. TheSC issued a publicconsultation docum ent
on Crowdfunding. See SEC. COMM
N MALAY., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR EQUITY CROWDFUNDING PUBLIC CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 2/
2014
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.sc.com .m y/wp-content/uploads/eng/htm l/consulta
tion/140821_PublicConsultation_2.pdf [https://perm a.cc/FFB3-5T9B]. In February of2015, the Securities Com m ission Malay released new guidelines to
13

14 Id.
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Part I ofthis Article exam ines definitions ofcrowdfunding
and P2PL and provides an historicalbackground. We look at
portals that m atch crowdfunding investors and investees and
offerinsightsintocrowdfundingpracticesin variouspartsofthe
world including developing countries. We explore a variety of
crowdfunding m odels including donation-based, reward-based,
lending, and equitycrowdfunding.
Parts II and III considerthe SME financing problem in the
contextoftheGFC, which im posed lending constraintson traditionalprovidersoffinance. Wereview thelowerend ofthefundraising spectrum  including venture capital, angelinvesting, and
public equity financing via lower-tier m arket segm ents at existing securities exchanges such as the Alternative Investm ent
Market(AIM)atthe London Stock Exchange. We then turn to
place crowdfunding within thatspectrum . Here, our aim is to
add tothenascentliteratureon crowdfunding and SMEsaccess
to capital. Crowdfunding isan underresearched area offinance,
despiteitspotentialtoclosetheentrepreneurialfundinggap.
PartsIV and V focuson theECF m odeladopted in New Zealand and otherjurisdictions, includingtheregulatoryfram eworks
in theEuropean Union and theUnited States. Wediscussregulatoryconvergenceand divergenceattheinternationalleveland
pointtocom m on legalissuesassociatedwith ECF andP2PL. This
leadstoaconsideration ofhow tooptim allydesign securitiesregulation carveoutsforSMEsusing crowdfunding and P2P portals.
Given thatthe ECF and P2PL are relatively new activities, the
regulatoryapproach isevolvingin thejurisdictionsunderreview in
thisArticle. We sum m arize insightsfrom ouranalysisand providerecom m endationsforfurtherreform . Theserecom m endations
m ay beutilized by policym akersin developing regulatory fram eworkstodealwith therisksandissuesraisedbyECF andP2PL.
facilitiate equity crowdfunding undersection 34 ofthe CapitalMarkets and
ServicesAct2007. On Septem ber22, 2015, am endm entsto Malaysia
ssecuritiesregulation regim ewerepassed thatenabled ECF. See CapitalMarketsand
Services(Am endm ent)Act2015 (Malay.)(CMSA)and SecuritiesCom m ission
(Am endm ent)Act2015 (Malay.)(SCMA). PursuanttotheCMSA am endm ent,
privatecom panieshosted on aregistered ECF platform aregiven asafeharbor
from provisions in the Com panies Act1965 thatprohibitprivate com panies
from offeringsharestothepublic. Asia-Pacificcrowdfundingiscovered bythe
website Crowdfund Vibe. CROWDFUND VIBE, http://crowdfundvibe.com [https://
perm a.cc/V464-ESE7].
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I. CROWDFUNDING AND P2PL:DEFINITIONS, BUSINESS MODELS,
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Definitions
The term crowdsourcinghas been defined as the practice of
obtaining needed services, ideas, orcontentby soliciting contributionsfrom a largegroup ofpeople, especially from theonline com m unity.16 Typically, crowdsourcing involves the outsourcing of
tasksto an undefined group ofpeople through an open call. By
contrast, crowdfundingenables entrepreneurs who traditionally
face financing constraints to obtain capitalfrom anyone in the
world via theInternet.17 Crowdfunding as a form ofcrowdsourcing isdesigned to facilitate raising capital.18 Thekeydifference
between crowdsourcing and crowdfunding isthatin crowdsourcing, thecrowd provideslabor. Underthecrowdfunding m odel, the
crowd provides funds.19 Related term s are crowd intelligence
(knowledgeofthecrowd), crowd production(creation ofthecrowd),
and crowd evaluation(thoughtsofthecrowd).20
According to IOSCO, crowdfunding is an um brella term describingtheuseofsm allam ountsofm oney, obtained from a large
num berofindividualsororganizations, tofundaproject, abusiness
orpersonalloan, and otherneeds through an online web-based
platform .21 The advantage ofraising funds online is that the
16
Crowdsourcing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.m er
riam -webster.com /dictionary/crowd-sourcing [https://perm a.cc/QB8A-MTPH].
See generally JeffHowe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED MAGAZINE, June
2006, at 14, http:/
/archive.wired.com /wired/archive/14.06/crowds.htm l, [https:
//
perm a.cc/TLV3-E6WP](The identification and nam ing ofthe phenom enon of
crowdsourcingisgenerallyattributed tothissem inalarticle).
17 St
even Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012).
18 Wi
kipedia itselfisan exam ple ofcrowdsourcing. See Tony Weim er, Ten
examples of crowdsourcing, CALLCENTREHELPER.COM (Nov. 24, 2010), http://
www.callcentrehelper.com /ten-exam ples-of-crowdsourcing-14133.htm [https://
perm a.cc/N3ME-NKVY].
19 Sam m i
e Schweissguth, Crowdsourcing vs. Crowdfunding: Whats the
Difference, CROWDSOURCE (July 23, 2013), http://www.crowdsource.com /blog
/2013/07/crowdsourcing-vs-crowdfunding-whats-the-difference/ [https://
perm a.cc
/
J6NV-8FEE].
20 See generally JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING:WHY THE POWER OF THE
CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF THE BUSINESS 47 (2008).
21 El
eanor Kirby & Shane Worner, Crowd-funding: An Infant Industry
Growing Fast 4 (Int. Org. Sec. Com m 
n, Working Paper No. SWP3/2014,
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Internet substantially reduces transaction costs and m akes it
possible to collectsm allam ounts offunds from a large poolof
funders.22 The aggregation ofa large num berofsm allcontributions can resultin considerable am ounts ofcapital.23 Exam ples
ofcrowdfunding InternetsitesincludeMyMajorCom pany,24 Kiva,25
Kickstarter, 26 Crowdcube, 27 and IndieGoGo. 28 These sites allow
com panies and entrepreneurs to turn to a crowdofpotentialinvestorsforfinancing.29
Crowdfunding exists because of Internet technology.
Schwienbacher et al. define crowdfunding as [an] open call,
essentially through the Internet, for the provision offinancial
resources either in form ofdonation or in exchange for som e
form ofreward and/or voting rights in order to supportinitiatives for specific purposes.30 A narrower definition used in the
entrepreneurialcontextrefers to the efforts by entrepreneurial
individuals and groups cultural, social, and for-profit to fund
theirventuresbydrawingon relativelysm allcontributionsfrom
a relatively large num ber of individuals using the Internet,
withoutstandard financialinterm ediaries.31
Thethreekeycom ponentsofcrowdfundingare(1)alargenum berofinvestors;(2)the provision ofrelatively sm allam ountsof
2014), http://www.iosco.org/
research/
pdf/swp/
Crowd-funding-An-Infant-Industry
-Growing-Fast.pdf[https://perm a.cc/K4B5-K5WN].
22 Id. at22.
23 See Karen E. Wi
lson & MarcoTestoni, Improving the Role of Equity Crowdfunding in Europes Capital Markets, 9 BRUEGEL POL
Y CONTRIBUTION 2 (
2014).
24 MYMAJORCOMPANY, ht
tps:/
/www.m ym ajorcom pany.com /[https://perm a.cc
/W2MY-Q3C2].
25 K IVA, ht
tp://www.kiva.org/[https://perm a.cc/J9RJ-46PV].
26 KICKSTARTER, ht
tps:
//www.kickstarter.com /[https:/
/perm a.cc/9AQH-ULZ9].
27 CROWDCUBE, ht
tp://www.crowdcube.com /[https:
//
perm a.cc/YC73-XM3T].
28 INDIEGOGO, ht
tps://www.indiegogo.com /[https://perm a.cc/Y7UG-ZW2H].
29 See, e.g., MYMAJORCOMPANY, supra not
e 24, see also PaulBelleflam m e
et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 29(5)J. BUS. VENTURING
585, 585 (2014).
30 Bel
leflam m eetal., supra note29, at588. See ARMIN SCHWIENBACHER ET
AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 36990 (
David
Cum m ingsed., 2012). Thisdefinition buildson a definition ofcrowdsourcing
provided in Frank Kleem an etal., Un(der)paid Innovators: The Commercial
Utilization of Consumer Work Through Crowdsourcing, 4(1)SCI., TECH. &
INNOVATION STUD., 526 (2008).
31 Et
han Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Explanatory Study,
29 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 2 (2014).
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m oneyfrom each investor;and (3)theuseoftheInternet, which
is used for its convenience and ability to connect individuals
acrossthe globe.32 Forexam ple, individualsm ay seek relatively
sm allam ounts ofcapital often under $1,000 in order to fund
a one-tim e projectorevent, and the capitalm ay be provided by
fam ily orfriends.33 Alternatively, entrepreneursuse crowdfunding asa form ofseed financing in ordertofund thestartup ofa
firm .34 Thus, equity crowdfunding m ay be used as a substitute
fortraditionalform sofform alventurefinancing, wherefunders
are treated as investors who receive equity stakes or sim ilar
consideration in exchange for funding a projector product. As
stated, werefertothistypeoffunding asECF.35 Theadvantage
ofutilizingECF isthattheem ergingcom panyneednotrelyon a
substantialinvestm entfrom a sm allnum berofventurecapitalistsorangelinvestorsbutcan turn to a large num berofinvestorsforsm allcontributions, which m akesbacking new businesses
[m ore]affordable.36 In a setting like New Zealand, where there
are no m ore than one hundred angelinvestors, this can be a
significantadvantage.37 Thesam ecould besaid ofotherjurisdictionswhereprivateequityisrelativelyundeveloped.
Crowdfunding m ay also be used as a lending m odel. Here,
funderstypically offercapitalin theform ofa loan, expecting to
receiveareturn ofthecapitalinvested. Theycan alsoinveston the
basisofphilanthropicgoalssuch aswanting toprom otea certain
socialgood orobjective.38 TheBritish Peer-to-PeerFinanceAssociation provides the following definition ofpeer-to-peer finance:
Id. at1.
Id. at3.
34 Id.
35 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra not
e2.
36 Mi
chaelMurray, Want to Grow Your Business? Its Time to Get Social,
INDEP., Mar. 10, 2011, § 2, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/sm e
/want-to-grow-your-business-itrsquos-tim e-to-get-social-2238088.htm l [https://
perm a.cc/Z9AX-5CA5].
37 MINISTRY OF ECO. DEV., BASELINE REVIEW OF ANGEL INVESTMENT IN
NEW ZEALAND 47 (2007) (N.Z.), https://www.m ed.govt.nz/about-us/publica
tions/publications-by-topic/evaluation-of-governm ent-program m es/archive/
report
.pdf[https://perm a.cc/45PE-QYN6]. The em ergence ofinform ation exchanges
in New Zealand, notably theUnited Kingdom based AngelInvestm entNetwork,
m ayhavecontributed toan increasein thatnum ber.
38 Mol
lick, supra note31, at3.
32
33
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platform s thatfacilitate financialservices via direct, one-to-one
contractsbetween a singlerecipientand oneorm ultipleproviders.39 Thus, P2PL is a form ofcrowdfunding and is usually referred to as crowd lending or debt crowdfunding.40 Borrowers
seek capitaland lenders provide capitalvia websites.41 A P2PL
platform , ratherthan a bank, actsasan interm ediary between
borrowerand lender.42 Thisoften allowslenderstoobtain higher
returns. Thewebsitehandlesthecontractualrelationshipsanddisburses the funds.43 In the United Kingdom , Zopa was the first
platform toofferthiskindofservicein2005.44 RateSetterisanother
U.K. P2PL platform thatalsorecentlylaunched in theAustralian
m arket.45 Sm avaisaGerm an platform ,46 andBabyloan isaFrench
provider.47 Anotherexam ple isthe British crowdfunding platform
Buzzbnk;however, this platform prim arily focuses on donationbasedloans, with lendersreceivingonlyasym bolicpaym entback.48
TheU.S.-basedProsperiscurrentlyregardedasthem arketleader
See PEER-TO-PEER FIN. ASS
N, LAUNCH OF PEER-TO-PEER FINANCE
ASSOCIATION, http://p2pfa.info/p2pfa-launch [https://perm a.cc/T8X3-D4NL].
40 See generally Scot
t E. Hartley, Kiva.org: Crowd-Sourced Microfinance
and Cooperation in Group Lending (Harv. U. Berkm an Ctr. Internet& Soc
y,
Working Paper, 2010), http://ssrn.com /abstract=1572182 [https://perm a.cc/9B
5C-YN2M].
41 Id. at7.
42 How peer-to-peer lending works, ZOPA, ht
tp://www.zopa.com /peer-to-peer
-lending[https://perm a.cc/R7DU-7FFZ].
43 How lending works, ZOPA, ht
tp://www.zopa.com /lending/how-lending-m on
ey-works[https://perm a.cc/6275-822D].
44 Peer-to-peer lending: Banking without banks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2014,
at 6970, http://www.econom ist.com /news/finance-and-econom ics/21597932-of
fering-both-borrowers-and-lenders-better-deal-websites-put-two [https://perm a
.cc/CST6-EW6G].
45 Mi
tchellNeem s, RateSetter launches in Australia, Plans to Challenge Banks,
AUSTL. BUS. REV. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.theaustralian.com .au/business
/
financial-services/ratesetter-launches-in-australia-plans-to-challenge-banks/
story
-fn91wd6x-1227119113243 [https://perm a.cc/DH29-TCET].
46 See SMAVA, ht
tp://www.sm ava.de/[https://perm a.cc/96RH-YDTT].
47 See BABYLOAN, ht
tp:
//
www.babyloan.org/fr/[https://perm a.cc/3QLM-K8BJ].
48 See BUZZBNK , ht
tps://www.buzzbnk.org/[https://perm a.cc/G3CB-BDT5].
The site includesthe following proviso:Buzzbnk isa platform to raise social
loanswhich m eanstheprim arypurposeforbackinga ventureisthesocialor
environm entaloutcom etheyseek toachieveand anyfinancialreturnssecondary.
Id. Theloansarenotsecured. Id.
39
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in P2PL.49 Another U.S.-based P2P lending site is the Lending
Club.50 These sites gained particular popularity in the wake of
risingbank interestratesfollowingtheGFC.
Som e websites also facilitate peer-to-peer foreign exchanges
connecting individualsand corporationsonline to exchange currenciesdirectly.51 Exam plesofP2PL foreign exchangeplatform s
are CurrencyFair, launched in Ireland in 2010, and TransferWise, launched in the United Kingdom in 2011.52 A U.K. site,
Kantox, offers peer-to-peer foreign exchange hedging.53 The reward forfinancingaprojectm ayoften benonfinancialin nature,
such asbeing credited in a m ovie, havingcreativeinputintothe
design ofa product, orbeing given theopportunity tom eetwith
the creators ofthe project.54 Funders m ay also receive special
rewardsand benefitsby gaining accesstofunded productsatan
earlierdate, atabetterprice, orwith specialconditionsattached
to the product.55 We refer to this type of crowdfunding as reward crowdfunding or pre-sales crowdfunding.56 Both reward
crowdfunding and donation crowdfunding can be thoughtofas
crowd sponsoring;there is no financialreturn involved for the
backers.57 One ofthe m ain platform s offering crowd sponsoring
See How it Works, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com /welcom e/how-it
-works/[https://perm a.cc/C9QH-FEYV].
50 LENDINGCLUB, ht
tp:
//
www.lendingclub.com [https:/
/perm a.cc/L87D-D2SH].
51 See Sebast
ian C. Moenninghoff& AxelWieandt, The Future of Peerto-Peer Finance, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG
46687, at3 (2013).
52 See CURRENCYFAIR, ht
tp://www.currencyfair.com [https://perm a.cc/FEP6
-XDUU];see also TRANSFERWISE, http://www.transferwise.com [https://perm a
.cc/2T5Y-27L9].
53 How it Works, KANTOX, ht
tp://kantox.com /
en/
how-it-works-kantox [https:/
/
perm a.cc/M639-GBS7].
54 Et
han Mollick, The Danger of Crowding out the Crowd with Equity Crowdfunding, 2 U. PENN. PUB. POL
Y INITIATIVE 1 (
2014), http:
/
/
publicpolicy.wharton
.upenn.edu/
live/
files/
201-a[https://perm a.cc/UCW4-5WZ4].
55 Id.
56 See generally Et
han Mollick & Venkat Kuppuswam y, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding (U.N.C. Kenan-Flager Bus. SchoolRes.
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2376997, 2014), http://ssrn.com /abstract
=2376997 [https://perm a.cc/B5KV-8BY7].
57 Thewebsi
teBetterPlace.org isa Germ an donorpooling platform . Crowdfunding orcrowd sponsoring can beused forpoliticalpurposes. BETTERPLACE
.ORG, http:
/
/
www.betterplace.org/de/[https:
//
perm a.cc/MN9B-CVUA]. Forexam ple,
Barack Obam a collected about$750 m illion forhispresidentialcam paign in
49
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istheU.S.-based Kickstarterplatform .58 Sim ilarplatform shave
em erged in the European setting. 59 The Open Source Science
Project allows researchers to propose research projects to the
crowd and pitch forfunding online.60 Thisprojectisintended to
give researchers access to alternative funding m odels and bypasstraditionalfunding routessuch asthose thatare typically
availablethrough thegovernm ent, charity, orindustry.61
Crowd sponsoring should be distinguished from equity crowdfunding(crowd investing)and P2PL (crowd lending) som etim es
collectively referred to as financial reward crowdfunding and
the focusofthisArticle. Financialreward crowdfunding carries
higher risks than crowd sponsoring, and hence, necessitates a
specialregulatory response. Investorprotection, in particular, is
an im portantconsideration forfinancialreward crowdfunding.62
The m ain risks that contributors face in crowd investing and
crowd lending m odels are loss ofinvested capital, fraud, and
lack oftransparency with respectto charges, aswellasinterest
ratesand expected yields. Furtherm ore, thelevelofuncertaintyin
crowd investing and crowd lending isgreatercom pared toother
m odelsbecauseitisdifficulttoassessthequality oftheprojects
and theabilityoftheentrepreneurtogenerateequityvalue.
There isconsiderable interestin the potentialofcrowdfunding to im prove access to finance in developing countries.63 As a
2008. Mostofthisam ountwasraised via the Internetand cam e from sm all
donorswhocontributed $200 orless. See Tahm an Bradley, Final Fundraising
Figure: Obamas $750M, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com
/
Politics/Vote2008/story?id=6397572&page=1 [https://perm a.cc/QT4C-PFGH];see
also Jose Antonio Vargas, Obama Raised Half a Billion Online, WASH. POST
(Nov. 20, 2008), http://voices.washingtonpost.com /44/2008/11/obam a-raised-half
-a-billion-on.htm l[https://perm a.cc/3QQW-Y6FM].
58 See K ICKSTARTER, supra not
e26.
59 See EURO. CROWDFUNDING NETWORK , ht
tp://eurocrowd.org/directory-of
-m em bers/[https://perm a.cc/HX88-4QNT].
60 See OPEN SOURCE PROJECT, ht
tp://www.theopensourcescienceproject.com /
[https://perm a.cc/X7K4-8BXE].
61 Id.
62 Andy Kol
lm orgen, Crowdfunding Risks and Rewards: Is It Time to Regulate Crowdfunding in Australia, CHOICE (June 25, 2014), https://www.choice
.com .au/m oney/financial-planning-and-investing/stock-m arket-investing/articles
/
crowdfunding-risks-and-rewards[https://perm a.cc/64M3-BG57].
63 WORLD BANK , CROWDFUNDING
S POTENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD
45 (2013), http://
www.infodev.org/
infodev-files/
wb_crowdfundingreport-v12.pdf
[https://perm a.cc/B8V4-CNY6].
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result, there isno doubtthatthe rise offinancialcrowdfunding
has significantpotentialto contribute to econom ic growth and
developm ent. However, this form offinance is also associated
with various risks. 64 The various issues and risks that ECF
givesrisetoareexplored in latersectionsofthisArticle.
B. Crowdfunding Business Models
In this Section, we consider crowdfunding business m odels
adopted by existing portals. We can distinguish between these
m odels along severaldim ensions, including the form ofsecuritiesoffered tothecrowd (i.e., equity ordebtsecurities);them inim um investm ent required; the fee structures adopted; and
whether investors can investdirectly into startups or whether
theirinvestm entsarepooled viaspecialpurposevehicles.65
The typical crowdfunding m odel m ay be described as follows.66 First, a funding target the sum to be raised is set.67
Second, fundersare encouraged to donate orpledge orto m ake
advancepurchasesofitem s.68 Third, wherethetargetisreached,
the funds are released, m inus any fees payable to the crowdfunding interm ediary. 69 Where the target is not reached, the
contributionsarereturned tothefunder.70 Thism odelisthe allor-nothing m odel or the threshold pledge m odel.71 The key
feature ofthism odelisthatthe platform and the projectowner
agreeon a concretepledging period and the funding target.72 The
fundersprom iseto pay a specified am ountonly ifthesettarget
64 EURO. SECU. MKT. AUTH., POSITION PAPER:CROWDFUNDING 3 (
Apr.
2014), http://www.esm a.europa.eu/system /
files/2014-sm sg-010.pdf[https://perm a
.cc/T6NZ-NB8B].
65 LarsHornuf& Arm i
n Schwienbacher, The Emergence of Crowdinvesting
in Europe 2 (U. of Munich Dep
t of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 2014-43,
2014), http://ssrn.com /abstract=2481994[https://perm a.cc/6HDF-X5XB].
66 See J. Barret
t, Crowdfunding: Some Legal and Policy Considerations, 18
N.Z. BUS. L. QUARTERLY 296, 296 (2012).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Joachi
m Hem er, A Snapshot on Crowdfunding 1516 (FraunhoferInst.
forSy. and Innovation Res., Working PaperNo. R2/2011, 2011), http://www
.econstor.eu/handle/10419/52302 [https://perm a.cc/5EYR-DTLE].
72 Id. at15.
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thresholdisreachedwithin aspecified period. Theyprovidepledges
and thepledged am ountsaretypicallyheld in an escrow account
m anaged eitherby thecrowdfunding platform ora partnerfinancialinstitution.73 Interested funderscan view thecurrentstatus
oftheprojectand thenum berand am ountofincom ingpledges.74
Paym entsare only released from the escrow accountand transferred totheprojectownerifthefunding targetisreached.75 This
isintended toprotectthesingleinvestor, asfundsareonly payableifalargenum berofinvestorsarewillingtofund aproject.
Underacrowdlendingm odel, thethresholdprincipleisapplied
toreleaseloan pledgesfrom thecrowdoncethetargetloan am ount
isreached.76 The P2PL providerthen collectsthe repaym entinstallm ents from the debtor (the projectinitiator), and forwards
them toeach crowd lender.77
In an equity orinvestm entm odel, theplatform and theproject initiators define a tim e period and target threshold.78 This
targetis then divided into thousands ofequalslices, which are
offered asequity sharesorto crowd investorsata specified price
forexam ple, $10 pershare.79 Crowd investorsthen pledgetobuy
thesharesifthetargetthresholdisreached.80 Som eplatform s, such
as the French platform wiseed.com , m ay also create subsidiary
com paniesto hold allofthesharesin thecrowdfunded venture,
which arethen on-sold tothecrowd.81 Here, asubsidiarycom pany
actsasasingleinvestorin theproposed ventureand sellsshares
tocrowd investors.82 From theperspectiveoftheissuing firm , one
advantage ofa specialpurpose vehicle (SPV)holding shares in
an issueron behalfofinvestorsisthatinvestm entsarepooled.83
Rather than having a fragm ented share register with a large
num ber ofsm allinvestors, the crowdfunding firm can reduce
73

Id.

74 Id.

Id.
Id. at16.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 GUIDE ENTREPRENEUR, ht
tps://s3-eu-west-1.am azonaws.com /wiseed-pub
lic-fr/m ediatheque/guide_entrepreneurs.pdf[https://perm a.cc/QA73-736B].
82 Id.
83 Id.
75
76
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transaction costs by utilizing an interposed SPV between itself
and itsinvestors.84
Finally, som ecrowdfunding platform sm ay only targetm em bers ofa closed circle ofpotentialinvestors, and function in a
sim ilar vein to investm entclubs or angelinvestor groups. For
exam ple, theym ayonlytargetaccredited investors. Thism aybe
referred to as the club m odel.85 Two exam ples ofthis m odelin
the United States, CircleUp and FundersClub, are restricted to
accredited investors.86 Theaim istoreducethesizeofthecrowd
tothoseforwhom investm entsarem adeavailable.87 Thism ayalso
beachieved through theim position ofhigh investm entm inim um s,
the effectofwhich isto m ake platform sonly availableto investorswhoareabletoadheretosuch lim its.
C. Historical Background
Crowdfunding is not a new phenom enon. For instance, a
cam paign in 1884 led by the newspaper proprietor Joseph Pulitzerhelped fund the installation ofthepedestalfortheStatue
ofLiberty in New York Harbor with donations of$1 or less.88
84 Thi
sstructureisutilized bytheU.K.

equitycrowdfundingplatform Seedrs.
See SEEDRS, http:
//www.nea2fguide.co.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2013/02/FAQ-SEE
DRS.pdf[https:
/
/perm a.cc/
6M7D-8FNU]. Seedrsusesthefollowingdisclaim er:
The nom inee structure allowsusto m anage the investm entfor
you whilestillgiving you thefulleconom icinterestin thebusiness. Ifyou held the shares directly, you would have to deal
with the various obligations and hassles of being a legal
shareholder, and the start-up would have to m anage the adm inistrative com plexities ofhaving a large num ber ofshareholders. By using a nom ineestructure, you getthebenefitsof
being a shareholder financial returns as well keeping inform ed aboutthe business
s progress and the start-ups gets
the benefits ofyourinvestm entwithouteitherofyou having
tofacetheburdensofadirectshareholding.
Id.
85 Hem er, supra not
e71, at17.
86 See CIRCLEUP, ht
tps:/
/circleup.com /faq/#investors-q-can-non-accredited-in
vestors-invest[https:/
/perm a.cc/
L5UF-V696];FUNDERSCLUB, https:/
/support.fund
ersclub.com /hc/en-us/articles/204968777-How-do-I-start-investing-with-Funders
Club[https://perm a.cc/6U5X-32LT].
87 Hem er, supra not
e71, at17.
88 The Statue of Liberty and Americas Crowdfunding Pioneer, BBC
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com /news/m agazine-21932675 [https://perm a
.cc/7GQ8-FCGM].
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Pulitzer helped raise m ore than $100,000 in six m onths from
125,000 people.89
In its m odern iteration, crowdfunding can be traced back to
the m icrofinance and m icrocreditm ovem ents.90 Thus, crowdfunding hasbeen described asthefusion oftwopreexisting concepts,
nam ely crowdsourcing and m icrofinance, 91 and is generally regarded as a progression of the crowdsourcing m odel described
above.92 Theobjectiveofthem icrofinancem ovem entistoreduce
poverty am ong im poverished com m unitiesby facilitating access
to finance for individuals who cannot access traditionalbankbased financing. 93 Receiving parties dem onstrate creditworthiness to financiersordonors by aggregating individualclaim s.94
A key characteristicofm icrofinanceisthatindividualsdonating
orlending m oneycan develop a personalconnection tothebeneficiariesoftheircontributionsbecause they provide loansbased
on theprofilesofthebeneficiariesand theirgoals, asopposed to
providing funding through opaqueinterm ediariesorotherlending
channels.95 The Gram een Bank, established overthirty yearsago
toassistthepoorin thedevelopingworld, isregarded asa pioneer
in thefield ofm icrofinanceand aprecursortocrowd lending.96 A
crucial difference between crowdfunding and m icrofinance is
thatundera crowdfunding m odel, thesizeofinvestm entisscaled
Id.
See generally BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE (
2d ed. 2010);ABHIJIT BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO,
POOR ECONOMICS:A RADICAL RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL
POVERTY (reprint ed. 2012); 5 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS:
470377 (Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig eds., 2009) (Neth.);see also J.
Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1569 (1999).
91 Ri
chard Harrison, Crowdfunding and the Revitalization of the Early
Stage Risk Capital Market: Catalyst or Chimera?, 15(4)VENTURE CAP.:INT
L
J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 283, 285 (2013).
92 STEVEN DRESNER, CROWDFUNDING:A GUIDE TO RAISING CAPITAL ON THE
INTERNET 45 (2014).
93 Anand Gi
riharadas& Keith Bradsher, Microloan Pioneer and His Bank
Win Nobel Peace Prize, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nytim es.com
/2006/10/13/business/14nobelcnd.htm l?_r=0 [https://perm a.cc/42L9-BMUB];see
also Jon Westover, The Record of Microfinance: The Effectiveness/Ineffectiveness
of Microfinance as a Means of Alleviating Poverty, ELEC. J. SOC. (2008).
94 Gi
riharadas& Bradsher, supra note93.
95 See K IVA, ht
tp://www.kiva.org/lend [https://perm a.cc/FM7G-AB8U];see
also KIVA, http:
//
www.kiva.org/about/m icrofinance[https:
//perm a.cc/W9LZ-EJ4P].
96 See GREENBANK, ht
tp://www.gram een-info.org/[https://perm a.cc/55TP-H
9JA].
89
90
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down owing tom asssupportorcrowd support, whereasundera
m icrofinancem odel, theaggregateam ountsoughtisscaled down.97
Thisdoesnotprecludethecrowdfunding ofm icroloansorm icrodonation cam paigns.98
In the developed world, crowdfunding first em erged in the
m usicand film industries.99 Thisis consistentwith private sponsorship and donationshistorically favoring the artsand culture.
McFedries suggests the term crowdfunding was first used in
2006.100 MichaelSullivan coined theterm todescribehiswebsite
fundavlog.com , which prom oted videoblogs.101 In 2009, theterm
gained prom inencewith theestablishm entofthepopularcrowdfundingplatform Kickstarter.102 Theriseofwebsitessuch asFacebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn websitesgenerallyassociated with
the em ergence ofWeb 2.0 as wellas the popular paym entservicessitePayPal, enabledcrowdfundingtogaingreatervisibility.103
II. SME FINANCING AND THE GFC
A. The Financing Problem for SMEs
SMEscom prisethem ajority ofbusinessesin m ostEuropean
Union countries and are the key private sector em ploym ent
driver.104 Forexam ple, in the European Union, SMEsrepresent
99 percentofallEuropean enterprises.105 They accountfor58.6
DRESNER, supra note92, at35.
Id.
99 See Ti
m Kappel, Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording Industry: A
Model for the U.S.?, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 375 (2009).
100 Paul McFedri
es, Crowdfunding, WORDSPY (2013), http://www.word
spy.com /words/crowdfunding.as[https://perm a.cc/8H66-TX7E]; see also K EVIN
LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION:SOCIAL NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 49 (
2010).
101 Dani
ela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, SOC. MEDIA
WEEK (2011), http://socialm ediaweek.org/
blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowd
funding/[https://perm a.cc/P5BR-PJXJ].
102 Id.
103 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at11.
104 EUROSTAT, K EY FIGURES ON EUROPEAN BUSINESS, 1011 (
2011), http://ec
.europa.eu/
eurostat/docum ents/3930297/
5967534/
KS-ET-11-001-EN.PDF [https:
//perm a.cc/HUV4-TJLS];see also EUR. COMM
N, EUROPEAN COMMISSION ACTION
PLAN 1 (2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-879_fr.htm ?lo
cale=en [https://perm a.cc/7T5E-JAM5].
105 EUROSTAT, supra not
e104, at11.
97
98
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percentofthe totalgross value added (GVA)produced by privatebusinessesand providem orethan two-thirdsofallem ploym entopportunitiesin theprivatesector.106
The continued econom icrelevance ofSMEs is contingenton
theirability toobtain financeforsustainablegrowth. SME access
tofinancetendstobeacom m on issueconfrontingboth developing
and developed countries.107 Forexam ple, 97 percentofallenterprises in New Zealand have fewer than twenty em ployees and
arehenceSMEs.108 Theform erMinistryofEconom icDevelopm ent
in New Zealand notes thataccess to financing can be an issue
for startup firm s and firm s that have intellectualproperty on
accountoftheir lack ofcollateraland likely cash flow.109 Sim ilarly, a recentWorld Bank study notesthat, while SMEsm ake
up a largepartoftheem erging privatesectorin m ostcountries,
they are m ore constrained in theiraccess to capitalthan large
firm s.110 These constraints are m ore pronounced in developing
asopposed to developed countries, with SME loansconstituting
13 percentofGDP in developed countries, com pared to3 percent
in thedevelopingworld.111
The GFC downturn resulted in a deterioration offinancing
conditions. 112 The European Com m ission in its Consultation
Paperon Crowdfundingin theEU observesthatEuropean SMEs
Id.
Thorsten Beck etal., Is Small Beautiful? Financial Structure, Size and
Access to Finance 2 (World Dev., WorkingPaperNo. 5806, 2011), https://www
.researchgate.net/
publication/228202340_Is_Sm all_Beautiful_Financial_Structure
_Size_and_Access_to_Finance[https://perm a.cc/B2PY-HALS].
108 New Zealand Business Demography Statistics: At February 2014, STATISTICS N.Z. (
2014), http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/businesses/busi
ness_characteristics/BusinessDem ographyStatistics_HOTPFeb14.aspx [https://
perm a.cc/E44G-9X85].
109 MINISTRY OF ECO. DEV., supra not
e37, at9.
110 Beck etal
., supra note107, at1314.
111 Oya Pi
narArdicetal., Small and Medium Enterprises: A Cross-Country
Analysis with a New Data Set 5 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5538,
2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/[https://perm a.cc/CGX8-RBX4].
112 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE IMPACT OF
THE GLOBAL CRISIS ON SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP FINANCING AND POLICY
RESPONSES 17 (2009), http:
//www.oecd.org/cfe/sm es/43183090.pdf[https:
//
perm a
.cc/XH46-JYW4](Ger.). In the Germ an context, see MichaelBräuninger& Jörg
Hinze, Konjunkturschlaglicht: Deutschland in der Rezession, 88(12) WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 823 (
2008) (Ger.) and Mechthild Schrooten, Internationale
FinanzkriseKonsequenzen für das deutsche Finanzsystem, 88(8) WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 508 (
2008)(Ger.).
106
107
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largely depend on bank financing, butsince the financialcrisis
banks are m uch m ore restrictive in their lending.113 Forexam ple, in the United Kingdom alone, there was an estim ated gap
between thedem and and supply ofSME lending ofbetween £26
billion and £59 billion in 2012.114 Sim ilarly, in theUnited States,
oneofthem ain negativeoutcom esoftheGFC crisiswastheloss
ofbank funding for SMEs.115 According to the FederalDeposit
InsuranceCorporation, banksheld roughly$590 billion ofsm allbusiness loans in the third quarter in 2014 still 17 percent
below 2008 highs.116 This phenom enon has far-reaching effects
on econom ic developm ent and job creation because new firm s
have specialim portance in generating new jobs. In the United
States, em ergingcom paniesgeneratean averageofthreem illion
jobsin the firstyear, whereasoldercom panieslose one m illion
jobsannually.117 Theproblem iscom poundedin theUnitedStates
byaslowdown in thenum berofstartups.118
In the Eurozone, there is em piricalevidence to show that
SMEsplace increased im portance on non-bank lending and the
institutionsprovidingit, with SMEsrelyingon alternativeform s
offinancesuch asleasing contracts.119 A 2013 reportby theEuropean CentralBank suggeststhatthesm allerafirm , thelarger
the likelihood thatitsfunding application willbe declined by a
113 EUR. COMM
N, CONSULTATION PAPER: CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU
EXPLORING THE ADDED VALUE OF POTENTIAL EU ACTION 6 (2013).
114 GR. BRITAIN DEP
T FOR BUS., INNOVATION AND SKILLS, BREEDON
REPORT:BOOSTING FINANCE OPTIONS FOR BUSINESS 16 (2012), https://www
.gov.uk/governm ent/uploads/system /uploads/attachm ent_data/file/32230/12-668
-boosting-finance-options-for-business.pdf[https://perm a.cc/3V3Q-5L93].
115 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at9.
116 Lot
en & Sim on, supra note1, atB5.
117 See TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN JOB
CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION 2, 6 (2010), http:/
/
www.kauffm an.org/
~/
m edia
/kauffm an_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2010/
07/firm _form ation_im
portance_of_startups.pdf[https://perm a.cc/VWK7-ADL8].
118 See RobertLi
tan, Start-Up Slowdown, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2015), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com /articles/
am ericas/2014-12-15/start-slowdown [https:/
/per
m a.cc/LDL9-Q7NE].
119 Hel
m utKraem er-Eis& Frank Lang, The Importance of Leasing for SME
Finance (Eur. Inv. FundResearch & Mkt. Analysis, WorkingPaperNo. 2012/15,
2012), http://www.eif.org/news_centre/research/eif_wp_2012_15_The%20im por
tance%20of%20leasing%20for%20SME%20finance_August_2102.pdf [https://
perm a.cc/Z8CR-UR44].
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bank.120 The rate for rejection was 17.9 percentfor m icro enterprises, followed by13.5 percentforsm allenterprises, 5.7 percent
for m edium -sized enterprises, and 3.4 percent for large enterprises.121 There are also significantvariations between m em ber
states with respect to SMEsaccess to banking finance.122 Accordingly, itis pertinentto review SME financing and explore
alternativesourcesoffinancing. Whiletherearem anysourcesof
financing, ourfocusison SME accesstoP2PL and ECF.123
B. Sources of Finance for SMEs
1. Public Equity
Stock exchangesplay a key role in m obilizing equity capital.
However, in som e jurisdictions, where the legalprotections of
creditors are strong, a preference has arisen for bank-oriented
financing m odels.124 The introduction ofthe BaselCapitalAccords BaselII and BaselIIIand theGFC downturn, however,
have led to a tightening ofbank creditpolicies.125 BaselII triggered a fundam entalchange in banksattitudestowardsSMEs.126
The recom m endations adopted by the BaselCom m ittee require
banksto establish rating processes, which areintended to m ore
accurately assess the risks ofgranting a loan.127 Quantitative
See EUR. COMM
N, SURVEY ON THE ACCESS TO FINANCE OF ENTERPRISES
4 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/growth/access-to-finance/data-surveys/index_en
.htm [https://perm a.cc/6U6G-DT24];EUR. COMM
N, EVALUATION OF MARKET
PRACTICES AND POLICIES ON SME RATING 6 (2014)http://ec.europa.eu/enter
prise/policies/finance/index_en.htm [https://perm a.cc/6D4B-NPEQ].
121 EVALUATION OF MARKET PRACTICES AND POLICIES ON SME RATING,
supra note120, at6.
122 Id.
123 On generalsourcesoff
inance, seeAllen N. Berger& Gregory F. Udell,
A More Complete Conceptual Framework for SME Finance, 30 J. BANKING &
FIN. 2945, 294852 (2006).
124 RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., WORLD BANK, INVESTOR PROTECTION:ORIGINS,
CONSEQUENCES, REFORM 1718 (1999), http://www1.worldbank.org/finance
/assets/im ages/Fs01_web1.pdf[https://perm a.cc/N43T-P5EW].
125 Dorot
hea Schäfer, The New Basel Capital Accord and its Impact on
Small and Medium-sized Companies, 40(6)ECON. BULL. 209, 209 (2003).
126 Id.
127 See Al
exandra Schindele & Andrea Szczesny, Debt Costs of German
SMEs in the Dilemma of Basel II and the Financial Crisis (Univ. ofWuerzburg
Working Paper, 2013), http://
www.researchgate.net/
publication/281088344 _The
_im pact_of_Basel_II_on_the_debt_costs_of_Germ an_SMEs [https://perm a.cc/X9
120
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and qualitative aspects are taken into account.128 One consequence ofBaselII has been to reduce the ability ofbanks to
grantloans during econom ic downturns.129 Banks are required
to apply their ratings, which increases their risk awareness.130
Banks now dem and m ore transparency when lending and generallyareonlywillingtolendtowell-establishedcom panies.131
Asa result, SMEsfacehurdlesin satisfying therisk requirem entsofbanks, m akingitcriticalforthem toconsideralternative
sourcesoffinance, such asshadow banking132 and publicequity.133
Butwhilean IPO allowscom paniesto raise new capital, italso
triggersarangeofdisclosureobligations. New entrantsencounter
a m ultitude ofcoststhrough both the IPO processand the continuing obligationsand expensesassociated with going public.134
Thefixed natureofsom ecom pliancecostscreatesa disproportionateburden on SMEs, reducingtheattractivenessofan IPO.135 In
fact, IPOsforstartupsarerelativelyrare.136
NH-LTVB];see also Monica Bartolinietal., International Financial Reporting Standards and SMEs: The Effects on Firm Rating According to Basel II,
10(1)INT
L J. ACCT., AUDITING & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 43, 48 (
2014).
128 Bart
olinietal., supra note127, at55.
129 RYM AYADI & ANDREA RESTI, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND THE
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, CTR. FOR EUR. POL
Y STUDIES
44(2004).
130 HENDRIK HAKANES & ISABEL SCHNABEL, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR RESEARCH
ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, BANK SIZE AND RISK TAKING UNDER BASEL II 2123 (
2011),
http:/
/
www.coll.m pg.de/
pdf_dat/2005_06online.pdf[https:
/
/
perm a.cc/94UU-4XL4].
131 Crowdfunding: Many Scrappy Returns, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2011, at
36;see also AYADI & RESTI, supra note 129, at45;JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 507 (MichaelR. Reynolds, 8th ed. 2008);WORLD
BANK, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014:FINANCIAL INCLUSION
129 (2014).
132 See Shadow and Substance, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2014, at116.
133 MittelstandsMonitor 2009: Deutsche Wirtschaft in der RezessionTalfahrt
auch im Mittelstand 53, K FW BANKENGRUPPE (2009)(Ger.), ftp://ftp.zew.de
/pub/zew-docs/m im o/MittelstandsMonitor_2009.pdf.
134 Xi
aohuiGao et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48(6)J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1675, 1687 (2013).
135 Mi
chaelDam bra etal., The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence that
Disclosure Affects the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 12425. See
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 293
(Björn Espen Eckboed., 1sted. 2007).
136 Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting: Hearing
Before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong.
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Thepastdecadehaswitnessed a waveofregulatory changes
thathave increased the costs associated with going public. The
proliferation offraud cases in the wake ofthe corporate governance crisisatthe end of1990screated a shifttowardsgreater
corporate transparency and accountability.137 In particular, the
post-Enron Am erican crisis provided an im petus for increased
regulation ofIPO m arkets. 138 As a result, SMEs faced higher
entrybarriers, reducingthebenefitsofan IPO.139
In response to increased regulation, a num ber ofsecurities
exchangeshavereorganized theirm arketsegm entswith theaim
ofreducing the costs ofentry and prom oting greater access to
publicequity capital.140 A featureofthenew fram eworksisthat
initiallisting and subsequentdisclosure requirem ents progress
from thelowesttothehighestm arketsegm ent.141 Theem ergence
oflower-tierm arketsegm ents, such astheAlternativeInvestm ent
Market(AIM)atthe London Stock Exchange (LSE), Alternext
on the NYSE Euronext, access on the Munich Stock Exchange,
the Alternative Market(NZAX)and its successor(NXT)on the
New Zealand Exchange, ortheGrowth EnterpriseMarket(GEM)
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, represent a m ajor experim entin m arketdesign.142 However, thesem arketsegm entsare
13 (2011)(statem entofProfessorJohn C. Coffee, Jr., AdolfA. Berle Professor
ofLaw, Colum biaUniversityLaw School).
137 CORPORATE, PUBLIC AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:THE G8 CONTRIBUTION
68 (MicheleFratiannietal. eds., 2007). See OLIVER MARNET, BEHAVIOUR AND
RATIONALITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 175 (2008); Gregory A. Mark,
Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and Corporate Governance, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 969, 979 (1995);Edward B. Rock, Americas Shifting Fascination with
Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L. QUARTERLY 367, 37577
(1996);Roberta Rom ano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2029 (1993);MargaretO
Sullivan,
Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 153, 154(2000).
138 Sharon Hannes, Managers vs. Regulators: Post-Enron Regulation and
the Great Depression, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 279, 31819 (2013).
139 Id.
140 Val
erie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, Does the Alternative Investment
Market Nurture Firm Growth? A Comparison between Listed and Private
Companies, 4INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 953, 956 (2013).
141 Id. at955;see LONDON STOCK EXCH. PLC, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR
MAIN MARKET AND AIM COMPANIES 94(NigelPageed., 2012).
142 LauraBot
tazzi& MarcoDaRin, Europes New Stock Markets (EFA 2003
Annual Conference Paper, Innocenzo Gasparini Inst. for Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 218, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract
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rarely accessed by SMEs. Asa result, sm allentrepreneurscontinuetofacefinancingconstraints, despitetheseinnovations.
Againstthisbackground, crowdfunding offers a viable alternative forSME fundraising. Moreover, crowdfunding can precede
otherform soffinancing such asbank financing, angeland venturecapitalfinancing, and IPOs, thereby helping startupsm ove
up the funding escalator.143 In particular, crowdfunding has
thepotentialtofunction wellin the seed phaseoffinance, when a
relatively sm allam ount ofm oney m ightbe sufficient to geta
projectoffthe ground. Seed financing isparticularly im portant
in the design and developm ent phase ofthe venture financing
lifecyclewhilethebusinessisstilltakingshape.144 Thisstageprecedesthestartup phase, wherefirm sarebeginningtorealizean
idea orproductand enterintotheproductdevelopm entstage.145
Duringthisstageoffinancing, capitalisneededtodevelop an idea
orproductandthefirm isunlikelytohavem adeanycom m ercial
profityet.146 Later, oncethefirm hasdeveloped itsproducts, the
firm islikelytoenterintoan expansion-developm entstagerequiring additionalcapitalto further finance increased production,
m akenew acquisitions, andincreaseitsworkingcapital.147
2. Private Equity
Priorto the IPO stage, SMEs rely on severalheterogeneous
providersoffinance.148 Atlaw, these providersaccesscarveouts
_id=319260 [https://perm a.cc/CK5H-73BD]. See Stephanie Rousseau, London
Calling? The Experience of the Alternative Investment Market and the
Competitiveness of Canadian Stock Exchanges, 23 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 51,
53 (2007), http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=319260 [https://
perm a.cc/T8YW-J46C].
143 EUR. COMM
N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS:UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CROWDFUNDING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (
2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/[https://
perm a.cc/BS2F-VYEP].
144 Mat
eoRossi, The New Ways to Raise Capital: An Explanatory Study of
Crowdfunding, 5(2) INT
L J. FIN. RES. 8, 9 (
2014), http://www.sciedu.ca
/
journal/index.php/
ijfr/article/
viewFile/4536/2618 [https:/
/perm a.cc/
J3R7-P35J].
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 OECD, GLOBALISATION AND SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (
SMES)
117 (1997).
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orexclusionstoprospectusrequirem ents, such asthoseapplying
to sophisticated or accredited investors. 149 The private equity
m arketiscom prised ofinform alnetworksand institutions, such
as high networth individuals known as angelsand specialized
financial interm ediaries venture capitalists who provide directcapitaltoprom isingfirm s.150 Privateequityprovidescapital
to firm s thathave difficulties raising sufficientdebtfinance or
obtaining publicequity capital.151 Accordingly, theprivateequity
m arkethas the potentialto fillthe gap between self-financing
and conventionalcapitalm arketactivity by offering entrepreneurs
an attractivem idpoint.152
Privateequityoffersa num berofbenefits.153 First, in com parison to debt, private equity does notresultin fixed repaym ent
obligations. 154 Another advantage is availability at an earlier
stage than debt financing.155 This is usefulfor firm s that lack
assetscapable ofbeing used ascollateral.156 Second, the private
equity infusion of funds enhances the credibility of the firm ,
increasing its networth and overallfinancialstrength.157 This,
in turn, im provestheaccessofthefirm tootherform soffinancing, such asdebtfinancing.158
The provision ofequity finance m ay increase a firm 
schances
of survival. Private investors can lend significant m anagerial
supportand advice.159 Theprovision offinancing by a particular
investorm ay lead toa preferred relationship with otherinstitutions.160 Although the levelofinvolvem entin a venture differs
17 §C.F.R. 230.506 (2015).
DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE
EQUITY CONTRACTING:AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 314 (2014).
151 Id. at10.
152 RogerLeeds& Jul
ieSunderland, Private Equity Investing in Emerging
Markets, 15(4)J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 111, 11112 (2003).
153 SOPHIE MANIGART & MIGUEL MEULEMAN, FINANCING ENTREPRENEURIAL COMPANIES:HOW TO RAISE PRIVATE EQUITY AS A HIGH GROWTH COMPANY
71 (2004).
154 GREG N. GREGORIOU ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL IN EUROPE 314(
2007).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at316.
158 Id.
159 See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 356, 413 (
Mark Casson
etal. eds., 2006).
160 See INVESTOR ENGAGEMENT 85 (
Roderick Martin etal. eds., 2007).
149
150
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between privateinvestors, m onitoring can providetheentrepreneurwith an incentive to m axim ize the value ofthe venture.161
However, only a m inority ofSMEs are able to obtain private
equity.162 Privateequity investorsareusually attracted to rapidly
growing SMEs, such asinnovativetechnology firm swith a high
potentialforprofitsand expansion.163
3. Venture Capital
ThisSection providesan insightintothefinancialbehaviorof
venturecapitalfirm sand investigatesa num berofcom plex factors, including the relatively slow developm ent ofthe venture
capitalindustry, theselection criteria em ployed by venturecapitalfirm s, and theim portanceofdifferentexitchannels. Venture
capitalissom etim esseen asasolution tothefinancingproblem s
of SMEs. However, as the following discussion dem onstrates,
venturecapitalisonlyavailablefora m inority ofSMEs, particularly in the developing world.164 Further, entrepreneurresistance
can prove to be an im portant barrier when entrepreneurs are
unwillingtoconfercontrolrightstofinanciers.165
Theeconom icfunctionsofventurecapitalistcom paniesinclude
risk pooling, risk diversification, specialization, and syndication.166
The venturecapitalistcarriesouttwoim portantfunctions:capitalacquisition and capitalprovision.167 Priortoinvesting in businesses, the venture capitalisthasto accum ulate enough capital
Id. at11316.
See DEP
T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, FINANCING A PRIVATE SECTOR
RECOVERY 14(2010).
163 Id. See generally PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE (
2014).
164 See SHANTI DIVAKARAN, PATRICK J. MCGINNIS & MASOOD SHARIFF,
WORLD BANK, PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL IN SMES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 46 (Apr. 2014), http:/
/
ssrn.com /
abstract=2419273 [https:
/
/
perm a.cc
/
5BGD-XFFA].
165 See Ni
na Rosenbusch etal., Does Acquiring Venture Capital Pay Off for
the Funded Firms? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Venture
Capital Investment and Funded Firm Financial Performance, 28(3)J. BUS.
VENTURING 335, 33940, 348 (2013).
166 See Xuan Ti
an, The Role of Venture Capital Syndication in Value
Creation for Entrepreneurial Firms, 16(1)REV. FIN. 245, 24647 (2012).
167 PAUL GOMPERS & JOSHUA LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 3 (
2nd
ed. 2004).
161
162
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andsecurecom m itm entsfrom investors.168 Traditionally, theparticipantsin venture capitalfundsare institutionalinvestorsand
wealthy individuals.169 Exam ples ofcorporate venture program s
areGoogleVentures, DellVentures, and OracleVentures.170 Venture capitalfirm s specialize in investing in particular types of
firm s, considering the industry, technologies, geographic region,
and stage ofdevelopm entofthe firm . There are differencesbetweenindividualandcorporateventurecapitalists.171
In the pre-investm entperiod, the venture capitalisthas the
necessaryknowledgetoscreen firm s, evaluaterisksand returns,
conductdue diligence, and contractwith young growth firm s.172
Venture capitalists act as institutionalized m eeting points for
entrepreneursand potentialinvestors;173 they have the skillsto
identify profitable investm ent opportunities. In addition, venturecapitalistsbearsearch and inform ation costs, which results
in a reduction in transaction costsincurred by theoriginalsuppliersoffinance.174 Forexam ple, theuse ofstandardized contracts
Id.
See Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, 76(6)HARV. BUS. REV. 131
(1998), https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works [https://perm a.cc
/W5LE-X96B];Ram iRahal, Will Corporate Venture Capital Disrupt the Traditional Investment Ecosystem? (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com
/article/240904 [https://perm a.cc/VP2N-FM5L];TEREZA TYKVOVA & UWE WALZ,
CTR. FOR EUR. ECON. RESEARCH, ARE IPOS OF DIFFERENT VCS DIFFERENT?7
10 (Apr. 2004), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0432.pdf[https://perm a.cc
/48T3-KTXP].
170 Id. at1214. See Sandi
p Basu, Corey Phelps& Suresh Kotha, Towards
Understanding Who Makes Corporate Venture Capital Investments and Why,
26(2)J. BUS. VENTURING 153 (2011);see also David Benson & Rosem arie H.
Ziedonis, Corporate Venture Capital as a Window on New Technologies, 20(2)
ORG. SCI. 329 (2009).
171 See Luc Arm elG. Da Gbadj
i, BenoitGailly & Arm in Schwienbacher,
International Analysis of Venture Capital Programs of Large Corporations
and Financial, 39(5)ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRACTICE 1213 (2014),
foradiscussion on corporateventurecapitalists(detailingthedevelopm entof
thecorporateventurecapitalbusinessm odel).
172 E.g. Annal
ise Croce, José Martí& Sam uele Murtinu, The Impact of
Venture Capital on the Productivity Growth of European Entrepreneurial
Firms: Screening or Value Added Effect?, 28(4) J. BUS. VENTURING 489,
49091 (2013).
173 See Bernard S. Bl
ack & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the
Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47(3) J. FIN.
ECON. 243, 245, 24851 (1998).
174 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra not
e167, at157, 160, 241.
168
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reducesnegotiation costs.175 Consequently, venturecapitalistshave
a levelofexpertise thatjustifies theirinvolvem entas financial
interm ediaries. In the post-investm entperiod, the active participation ofventurecapitalistsin them onitoring ofthefirm leads
tom itigation ofagencycosts.176 Theventurecapitalistm aybein
a better position than the originalsuppliers offinance to deal
with m arket im perfections and reduce agency costs resulting
from theopportunisticbehaviorofentrepreneurialowners.177
Agency theory has been applied to venture capital investm ents, even though such investm ents occur in private com panies.178 Itisworth notingthattheventurecapitalfirm itselfacts
as an agenton behalfofthe originalproviders ofcapital.179 In
fact, theventurecapitalfirm fulfillsa dualrole:itactsasboth a
principaland an agent.180 The venture capitalist assum es the
role ofthe originalsupplieroffinance in providing finance and
m onitoring the firm .181 The objectiveofthe originalprovidersof
capitalis to m axim ize the value oftheir investm ent. High returns, stability through diversification, and liquidity arekey concernsfortheinvestors.

See K EVIN MCNALLY, CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL:BRIDGING THE
EQUITY GAP IN THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR 200 (David Storyed. 1997).
176 See Vi
olettaGerasym enko& Jonathan D. Arthurs, New Insights into Venture Capitalists Activity: IPO and Time-to-Exit Forecast as Antecedents of their
Post-Investment Involvement, 29(3)J. BUS. VENTURING 405, 408, 419 (2014).
177 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra not
e 167, at171;see also FREDERIC S.
MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS:
INTERNATIONAL EDITION 194 (8th ed. 2008). Cash-efficientstartupsm ay need
less m onitoring by venture capitalists. Darian M. Ibrahim , Should AngelBacked Startups Reject Venture Capital?, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE
CAP. L. 251, 252, 26162 (2013).
178 John Cal
lahan & Steven Muegge, Venture Capitals Role in Innovation,
in INT
L HANDBOOK ON INNOVATION 641, 654 (
Larisa V. Shavinina ed. 2003);
see MichaelKlausner& KateLitvak, What Economists Have Taught us About
Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING
GAP 54, 5657 (MichaelJ. Whincop ed., 2001).
179 See PIERRE-YVES MATHONET & THOMAS MEYER, J-CURVE EXPOSURE:
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
25456 (2007).
180 Id.
181 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra not
e167, at3.
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There are inter-country differences concerning the size and
effectivenessofthe venture capitalm arket.182 Theventurecapitalm arketisa vibrantsource ofdirectcapitalforSMEsin the
UnitedStates, butthiscannotbesaidofallcountries.183 Thelevels
ofventure capitalfinancing are higher in developed countries
due to the presence ofestablished public capitalm arkets and
institutionalinvestors.184 Lookingatthedifferencesbetween the
European Union and the United States, itisclearthattheU.S.
venture capitalindustry is m ore developed. For instance, the
average European venture capitalfund is sm all, containing on
average approxim ately 60 m illion vis-à-vis 130 m illion in the
United States, which issm allerthan theoptim alsizenecessary
form aking a substantialcontribution to individualcom panies.185
Moreover, U.S. venture capitalfunds invest around 4 m illion
on average in a com pany com pared to 2 m illion invested by
theirEuropean counterparts.186 Early-stage capitalinvestm ents
in the United States are, on average, 2.2 m illion per com pany,
while such investm ents am ount to an average of400,000 per
com panyin theEuropean setting.187
See Garry D. Bruton, Vance H. Fried & Sophie Manigart, Institutional
Influences on the Worldwide Expansion of Venture Capital, 29(6) ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRACTICE 737 (
2005);see also Yong Li& Shaker A.
Zahra, Formal Institutions, Culture, and Venture Capital Activity: A CrossCountry Analysis, 27(1)J. BUS. VENTURING 95 (2012).
183 See Ronal
d J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 106869 (2003);Paul
A. Gom pers& Joshua Lerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15(2)J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 145, 145, 163 (2001);Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works,
76(6)HARV. BUS. REV. 131, 132 (1998).
184 See generally Pekka St
enholm , Zoltan J. Acs & Robert Wuebker,
Exploring Country Level Institutional Arrangements on the Rate and Type of
Entrepreneurial Activity, 28(1)J. BUS. VENTURING 176 (2013).
185 See Press Rel
ease, European Com m ission, New EU fundraising rules:
boosting venture capitalforSMEsand easing accessto credit(Dec. 7, 2011),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1513_en.htm ?locale=en#footnote-1
[https://perm a.cc/ULB8-RL8A];see also JOSH LERNER ET AL., NESTA, ATLANTIC
DRIFT:VENTURE CAPITAL PERFORMANCE IN THE UK AND THE US 14(June2011),
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/atlantic_drift.pdf [https://perm a.cc
/6TCN-8A4S].
186 Id.
187 Kri
stiina Raade & Catarina Dantas Machado, Recent Developments in
the European Private Equity Markets, EUR. COMM
N 26 (
Apr. 2008), http://ec
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Generally, onlyafraction offirm sthatsubm itbusinessplans
to venture capitalorganizationsare successful.188 Withouta good
risk-return ratio, a com pany isunlikely tobedeem ed an attractiveinvestm ent. Venturecapitalistsoften prefertom akeasm all
num ber oflarge investm ents instead ofspreading their investm ents overa large num berofsm allerbusinesses.189 Itis costly
fortheventurecapitalfund m anagertom onitora largenum ber
offirm sin theportfolio. Further, privateinvestorsin venturecapitalist funds m ay favor later-stage deals.190 Early-stage investm ents are considered to be higher risk. 191 Such investm ents
require a long-term strategy.192 The selection ofprofitablelaterstageinvestm entsenablestheventurecapitalisttobuild a reputation withouthavingtowaitfortheinvestm enttom aterialize.
After closing the fund, the venture capitalist collects inform ation about potentialinvestm ents and prom otes the fund.193
Theventurecapitalistthen screenscom paniesand conductsdue
diligence to determ ine the strengths, weaknesses, profitability,
and risksassociated with particularventures.194 Venturecapital
firm susea num berofselection criteria todecideon thesuitability ofpotentialapplicantfirm s.195 The selection process usually
.europa.eu/
econom y_finance/
publications/
publication12419_en.pdf[https:
//
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.cc/Y7GH-X7XZ].
188 See generally PaulA. Gom pers& Joshua Lerner, The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth, 2(43)UBIQUITY 1 (2002);Arm in
Schwienbacher, Financing the Business, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 193, 195 (Ted Baker& FriederikeWeltereds., 2015).
189 MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING:
MATCHING START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES 25 (2000).
190 GREG N. GREGORIU ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL IN EUROPE 29 (
1st ed.
2007);see also DouglasCum m ing, Public Economics Gone Wild: Lessons from
Venture Capital, 36 INT
L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 259 (
2014).
191 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra not
e167, at145.
192 Id.
193 Id. at39798.
194 See SuzannedeTrevi
lle, JeffreyS. Petty& Stefan Wager, Economies of
Extremes: Lessons from Venture Capital Decision Making, 32 J. OPERATIONS
MGMT. 387, 390 (2014).
195 Id. at389. See Thom asHel
lm ann, Entrepreneurship and the Process of
Obtaining Resources, 16(1)J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 81, 8182 (2007);see
also Dan K. Hsu etal., What Matters, Matters Differently: A Cojoint Analysis
of the Decision Policies of Angel and Venture Capital Investors, 16(1)
VENTURE CAPITAL:INT
L ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 1 (
2014).
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consists of an assessm ent of the abilities ofthe m anagem ent
team .196 The talents, experience, and skills ofthe m anagem ent
are considered a key determ ining factor in selection.197 Second,
the venture capitalfirm willconsiderthe potentialm arketsize
ofthe productorservice offered by the firm , itsoriginality, and
its m arketability.198 The selected firm needs to fitinto the generalinvestm entstrategy ofthe venture capitalist. Anotherprecondition often im posed isthattheapplicanthasobtained oneor
severalroundsofangelfinancing.199 Theobjectiveistoselectan
enterprise with a good risk-return and provide it with capital
andm anagem entsupportbeforesellingitatahigherprice.200
Oncesuitableinvestm entopportunitiesareidentified, theventure capitalist seeks to reach an agreem ent with the investee
businessaboutthedeal.201 Ifboth partiesagree, theventurecapitalfirm willbegin disbursing funds to the firm .202 In the postinvestm ent period, the venture capitalist m onitors the firm to
ensuretheproperuseoffunds.203 Attheend ofthefund lifecycle,
venture capitalists seek to exit by selling their stake to third
partiesviaatradesale, an IPO, orasecondarytransaction.204
4. Business Angels
Venture capitalistsand businessangelsplay sim ilarrolesand
m aysom etim esco-invest.205 In essence, angelsareprivateinform al
See Hsu etal., supra note 195, at23.
Id.
198 Id. at8, 14, 20.
199 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra not
e167, at183.
200 See Thom as F. Hel
lm ann & Veikko Thiele, Friends or Foes? The
Interrelationship between Angel and Venture Capital Markets, NAT
L BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH 2 (
May 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20147.pdf
[https://perm a.cc/AB4F-S4S8].
201 Tyzoon T. Tyebj
ee & AlbertV. Bruno, A Model of Venture Capitalist
Investment Activity, 30(9)MGMT. SCI. 1051, 1053 (1984).
202 See Hsu etal
., supra note195.
203 See Um i
t Ozm el, David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Strategic
Alliances, Venture Capital, and Exit Decisions in Early Stage High-Tech
Firms, 107(3)J. FIN. ECON. 655, 658 (2013).
204 See Dougl
asCum m ing, GrantFlem ing & Arm in Schwienbacher, Legality
and Venture Capital Exits, 12(2)J. CORP. FIN. 214, 216 (2006);GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note167, at397.
205 ANNAREETTA LUMME ET AL., INFORMAL VENTURE CAPITAL:INVESTORS,
INVESTMENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN FINLAND 54 (1998);see also Christophe
196
197
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venture capitalists. The angel finance m arket is a non-interm ediated m arketwhich consistsofa diversepoolofinvestors.206
Businessangelsareprivateindividualswhousetheirown m oney
to investin an unlisted com pany in which they have no fam ily
connections. 207 Obtaining inform ation about transactions between entrepreneurs and business angels is often difficult becausesuch transactionsoccurin an inform al, unregulated m arket.
The m arketplace for angel finance is characterized by inform ationalopacity208 and operatesin obscurity.209 Finding business
angels can be difficult, as they keep a low profile and preferto
rem ain anonym ous; however, business angel networks have
em erged to allow entrepreneurs to connectwith angels.210 Such
networksm ay be com pared to crowdfunding portalsthatm atch
entrepreneurswith crowd investors.
Intheliterature, distinctionsarem adebetween typesofangels,
includingbusinessand knowledgeangels.211 Ourfocusisonlyon
businessangels. Theprovision offinance to unlisted young and
high-growth firm sisoneinvestm entoption.212 Businessangelscan
be selectiveand m ay choose to investin young growth firm sfor
diversification purposes.213 Given this, SMEs wishing to obtain
angelfinancing need todem onstratethequality oftheirventure.
Bonnet& PeterWirtz, Raising Capital for Rapid Growth in Young Technology Ventures: When Business Angels and Venture Capitalists Coinvest, 14(23)
VENTURE CAPITAL:INT
L J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 91, 92 (
2012).
206 See Al
len N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small
Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22(68)J. BANKING & FIN. 613, 630 (1998).
207 Col
in M. Mason & Richard T. Harrison, Business Angel Networks and
the Development of the Informal Venture Capital Market in the U.K., 9(2)
SMALL BUS. ECON. 111, 112 (1997).
208 St
uartPaul& GeoffWhittam , Manna from Heaven? The Entrepreneurs
Experience of Angel Funding, in ADVANCES IN INTERDISCIPLINARY EUROPEAN
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 321, 321 (MichaelDowlingetal., 2005).
209 St
ephen Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments,
22(68)J. BANKING & FIN. 785, 785 (1998).
210 Mason & Harri
son, supra note207, at111.
211 See Em m anuelMul
leretal., Knowledge Angels: fostering innovation in
knowledge-intensive business services through creative individualsObservations from Canada, China, France, Germany and Spain 25 (2013), http://
www.jaheraud.eu/docrech/cccc/Knowledge_Angels_EM_AZ_JAH_2013.pdf[https:
/
/perm a.cc/W9G3-WZT3].
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Andrew L. Maxwel
letal., Business angel early stage decision
making, 26(2)J. BUS. VENTURING 212 (2011).
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Business angels often view them selves as being constrained by
the lack ofprom ising entrepreneursand investm entprojects.214
Consequently, they donotneed toallocatea significantpercentageoftheircapitaltotheirprivateequityportfolio.215
Businessangelsfrequently base theirinvestm entdecisionson
idiosyncratic considerations and m ay investatan earlier stage
than venture capitalists.216 Investing close to hom e m ay be im portant. The investor
s stage oflife m ay also have an im pacton
thedecision and theirwillingnesstoprovidefinancetoearly-stage
or later-stage firm s. Investors have differentdegrees ofexperiencein theinvestm entcycleand arelikely toselecta stagethat
allowsthem toapplytheirstrengths.217 Higher-risk investm ents
m ayrequirealonger-term horizon forrealizingreturns.218 While
certain investorswillacceptlonger, otherswillnotwanttowait
severalyearsforgains.219
The individual considerations of business angels m ay not
m atchtheneedsoftheventureortheobjectivesoftheentrepreneur.
Businessangelsm ayrejectinvestm entopportunitiesbecausethey
are unfam iliarwith the underlying technology. Alternatively, if
they have reason to believe the entrepreneurhasoverestim ated
thevalueoftheventureanditsgrowth prospects, theym ayrefuse
toprovidefinancing. Businessangels, however, m ay bem otivated
by noneconom icconsiderationswhen providing fundstounquoted
firm s.220 They m ay be willing to m ake a tradeoffbetween financialand nonfinancialreturns.221 Exam plesofrelevantnoneconom ic
m otivationsincludetheexcitem entofbeing involved in thedevelopm entofa new business, job creation, assisting m inority entrepreneurs, orfundingparticularhigh-technologyprojects.222
214 See, e.g., Col
in M. Mason & Richard T. Harrison, Why Business Angels
Say No: A Case Study of Opportunities Rejected by an Informal Investor
Syndicate, 14(2)INT. SMALL BUS. J. 35, 37 (1996).
215 Id. at36.
216 See, e.g., id. at36;see also Dari
an M. Ibrahim , The (Not So) Puzzling
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (2008).
217 See, e.g., Mason & Harri
son, supra note214, at36.
218 See Ibrahi
m , supra 216, at1410.
219 See, e.g., id. at1408.
220 See Col
in M. Mason & Richard T. Harrison, Is it worth it? The rates of
return from informal venture capital investments, 17(3)J. BUS. VENTURING
211, 220 (2002).
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., id.;see also Mason & Harri
son, supra note214, at36.
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An advantage ofangelfinancing isthatitcan fillthe sm all
equity gap. The absence ofinterestcosts and fixed repaym ent
obligationsisattractiveforyoungstartupfirm s. Obtainingangel
financing is im portantform any firm s, as itcan lead to second
round venture capitalfinancing.223 However, despite the valueadding advantages for SMEs, the angelfinance m arket is not
efficient. Thisisduetoitsfragm ented nature, itsrelianceon ineffectivecom m unication channels, and theanonym ityofangels.224
In thepreviousSection, wecom paredseveralfinancingoptions,
including internalfinance, debt capital, and equity finance. 225
The analysis revealed that different groups of financiers are
likely to have heterogeneous incentive structures.226 The extent
to which financiersengage in m onitoring when providing finance
varies between different groups of financiers. 227 For exam ple,
venture capitalfirm s prefer to be involved in m anagem ent.228
Although bank financinghashistoricallybeen predom inant, recent
trends cast doubt on its continued availability. 229 Recent econom icdownturns, theconsolidation ofthebankingindustry, and
the erosion ofrelationship banking lim itthe poolofcredit.230 In
light ofthe lim ited availability ofdebt finance, entrepreneurs
need tolook toward expanding theirequity basethrough alternatives. Itisin thisclim ateoflim ited accesstocapitalthatcrowdfunding and P2PL create new m eansoffund raising forSMEs.
However, therearecrucialdifferencesbetween venturecapitalists,
business angels, institutionalinvestors, and crowd investors.231
Thesedifferencesareexplored in thesection below.
5. Differences Between Venture Capitalists, Angels, and
Crowd Investors
In thisSection, wedraw attention tothedifferencesbetween
publicfundraisingviaECF andP2PL platform sandprivateequity
channelssuch asventurecapitaland angelfinancing.
See, e.g., Ibrahim , supra note216, at1418.
e.g., Mason & Harrison, supra note220, at217.
225 See supra PartII.B.
226 See id.
227 See Wi
lson & Testoni, supra note23, at4.
228 See id. at6.
229 See, e.g., id. at4.
230 See, e.g., id.
231 See infra PartII.B.5.
223

224 See,
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Crowdfundingprim arilyrelieson standardized contractsprovided by thecrowdfunding interm ediaries, whereasprivate contracting tends to be the norm in angelinvesting and venture
capitalinvesting.232 Private contracting allows venture capitalistsand angelinvestorstoenterintotailor-m adecontractswith
entrepreneurs that can include various clauses, such as antidilution provisions, convertible preference shares, m onitoring
rights, and board representation to ensure control.233 Moreover,
businessangelsrefrain from buying com m on shareswithoutvoting rights, which tendsto be com m on in crowdfunding.234 Thus,
som e fundam entalprotections available to business angels and
venture capitalists ex ante through tailor-m ade contracts m ay
be m issing in the typical crowdfunding scenario. 235 Instead,
crowdfunding platform s often offer standardized financialcontracts to the issuer.236 These boilerplate contracts contain lim ited covenants to protectcrowd investors, butnotto the sam e
levelofex ante protectionsthatentrepreneurswould com m itto
with eitherbusinessangelsorventurecapitalists.237
Angelinvestors and venture capitalists function as sophisticated privatepartieswhocan utilizeshareholderagreem entsand
othergovernance structuresthataregenerally unavailableto the
crowd, and thusarem oreabletoeffectively constrain self-dealing
and otherentrepreneurialactionsdesigned tom axim izetheentrepreneursprivate benefits ofcontrol.238 This, in turn, can result
in efficiency gains and a reduction of agency costs as firm s
which would otherwise be unregulated com m itto greaterm onitoring and bettergovernance rules ex ante. In contrast, crowd
investorsdonotparticipateon theboardsofcrowdfunded firm s,
Lars Hornuf& Arm in Schwienbacher, CrowdinvestingAngel Investing
for the Masses?, 1, 6, 8 (3 Handbook ofRes. on VentureCapital, Working Paper,
2014), http://ssrn.com /abstract=2401515 [https://perm a.cc/4SL5-QG8K].
233 Id. at8.
234 Id. at9.
235 See, e.g., id. at9;see also Zachar
y Griffin, Note, Crowdfunding: Fleecing
the American Masses, 4J.L. Tech. & Internet375, 394(2013).
236 SeeHornuf& Schwi
enbacher, supra note232, at9.
237 See LarsHornuf& Arm i
n Schwienbacher, Should SecuritiesRegulation
Prom ote Crowdinvesting?1, 15, 32 (2015)(unpublished m anuscript)http://ssrn
.com /abstract=2412124[https://perm a.cc/JA3N-8ESS].
238 Luci
an A. Bebchuk, A Rent Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership
and Control (Nat
lBureau ofEcon. Research, Working PaperNo. 7203, 1999),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203 [https://perm a.cc/AM39-DKSM].
232
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and owing to sm allequity stakes, they m ay lack the necessary
incentivestoparticipatein them onitoring oftheinternalgovernanceofthe investee firm s.239 Moreover, unlike businessangels
orventure capitalists, crowd investorsare notexpertsin developing and valuing firm s.240 They do nothave the sam e levelof
expertise and knowledge aboutfirm s, and their individualequity
investm entsaregenerallym uch sm allerthan thoseofangelinvestorsorventure capitalists.241 Thisled Hornufand Schwienbacher
toconcludethatcrowd investorsarelikelytoofferlessvalue-add
than businessangelsorventurecapitalists.242
Nevertheless, wherecrowd investorsparticipatein ECF, there
isevidencetosuggestthattheycan beefficientin channelingfunds
to appropriate fund seekers and participating in productdevelopm ent, thereby creating value for the firm . 243 In fact, crowd
investorsoften becom e thefuture usersofa productonceithas
been realized and have an incentive to dissem inate inform ation
abouttheproduct.244 Theym ayactasboth patronsoftheproject
andcustom ersatthesam etim e.245 Accordingly, entrepreneurscan
benefitfrom crowdfunding in a num ber ofways:they notonly
receive funds for seed financing or early startup financing, but
they also benefitfrom word ofm outh by theirinvestorsand potentialcustom ersthrough socialm edia.246 Furtherm ore, som efirm s,
especially sm allerfirm s, m ay notfind iteconom ically worthwhile
to seek venture capitalorangelfinancing due to the costsassociatedwith usingthisform ofcapitalandtheexantecom m itm ents
required ofthem byventurecapitalistsorangelinvestors.247
Theadvantagesofusing crowdfunding extend beyond providing access to financing to m arketvalidation ofthe firm sproducts
Wilson & Testoni, supra note23, at8.
See id. at6.
241 See, e.g., id. at2.
242 Hornuf& Schwi
enbacher, supra note65, at25.
243 F. Kl
eem an etal., Un(der)paid Innovators: The Commercial Utilization
of Consumer Work through Crowdsourcing, 4(1)SCI., TECH., AND INNOVATION
STUD. 5, 1819 (2008).
244 See, e.g., Rossi
, supra note144, at12.
245 See, e.g., id.
246 Rossi
, supra note144, at15;see also P. Belleflam m e& T. Lam bert, Crowdfunding: Some Empirical Findings and Microeconomic Underpinnings (Lourvain
Sch. ofMgm t. Research Inst., Working PaperNo. 2014/04, 2014), http://ssrn
.com /abstract=2437786 [https://perm a.cc/7NGK-FJD6].
247 See Rossi
, supra note144, at10.
239
240
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orservices, brainstorm ing, m arkettestingin theform ofcom m ents,
feedback andideasfrom thecrowd, anddevelopingapotentialpool
ofloyalclients early in the startup process.248 Being able to presell products or services assists the firm in evaluating users
reactionsand allowsforfurtherfine-tuning orcustom izing ofits
products or ideas. The firm can involve the investor and consum ercom m unity in problem solving and ensurethatitobtains
am plefeedback beforesinkingitsresourcesintoproduction. Moreover, m arkettestingoccursatlittleornocosttotheentrepreneur.
In addition, asshown in theprevioussection, venturecapitalists
m ayfocuson certain investm ents, such ashigh-risk, high-return
investm entsin technology-based com paniesonly.249 Bycom parison,
crowdinvestorsm ayhaveam uchbroaderinvestm entspectrum .250
In thelongrun, crowdfundingplatform scan help entrepreneurs
benefitfrom theso-called big dataparadigm .251 Byanalyzingdata
trailsleftonlineby investorsand entrepreneursusing ECF and
P2PL, crowdfunding platform s m ay be able to better m atch investorsand com paniesandthusfacilitateinvestm entdeals.252 The
SEC hasstated thatitbelievesthatitisim portantforfunding
portalstobe subjectto a recordkeeping requirem entin orderto
create a m eaningful audit trail of crowdfunding transactions
and com m unications.253
Finally, a solution fortheperceived lack ofex ante investorprotectionsin theECF contextm aybeallowingcrowd investorstocoinvestwith businessangels an approach thathasbeen adopted by
som eplatform ssuch asMyMicroInvestin Belgium .254 Thatsolution
allowscrowdinvestorstoinvestalongsideprofessionalinvestors,
and thereby benefit from the financial contracting and postinvestm entm onitoringskillsofsuch investors.255 Theadvantage
ofsuch an approach is thatitfacilitates collaboration between
See id. at12.
See supra PartII.B.3.
250 Wi
lson & Testoni, supra note23, at5.
251 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 14, 63, 93 (
Josh Lerner&
ScottStern eds., 2014).
252 Id.;see also Wi
lson & Testoni, supra note23, at7.
253 Pr
oposed Crowdfunding RulesunderTitleIII ofthe JOBS Act, Securites
ActReleaseNo. 33-9470;ExchangeActReleaseNo. 34-70741, FileNo. S7-09-13,
at261 (Oct. 2013)[hereinafterProposed CrowdfundingRules].
254 See MICROINVEST, ht
tps:
//www.m ym icroinvest.com /en/faq [https:/
/perm a
.cc/CN3B-M7TR].
255 Wi
lson & Testoni, supra note23, at9.
248
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professionalinvestors and retailinvestors. Moreover, angelinvestorscan acttom aintain variousshort-term and long-term investorprotectionsforthecrowd investorand thereby betteralign the
interestsoftheentrepreneurswith thoseoftheinvestors.256
III. THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfundingisanew fundingm odelin anum berofcountries.
Onestudy reported 240 crowdfunding platform sglobally in 2011
and this num ber is growing rapidly. 257 According to the 2013
Crowdfunding Industry Report, crowdfunding raised $2.7 m illion
globally in 2012, an increase of81 percentcom pared to 2011.258
Thisfigureaccountsforalltypesofcrowdfunding, including donation-based, lending-based, reward-based, andequity-based crowdfunding.259 North Am erica and European platform s accountfor
approxim ately95 percentofthetotalm arket, raisingm orecapital
than anywhereelsein theworld.260 In 2011, theNorth Am erican
crowdfundingm arketgrew by 86 percent, followed by105 percent
in 2012 reaching an am ount in excess of$1.6 billion.261 European platform s raised $9.45 m illion an increase of65 percent
in 2012 com paredto2011.262 Thefinancinggap islargestin South
Am erica and Africa, where$800,000 and $65,000 wasraised respectively.263 Theaggregate2012 fundingvolum ein Asiawas$33
m illion;in Oceania, $76 m illion.264 TheUnited States, therefore,

DanielIsenberg, The Road to Crowdfunding Hell, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 23,
2012, https://hbr.org/2012/04/the-road-to-crowdfunding-hell/[https://perm a.cc
/524F-CWK6].
257 Hem er, supra not
e71, at19.
258 MASSOLUTION, THE 2013 CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT 7, at8 (
2013),
http://www.com prom isoem presarial.com /
wp-content/uploads/137356857-Massolu
tion-2013CF-Excerpt-Revised-04182.pdf[https://perm a.cc/F5ND-4MQ6]. In late
2015, the crowdfunding industry wasvalued at$16.2 billion worldwide. See
Crowdfunding takes root in Asia in boon to entrepreneurs, GULF TIMES, Nov. 18,
2015, atBusiness2.
259 MASSOLUTION, supra not
e258, at9.
260 See, e.g., id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at23.
264 Id.
256
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leadsthefield in crowdfunding.265 Donation-based crowdfunding
represents the highest volum e ofcrowdfunding, while equitybased crowdfunding isused toa lesserextentm ainly becauseof
theabsenceofcrowdfundinglegislation.266
The m ajority ofcrowdfunding projectapplicationswere subm itted to the established platform s such as MyMajorCom pany,
IndieGoGo, and Kickstarter, with 18,000, 15,000 and 12,000 applications subm itted to each ofthese sites respectively.267 The acceptance rate varieshighly between platform s, with PledgeMusic
accepting and processing 77 percentofallapplicationsreceived,
while the rate waslowerforKickstarter(42 percent)and Uluie
(31 percent).268 Conversely, MyMajorCom pany only accepts 0.2
percent of applications and Sonicangelaccepts 0.8 percent.269
These figuressuggestthatthe platform sutilize vastly different
selection criteria and m ethods. Sonicangel with a high success
rate of92 percent appears to have one ofthe m ost successful
business m odels, whereas other platform s such as SellaBand,
MyMajorCom pany, SliceThePie, IndieGoGo, and Kickstarterhave
lowersuccessrates, between 42 and84percent.270
Them ajorityofcrowdfundingprojectsarederivedfrom thecreative industry and the not-for-profitsector.271 Here, crowdfunding has been used prim arily to supportcreative ideas, projects,
and ventures, asopposed to innovations. Thisisbecause crowdfundingisparticularlysuitedtocase-by-casefundingofsingleprojects thatare com pelling and attractm any individuals, butare
lim ited in scope. Fundersareoften peersfrom thesam ecreative
industryand willingtoback artistsin asim ilarposition.272
A leading study estim ates the likelihood ofobtaining entrepreneurialfinancingvia crowdfundingin thesam eorderofm agnitudeasin theinternationalventurecapitalbusiness, which has
U.S. Leads World in Burgeoning Crowdfunding Trend, FORBES (Apr. 12,
2013), http:
//
www.forbes.com /sites/
groupthink/2013/04/12/
u-s-leads-world-in-bur
geoning-crowdfunding-trend/.
266 Id. at5859.
267 Hem er, supra not
e71, at21.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at2122.
271 Id. at23.
272 Id. at27.
265

388 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:347
successratesofbetween 1 and 5 percent.273 Theauthorconcludes
thatthere are presently few genuine entrepreneurialventures
funded through crowdfundingplatform s.274
Crowdfunding entrepreneursface variouschallengesthatoften preventthem from achieving theirfunding goals. Forexam ple, som e entrepreneurshave trouble estim ating and activating
their network capabilities when seeking funding.275 They often
do notrealize the im portance ofgrowing theirnetwork priorto
launching an online cam paign orunderestim ate the tim e ittakes
to build such a network.276 Crowdfunding is often notfully understood byentrepreneurs. Asa result, few usethisnovelwayof
financing despite the potentialthatitprovides.277 The key elem entsforasuccessfulcrowdfundingcam paign appeartobeaclear
understanding ofthe crowdfunding process, aim s, targets, and
tim efram es;theselection ofan appropriatecrowdfundingorP2PL
platform ;and successfulinvestor com m unication.278 According to
Mollick, personalnetworks, the attributes of the project, and
geographic location also play a crucialrole.279 It is difficult to
predictwhetherentrepreneurialfunding activitieswillgravitate
towardsadom inantequitycrowdfundingplatform internationally.
Them osteffectivem arketstructureislikelytoem ergebased on a
num beroffactors, includingm arketsize, businessm odel, thecost
ofparticipating on a particular platform , specialfeatures, and
services provided. 280 There is a great dealof experim entation
involved acrossdifferentm odels, and them arketforcrowdfunded
Id. at22.
at23.
275 See Jul
ieS. Huietal., Understandingand LeveragingSocialNetworksfor
Crowdfunding:OpportunitiesandChallenges678 (unpublishedm anuscript, featured in Designing InteractiveSys., 2014), http://delivery.acm .org/10.1145/26
00000/2598539/p677-hui.pdf?ip=128.239.114.252&id=2598539&acc=ACTIVE%
20SERVICE&key=B33240AC40EC9E30.491D1E721DB3290B.4D4702B0C3E8
B35.4D4702B0C3E38B35&CFID=561855669&CFTOKEN=79078245&__acm __
=1447833649_0263b3ae38ae62c260134826c13913a7 [https://perm a.cc/MG6X
-YJFB].
276 Id. at 680.
277 See Hem er, supra not
e71, at38.
278 See generally P. Bel
leflam m eetal., Individual Crowdfunding Practices,
15 VENTURE CAPITAL:INT. J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 313, 31516 (2013).
279 Id. at316. Mol
lick, supra note31, at14.
280 Bel
leflam m eetal., supra note278, at31516;AjayAgrawaletal., The Geography of Crowdfunding 20 (Nat
lBureau ofEcon. Research, Working PaperNo.
w16820, 2011), http:
/
/www.nber.org/
papers/
w19133 [https:
/
/perm a.cc/
82PY-4UDV].
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equity capitalrem ains atan evolutionary stage. The nextsection considersthevariousregulatoryregim escurrentlyavailable.
This is prefaced by an overview ofthe legalissues associated
with crowdfunding.
IV. COMMON LEGAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CROWDFUNDING
A. Prudential Supervision
CrowdfundingandP2PL sitesperform acom plexfunction. They
bring potentialinvestorsand entrepreneurstogether, and facilitate
thetransm ission offundsand disclosuretoandfrom entrepreneurs
toinvestors.281 However, crowdfunding and peer-to-peerplatform s
are not banks or deposit takers. They use escrow accounts in
which fundsareheld and donotreinvestthesefundsforfurther
purposes. Forexam ple, theBritish crowdplatform Buzzbnkstates:
Buzzbnk isnota bank in a legalorfinancialsense we do not
hold savingdepositsand actonly asan agenttointroducethe
Backersto the Ventures. Fundsare held on behalfofthe Venturesuntilthefundraising period iseithersuccessfuland the
fundsaretransferredorifunsuccessful,returnedtotheBacker.282

Such clausesensurethatcrowdfundingplatform sarenotsubject
to prudentialsupervision. While crowdfunding platform s cooperate with other paym entproviders such as PayPalor specific
banks, they preferto be seen asfacilitatorsofpaym entsrather
than deposit-takinginstitutions.
B. Taxation
Crowdfunding is typically subject to taxation, since it is a
m eanstoreceiveincom eon goodsand services. Applicabletaxes
aresalestax, incom etax, and capitalgainstax.283 Itislessclear
MoneyTalkNews, Investing In People: How Crowdfunding Works, MINT
LIFE BLOG (June 26, 2013), https://blog.m int.com /trends/investing-in-peo
ple-how-crowdfunding-works-0613/[https://perm a.cc/GUY6-WDKS].
282 See BUZZBNK, ht
tp:
//
buzzbnk.m elontech.com /StaticPages/FAQ.aspx [https:
/
/perm a.cc/UZ6S-7BL9].
283 See KICKSTARTER, ht
tps:
//www.kickstarter.com /help/taxes [https://
perm a
.cc/Z6SY-57N7];Kevin Frisch, The Tax Implications of Equity Crowdfunding
in the U.S., LAW FOR CHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp
?MODE=VIEW&ID=6362 [https://perm a.cc/U46N-TS2T].
281
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how crowdfunding projects with nonfinancialrewards are to be
taxed ifatall and such projects m ay be in a gray area in regards to taxation. Perhaps som e crowdfunding platform s ought
to be classified as non-profit platform s, while other platform s
that provide crowdfunding with financialrewards ought to be
classified asfor-profitplatform s.
C. Money Laundering
Moneylaunderingisanotherrisk associated with crowdfunding. However, the World Bank does not deem this risk to be
greater in ECF than in other investing system s. 284 Platform s
such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and RocketHub com ply with
internationalandU.S. anti-m oneylaunderinglaws.285
D. Credit Regulation and Peer-to-Peer Platforms
Undera crowd lending m odel, lending takesplace in the absenceofa traditionalbank. Accordingly, thediscretionary power
overthegranting ofa loan istransferred from thebank orbank
m anagerto the crowd consisting ofindividualloan providers
which m akesan assessm entoftheworthinessoftheborrower.286
Providing a loan via a peer-to-peerplatform istherefore associated with variousrisks, theprincipalrisk being thedefaultofthe
borrowerand inabilitytorepaytheloan.
British P2PL platform s have launched a P2PF association:
P2PFA.287 Theassociation isa self-regulatory body thatseeksto
prom ote certain standards ofconductand consum er protection
am ongstBritish P2PL platform s such as Zopa, FundingCircle,
and RateSetter.288 Theoperatingprinciplesoftheassociation set
outkey requirem entsfortheoperation ofP2PF platform s. They
coverthefollowing:
seniorm anagem ent;
m inim um operatingcapitalrequirem ents;
284 WORLD BANK, CROWDFUNDING
S POTENTIAL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD
45 (2013).
285 Id.
286 See Moenni
nghoff& Wieandt, supra note51, at45.
287 See PEER-TO-PEER FIN. ASS
N, http:
//
p2pfa.info/
about-p2p-finance [https://
perm a.cc/76FH-LMDQ].
288 Id.
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segregation of participantsfunds and auditing of
thesegregated bank account;
appropriatecreditand affordabilityassessm ent;
appropriate anti-m oney laundering and anti-fraud
m easures;
clearrulesgoverninguseoftheplatform , consistent
with theseOperatingPrinciples;
m arketing and custom er com m unications thatare
clear, fairand notm isleading;
secureand reliableIT system s;
faircom plaintshandling;and
theorderly adm inistration ofcontractsin theevent
aplatform ceasestooperate.289
E. Investor Protection and Cross-Border Access to Investments
One particularissue isthe problem ofcross-borderaccessto
investm entsvia crowdfunding platform s. Towhatextentshould
crowdfunding platform sbe available to non-dom esticinvestors?
The solution m ay be to m ake investm ents via platform s only
available to dom esticinvestorsby way ofa m eaningfuljurisdictionaldisclaim er. Forexam ple, theSwisscrowdfundingplatform
Investiere.ch only addresses dom estic investors and accredited
investorsfrom certain countries, such asGerm any.290 Sim ilarly,
portalssuch asAngelList.com and Shekra.com areonly accessible
toscreened high-networth investors.291 TheBritish crowdfunding
platform Crowdcubeincludesthefollowingprovisoon itssite:
Viewing pitchesand investing m ay notbelawfulin som ecountries. In othercountries, onlycertain categoriesofperson m ay
be allowed to view pitcheson Crowdcube. Any person resident
outsidetheUnited Kingdom whowishestoview pitchesm ust

See Operating Principles, PEER-TO-PEER FIN. ASS
N, http:
//p2pfa.info/wp
-content/uploads/2015/09/
Operating-Principals-vfinal.pdf [https:
//
perm a.cc/
U28S
-S8XG].
290 See INVESTIERE, ht
tps://www.investiere.ch/content/our-selection-criteria
[https://perm a.cc/MRU3-L9EV].
291 See ANGELLIST, ht
tps://angel.co/help/startups/how-do-i-get-featured-to-in
vestors [https://perm a.cc/TL46-EV2B]; Shekra Investors Network, SHEKRA,
http://www.shekra.com /en/howitworks.php [https://perm a.cc/A67A-NNJ8].
289
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firstsatisfy them selvesthattheyarenotsubjecttoanylocalrequirem entsthatprohibitorrestrictthem from doingso.292

In addition, using the site to initialize crowdfunding projects is
restrictedtocitizensoftheUnited Kingdom .293 Conversely, som e
platform swillacceptnon-dom esticventures. Forexam ple, Buzzbnk
states that Buzzbnk is developed for prim arily UK based ventures although we willacceptorganisations registered in other
countriesundercertain criteria.294
Platform swithoutfinancialrewards, on theotherhand, tend
to attractprojectsfrom othercountries. Forinstance, Indiegogo
is a globalplatform with cam paigns running in 200 countries
andregions.295
F. Designing an Appropriate Disclosure Regime for the Crowd
The prim ary audience fordisclosure is the crowd the actual
and potentialinvestors ofthe securities offered for sale.296 The
crowd islikely tobe heterogeneous including representativesof
varioussocialgroups, aswellasdifferenteconom icand political
circles and geographically dispersed. Furtherm ore, crowds can
be m ad irrationaland foolish, subject to hype but they can
also be wise rational, sensibleand intelligent.297
Behavioralpsychology offers two distinct narratives ofthe
crowd, focusingon thephenom enon ofcrowdsin econom icbubbles
(crowdsengaging in concerted irrationalorsuboptim aleconom ic
behavior) and crowds as a source of collective intelligence. 298
292 See FAQs, CROWDCUBE, ht
tps://www.crowdcube.com /faqs/investing-in-eq
uity/i-am -not-based-in-the-uk-can-i-still-register-and-invest [https://perm a.cc
/AZT3-FR5Y].
293 See FAQS, CROWDCUBE, ht
tps:/
/www.crowdcube.com /faqs/
raising-through
-equity/
who-can-start-a-pitch [https://perm a.cc/2YU9-5SWM].
294 See Buzzbnk FAQs, BUZZBNK BLOG (
Feb. 16, 2011), http:
//
blog.buzzbnk
.org/2011/
02/16/buzzbnk-faqs/[https://perm a.cc/265G-9R5K].
295 See About Us, INDIEGOGO, ht
tps://www.indiegogo.com /about/our-story
[https://perm a.cc/Y84C-VFJB].
296 See Joan Mac
LeodHem inway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the Crowd, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829 (2014).
297 Id. at830.
298 See generally TIM PHILIPS, CHARLES MACKAY
S EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (Infinite IdeasLtd. 2009);Gordon
R. Walker, Securities Regulation, Efficient Markets and Behavioural Finance:
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Surowiecki, forexam ple, suggeststhatcrowdshavethecapacityto
bewise, owingtosuch factorsascognitiveand conceptualdiversity,
collective knowledge, independence (relative freedom from the influence of others), and decentralization. 299 The wisdom of the
crowd consists ofdeveloping solutions using otherspropositions
and developingcollectivesolutions, which lead tobetteroutcom es
overall. Surowieckistates:
The idea ofthe wisdom ofcrowds takesdecentralization as
a given and a good, since itim pliesthatifyou seta crowd of
self-interested, independentpeopletowork in a decentralized
way on the sam e problem , instead oftrying to direct their
effortsfrom the top down, theircollective solution islikely to
bebetterthan anyothersolution you could com eupwith.300

From aregulatoryperspective, itisdifficulttopredictwhattype
ofcrowd willbeparticipatingin an offering, whetherthatcrowd
willhave the attributes ofa wisecrowd or have a tendency to
actirrationally, and whattypeofregulatory approach oughttobe
adopted. The actualand potentialcrowd audience isdifficultto
define. Moreover, investorprofilesm aychangeasthecrowdfunding
m arketm atures, and differentinvestorsm ay have conflicting objectives. Indeed, itisdifficulttoem piricallyassessthenatureofthe
investorcrowd. Accordingly, itisim portantto adopta regulatory
approach tobestaddresstheneedsofacrowdofdiverseinvestors.
From thesecuritiesregulation perspective, however, thecrowd
can be conflated with the public, and prim a facie fulldisclosure
on anyofferisrequired.301 Thisrequirem entisthen tem pered by
the sm allm onetary value ofthe investm ent. The sm allm onetary
valueoftheinvestm entistheflipsideofthesophisticated investorexclusion, leading totheconclusion thatan exem ption forsuch
investm entsiswarranted. Thelaw doesnotprohibittheracegoer
from bettingsm all(orlarge)am ountson ahorse. Itshould notprohibitan investorm aking a sm allinvestm entvia a licensed ECF
platform where arguably the form guideism ore reliable. One
Reclaiming the Legal Genealogy, 36 H.K. L.J. 481 (2006)(discussing behavioral
psychologygenerally).
299 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xvi
ii(Anchor Books, 1st
ed. 2005).
300 Id. at70.
301 See Hem i
nway, supra note296, at82930.
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logicalextension ofthisargum entistoproposea slidingscaleor
spectrum ofdisclosuretiedtothequantum offundstobeinvested.
G. Pre- and Post-Investment Problems: Soft Facts and
Peer Drivers
Potentialcrowdinvestorsoftenm akeinvestm entdecisionsbased
on lim ited inform ation and im perfectknowledgeoftheproducts
orservicesoffered. Thisgivesrisetotheinform ation asym m etry
problem described by Akerlof.302 Receivers offunds have m ore
knowledgeabouttheviability oftheprojectthan investors.303 In
addition, m oralhazard problem sarisebecauseentrepreneursm ay
utilizefundsforpersonalgain.304
Supposethataprojectisnotadequatelydeveloped orproven at
the tim e the cam paign is launched on a crowdfunding orP2PL
platform andthatconsum ersm aybeunabletotryouttheprojector
servicepriortoinvestingin it.305 Often, theonlyavailablesource
ofinform ation m ay be the cam paign description published by the
creatorsoftheproject. Thelatterm aybebiased, incom plete, orlim itedin scope. Thism akesitdifficultforpotentialbackerstoevaluate
thequalityorutilityofa project. Backerscan rely on third-party
endorsem entsand the num berofbackers(prom inently displayed
on the crowdfunding platform site foreach project)to gaugethe
likelysuccessofaproject. Forexam ple, Zhangand Liu findthatinvestorsarem orelikelytocontributetoprojectsin theECF orP2PL
settingwheretheprojectshavealreadygarnered supportfrom the
com m unity.306 Conversely, priorcontributionsm ay havetheoppositeeffectin donation-based crowdfundingm odels, wherea potentialbackerhaslessneed tosupporta projectasa resultofprior
302 George Akerl
of, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84Q UARTERLY J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
303 Gm el
een FayeB. Tom boc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J.
MARSHALL J. INFO TECH. & PRIVACY L. 253, 266 (2013).
304 Id.
305 See Fer
dinand Thies& MichaelWessel, The Circular Effects of Popularity
Information and Electronic Word-of-Mouth on Consumer Decision-Making:
Evidence from a Crowdfunding Platform 1 (22nd European Conferenceon Inform ation System s, TelAviv, 2014), http:
//
ecis2014.eu/E-poster/
files/0810-file1.pdf
[https://perm a.cc/UVA8-U3NQ].
306 J.J. Zhang& P. Li
u, Rational Herding in Microloan Markets, 58 MGMT.
SCI. 892, 893 (2012).
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donations.307 A studypublishedbyAhlersetal. findsthatfirm sthat
havebeeninbusinesslongerpriortoseekingECF arem orelikelyto
raisecapital, aswellasfirm swith agreaternum berofboardm em bers, higherlevelsofeducation (asm easured by the percentage of
boardm em bersholdingMBAs), andfirm swithbetternetworks.308
Moritzetal. published a study exam ining investorcom m unication in thecontextofcrowdfunding.309 The authorsadoptan exploratory qualitative research approach based on sem i-structured
interviewswith seventeen crowdfunding participants:six crowd
investors, six new ventures, and five third parties.310 Theauthors
develop a theoreticalfram ework and present it in a set ofsix
propositions.311 The results indicate that the venture
s overall
im pression especially perceived sym pathy, openness, and trustworthiness is im portant to reduce the perceived inform ation
asym m etries of [crowd] investors.312 Thus, it is im portant for
entrepreneursto com m unicate softfacts.Thisistypically done
viapseudo-personalcom m unication channels, such asvideos.313
In addition tosoftfacts, Moritzetal. foundthatcrowdinvestors
are also influenced by otherm arketparticipants.314 Thisisconsistentwith the findingsofZhang and Liu. Peereffectsare im portantdriversofcrowdfunding. Hence, third-party endorsem ents
are regarded asquality signalsand serve to reduce inform ation
asym m etry.315 This m ay lead to inform ation cascades and herd
behavior in the sense that individualinvestors choose to m ake
decisions based on the actions ofothers ratherthan on private
inform ation available to them . 316 The upshot is that investors
endupsupportingalreadysuccessfulprojects, i.e., projectsthatare
already successfulin term softhenum berofbackers. Asa result,
See Thies& Wessel, supra note305, at2.
GerritK.C. Ahlersetal., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 955, 95663 (
2015).
309 Al
exandra Moritzetal., InvestorCom m unication in Equity-Based Crowdfunding:A Qualitative-Em piricalStudy 1 (2014)(unpublished m anuscript),
http:/
/papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=2462282 [https:
//
perm a.cc/N3
F3-WD2M].
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 See Thi
es& Wessel, supra note305, at4.
307
308
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already successfulcam paigns receive furtherpopularity boosts,
leading to positive upward inform ation cascades.317 Conversely,
projects that lack a high num ber ofbackers m ay experience a
negativedownward inform ation cascade.318 Huietal. find thatthe
m ajority offailed projectcreatorscited the inability tosuccessfully leveragean onlineaudienceasa m ain reason forfailing.319
Theaboveanalysissuggeststhatcrowdinvestorsareoften hype
driven and subjectto socialcontagion processes a factthatm ay
beexploited bycrowdfundingplatform s.320 Crowdfundingplatform s
often adoptbusinessm odelsthatseek toestablish positivefunding
m om entum sbyim posingshortinvestm entspans, creatingfunding
lim its, and m aking the funding processtransparent. Thisprocess
is designed to generate a feeling ofurgency am ongstinvestors.
Entrepreneurs can also exploit inform ation cascades by artificiallytrying tokick-starta cam paign using preappointed guinea
pigswhoactasbuyers.321
AccordingtoBurtch, herdingbehaviorisa negativeexternality
ofcrowdfunding.322 However, from an entrepreneurialperspective,
the reverse isalsotrue. Herding can be regarded asa positive externality because itresultsin a snowballeffectand helpsentrepreneursm eettheirfinancingobjectives. Otherpotentialpitfalls
ofcrowd wisdom m ay be sum m arized as pluralistic ignorance
and groupthink (m em bersofthegroup com ing toincorrectdecisionsorassum ptionsbased on a desiretofind conform ity within
a group);323 bandwagoning (assum ption offalsehoods to be true
byanyonem em berofagroupandotherm em bersbuyingintothe
sam e falsehood);and the Dunning-Krueger effect (a cognitive
Id.
Id.
319 Jul
ie Huietal., Understanding the RoleofCom m unity in Crowdfunding
Work (2014)(unpublished m anuscript), http://egerber.m ech.northwestern.edu
/
wp-content/
uploads/2012/
11/
Gerber_UnderstandingtheRoleofCom m unityinCrowd
fundingWork.pdf[https://perm a.cc/E9TC-CGAR].
320 Id.
321 Dani
elSgroi, Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits
and Welfare, 39 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 137, 137 (2002).
322 See generally Gor
don Burtch, Herding Behavior as a Network Externality,
32 ICIS CONF. (2011), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/221599843
_Herding_Behavior_as_a_Network_Externality[https://perm a.cc/3UJC-RPJG].
323 Isenberg, supra not
e256.
317
318
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bias, with unskilled individualsrating theirown abilitieshigher
than average).324
V. CROWDFUNDING REGULATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
The aim ofthis Partis to exam ine crowdfunding regulation
in aglobalcontext. Itisstructured asfollows:first, weexam inethe
variouscapitalm arketinnovationsintroduced to closethe SME
financinggap priortotheintroduction ofcrowdfundingregulation.
Here, weuseAustralia and New Zealand ascasestudies. Second,
weturn tospecificcrowdfundingm odelsin selectjurisdictionsand
exam ine the nature ofthese m odels and the rationales for the
introduction ofcrowdfunding regulation. Thisanalysisisintended
toprovidean overview ofthevariouscapitalm arketlaw reform
options available to regulators in orderto enhance SME access
tocapital. Particularattention ispaid totheNew Zealand m odel,
whichweregardastheleadingm odelintheSouthernHem isphere.
A. Australia
In thepast, Australiahasattem pted tosolvetheSME financing problem via variousm eans. Forexam ple, theAustralian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.)contains various provisions that are
designed to facilitate sm allscale offerings,orlow-value capital
raisings.325 The relevant rules are contained in Chapter 6D of
the Act.326 The latterchapterrequires a disclosure docum entto
belodged with theAustralian Securitiesand Investm entCom m ission Australia
s corporate regulator priorto the m aking ofan
offerofsecurities to an investor.327 Exem ptions to this rule are
contained in Section 708 ofthe Act, which providesthatno disclosureisrequired when a personalofferism ade, i.e., an offerof
less than AU$2 m illion and involving no m ore than twenty investors in a twelve-m onth period;or alternatively, the offer is
m ade to sophisticated orprofessionalinvestors.328 A sophisticated
investor is defined as som eone with net assets greater than
324 DRESNER,

supra note92, at6465.
Corporations Act 2011 (Cth)ch. 6D, s708 (Austl.).
326 Id. atch. 6D.
327 Id. ats70407.
328 Id. atss708(
1), (8), (11).
325
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AU$2.5 m illion or gross incom e ofatleastAU$250,000 in the
lasttwo years.329 Professionalinvestors, on the other hand, include listed entities with assets of at least AU$10 m illion. 330
Unlessoneoftheseexem ptionsapplies, a com pany cannotraise
fundsfrom investorsgenerally and m usttargetsophisticated or
professionalinvestors. Because non-exem pt offers m ust be accom paniedbyaprospectus, thecostsofcom plianceandcom plexity
in obtainingfinancingfrom thepublicareincreased.331
The law also provides for the use ofoffer inform ation statem ents abbreviated inform ation statem ents rather than a prospectusifthetotalam ountraised by a corporatebody orspecific
related entitiesisAU$10 m illion orless.332 Moreover, there are
specific sophisticated investorexem ptions thatallow com panies
to raise fundsfrom sophisticated investorswithouta disclosure
docum ent.333 In addition, theVentureCapitalAct2002 provides
forso-called VentureCapitalLim ited Partnerships(VCLPs)and
Early Stage Venture CapitalLim ited Partnerships (ESVCLPs)
thatenjoy tax concessions.334 Forexam ple, the ESVCLP program
wasestablished in 2007 and is aim ed atfurtherencouraging investm entin early-stage com panies.335 Allpartnersin ESVCLPs
are exem ptfrom tax on any share ofthe incom e derived by the
partnership.336 Lastly, Australia has introduced certain publicprivate equity co-investm entschem eswhereby governm entand
private sectorcapitalare pooled to investin new Australian com panies com m ercializing innovative ideas. 337 Such coinvestm ent
Id. ats708(8).
Id. ats708(11).
331 Pekm ezovi
c& Walker, supra note10, at68.
332 Corporations Act 2011 (
Cth)ch. 6D, s709(4)(Austl.).
333 Id. ats708(
8)(10).
334 Factsheet: Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, AUSTL.
GOV
T DEP
T OF INDUS. & SCI (
2015), http://www.business.gov.au/grants-and-as
sistance/
venture-capital/esvclp/
Docum ents/
ESVCLP-FactSheet.pdf [https:
/
/
perm a
.cc/SCN8-E5JR][hereinafterFactsheet].
335AUSTL. GOV
T:INNOVATION INV. FUND, VENTURE CAPITAL IN AUSTRALIA 4
(2013).
336 Factsheet, supra not
e334.
337AUSTL. GOV
T:THE TREASURY AND THE DEP
T OF INDUS., INNOVATION, SCI.,
RESEARCH AND TERTIARY EDUC., REVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS:FINAL REPORT 1720 (
2012), http://www.avcal.com .au/docu
m ents/item /516 [https://perm a.cc/W3QQ-3Z6X].
329
330
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program sarecoupled with taxincentives, and togethertheyhelp
toattractcapitaltothehigh-risk venturecapitalsector. Table1
below providesan overview ofthesereform s.
TABLE 1:SME CAPITAL MARKET REFORMS IN AUSTRALIAN LAW
RELEVANT
LEGISLATION
LOW-VALUE
CAPITAL
RAISINGS

Sections 708(1)
(7) of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth)

KEY PROVISIONS
Australian provisions contain brightlinerulesthatsaydisclosure(via aprospectus) is required unless exceptions
apply. Keyexceptionsincludesm allscale
offeringsand sophisticatedinvestors.338
The exem ption from the prospectus
requirem entforsm allscaleofferingsallowsup to twenty personalofferingsin
any period oftwelve m onths(the20/12
rule).339
Under the 20/12 rule, the num ber of
investors, rather than the num ber of
offerees, is counted, subjectto a financialceiling.340
The exem ption isavailable when three
conditionsaresatisfied:
(1) theoffersarepersonaloffersforissueorsaleofa body
ssecurities;
(2) noneoftheoffersresultsin abreach
ofthetwentyinvestorsceiling;and
(3) noneoftheoffersresultsin a
breach ofthe$2 m illion ceiling.341
In futurereform proposals, thresholdsare
likely to be relaxed in the future, for
exam ple, through higherlim its forthe
am ount offunding that can be raised
under the 20/12 prospectus exem ption, orfora largernum berofinvestors
investingunderthatsam eexem ption.342

Corporations Act 2011 (Cth)ch. 6D, s708 (Austl.)
Id. ats708(1).
340 Id. ats708(
3)(4).
341 Id. ats708(
1).
342 AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM
N, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION:REVIEW OF BARRIERS TO BUSINESS ENTRIES AND EXITS IN THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY 22 (
2015).
338
339
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RELEVANT
LEGISLATION

KEY PROVISIONS

OFFER

Section 709(4) of
the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth)

A body, arelatedbodycorporate, oracontrolled entity offering to issue securities
m ay use an offerinform ation statem ent
instead ofa prospectusifthetotalofall
am ountsraised by the body orspecified
relatedentitiesisAU$10 m illionorless.343
The offer inform ation statem entis prim arilyintendedtobeafundraisingm echanism forSMEs, though itisnotlim ited
to those enterprises. 344 The m ain requirem entisthatthe com pany includes
an audited financial report covering a
twelve-m onth period and has a balance
datenolaterthan sixm onthsbeforethe
securitiesarefirstoffered.345

SOPHISTICATED
INVESTORS

Sections 708(8)
(10)ofthe Corporations Act 2001
(Cth)

The Corporations Act 2011 perm its offerstosophisticated investorswithouta
disclosure docum ent.346 A potential investor m ightderive sophistication from
oneorm oreofthesethreefactors:
(1) theam ountoftheinvestm ent;or
(2) the financial status or incom e of
theinvestor;or
(3) the investm ent experience of the
investor.347
Two types of sophisticated investors
are encom passed. One is the large investor. Ifthe investorispaying atleast
AU$500,000 or has a gross incom e or
net assets that exceed the prescribed
m inim um , theofferisexem pt.348
A sophisticated investorisaperson with
netassetsofatleastAU$2.5 m illion ora
grossincom e foreach ofthe pasttwo financialyearsofatleastAU$250,000.349
Anotheristheprofessionalorexperienced
investortowhom theofferism ade.350

INFORMATION
STATEMENTS

343

Corporations Act 2011, s709(4)(Austl.).

344 Id.

Id. ats715(2).
Id. atss708(8)(10).
347 Id. atss708(
8)(a)(c).
348 Id. atss708(
8)(a)(b).
349 Id. atss708(
8)(c), (9A)(9C).
350 Id. ats708(
11).
345
346
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LEGISLATION

VENTURE
CAPITAL
SECTOR

TAX
CONCESSIONS

Venture Capital
Act 2002

401

KEY PROVISIONS
Venture Capital Lim ited Partnerships
(VCLP)wereestablishedin 2002. 351
Early Stage Venture Capital Lim ited
Partnerships(ESVCLP)program s.352
The ESVCLP program was established
in 2007 and isaim ed atfurtherencouraging investm entin early stage com panies. 353 All partners in ESVCLPs are
exem ptfrom tax on any shareoftheincom ederivedbythepartnership.354
The ESVCLP program replaced the
Pooled Developm ent Funds (PDF)program . Over AU$961 m illion has been
invested in 707 Australian com panies
underthePDF program .355
Since the ESVCLP program was established in 2007, registered ESVCLPs
have invested AU$64 m illion into fifty
businesses.356
The Australian governm enthasseveral
tax concession program sfortheventure
capitalsector, includingtheVentureCapitalLim ited Partnerships(VCLP)and the
Early Stage Venture Capital Lim ited
Partnerships(ESVCLP)program s.357
Other tax concessions include the Research and Developm ent(R&D)Tax IncentiveandEnterpriseConnect.358

Venture Capital Act 2002 (Cth)(Austl.);Factsheet, supra note334.
Venture Capital Act 2002 (Cth)(Austl.);Factsheet, supra note334.
353 AUSTL. GOV
T:DEP
T OF IND. AND SCI.,EARLY STAGE VENTURE CAPITAL
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (ESVCLPS):CUSTOMER INFORMATION GUIDE 6 (2015).
354 Id. at23.
355 AUSTL. GOV
T:DEP
T OF IND. AND SCI., INNOVATION AUSTRALIA ANNUAL
REPORT 201213 70 (2013).
356 Id. at68.
357 AUSTL. GOV
T:BD. OF TAXATION, REVIEW OF TAXATION ARRANGEMENTS
UNDER THE VENTURE CAPITAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP REGIME:A REPORT TO
THE ASSISTANT TREASURER 89, 11 (
2011).
358 AUSTL. GOV
T:DEP
T OF IND., R&D TAX INCENTIVE:CUSTOMER INFORMATION GUIDE (
AUSINDUSTRY SECTIONS)(2012);AUSTL. GOV
T:DEP
T OF IND.,
SINGLE BUSINESS SERVICE, http://www.business.gov.au/about-businessgovau
/Pages/One-Website.aspx [https://perm a.cc/EG7E-2BTR] (noting that Single
BusinessServicereplaced EnterpriseConnect).
351
352
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RELEVANT
LEGISLATION
PUBLICPRIVATE
EQUITY COINVESTMENT
SCHEMES

KEY PROVISIONS
Governm ent and private sector capital
is pooled to invest in new Australian
com panies com m ercializing innovative
ideas.359
Co-investm ent program s are coupled
with tax incentives, and together they
help to attract capitalto the high-risk
venturecapitalsector.360
The current Australian Governm ent
equity-based venture capital program s
com prise:
the Innovation Investm ent Fund
(IIF) last funding tranche scheduled for2013 [and cutfrom federal
budgetin 20142015];
the Innovation Investm ent Followon Fund (IIFF) investm ent period
ceasedin late2012;
the Pre-Seed Fund (PSF) investm entperiod ceasedin late2012;[]
the Renewable Energy Venture
Capital (REVC) Fund investm ent
period underway;361 and
the Entrepreneurs Infrastructure
Program m e 20142015;intended to
supply AU$484.2 m illion over five
years.

AsofNovem ber2015, however, Australia hasnolegislation in
placetofacilitatecrowdfunding.362 Com paniesm ay, however, raise
financing via the exem ptions in Section 708 or the Australian
Sm allScale Offerings Board (ASSOB).363 ASSOB was created
under ASIC Class Order 02/273, which provides an exem ption
REVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS, supra
note337, at17.
360 Id. at47.
361 Id. at17;see also AUSTL. GOV
T DEPARTMENT OF INDUS., ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE ENTREPRENEUR
S INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME DISCUSSION PAPER
(2014), http:
/
/
www.industry.gov.au/
industry/
Docum ents/
EntrepreneursInfrastruc
tureProgram m eDiscussionPaper.pdf[https://perm a.cc/9BQP-J22F].
362 See Terence W. Wong, Crowd funding: Regulating the new phenomenon, 31 CO. & SEC. L. J. 89, 107 (2013).
363 Corporations Act 2011 (
Cth)ch. 6D, ss708(1)(11)(Austl.);AUSTL. SMALL
SCALE OFFERING BD., ASSOB PLATFORM:RULES OF ADMISSION FOR LIMITED
COMPANIES 2 (2015).
359
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from the fundraising provisions ofthe Corporations Act.364 The
board allowssm allcom paniestolisttheircom pany on theboard
for registered investors.365 To date, m ore than AU$130 m illion
hasbeen raisedusingtheplatform .366 Itcostsacom pany$4,500 to
list on the platform .367 Furtherm ore, com panies incur fees by rem aining on the list.368 Other than ASSOB, there are few equity
crowdfunding platform s to which Australian com panies m ay
have recourse. 369 This not only substantially reduces com petition in the crowdfunding m arket, butalso reduces SMEsaccess
tocapital.
B. New Zealand
Capitalm arketlaw reform saim ed atSMEshavebeen enacted
in variousjurisdictions, includingNew Zealand. Forexam ple, New
Zealand recently sim plified thefinancialreporting requirem ents
applicabletoSMEsundertheFinancialReportingAct2013 in order
to enhance the developm entofthe SME sector.370 New Zealand
law also follows the cognate Australian sm allscale offerings
exem ptions, enabling issuers of debt and equity securities to
fund up to $2,000,000 in any twelve-m onth period from twenty
investors. 371 Other exem ptions include the offers to wholesale
investors exem ption under the FinancialMarkets ConductAct
364 See generally ASIC, Business Introduction or Matching Services, Cl
ass
OrderCO 02/273 (Mar. 2002)(Austl.).
365 About ASSOB, AUSTL. SMALL SCALE OFFERING BD., ht
tps://www.assob
.com .au/about.asp?page=1 [https://perm a.cc/B8XJ-2VYZ].
366 Chri
sGay, Equity Crowdfunding: Good for Capitalism or for Fraudsters?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 21, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://m oney.usnews
.com /m oney/personal-finance/m utual-funds/articles/2012/11/21/will-crowdfund
ing-unleash-innovation-encourage-securities-fraud-or-both [https://
perm a.cc/Q2
WR-W7NA];see also ASIC, supra note364.
367 Our Fees, AUSTL. SMALL SCALE OFFERING BD., ht
tps://www.assob.com
.au/about.asp?page=3 [https://perm a.cc/PYW2-T88D].
368 Id.
369 See Rose Powel
l, VentureCrowd Fund-raising Adds $1.2m to Start-Up
Ingogos $9.1m Raising, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Sept. 30, 2014) (discussing the
VentureCrowd platform , which enables sophisticated investors in Australia
toinvestup toAU$2,500.).
370 ERNST & YOUNG, NEW ZEALAND FINANCIAL REPORTING GUIDE 2014/
15
17 (2015).
371 Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct2013, s12 (N.Z.).
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2013.372 Thelattercoversinvestm entbusinesses, personsengaged
in investm entactivities, eligible investors, and persons m aking
an investm entof$750,000 orm ore.373 Issuersissuing securities
to wholesale investorsare notrequired to com ply with prospectusrequirem ents.374 New Zealand law alsom akesprovisionsfor
venture capitalschem es, which allow com panies to raise funds
with substantialexem ptionsfrom theusualsecuritieslaw requirem ents(such asprospectusrequirem ents), butunderthesupervision ofan independentventurecapitalschem eadm inistrator.375
TheNew Zealand Stock Exchangehasintroduced a new high
growth m arketsegm ent(NXT)aim ed atSMEs.376 The key elem entsofthe NXT disclosure regim e are the setting by the firm
of key operating m ilestones (KOMs), by which investors can
m easureand m onitorbusinessperform anceand receivequarterly
business updates.377 The KOMs willreplace prospective financialinform ation (PFI)currently required in listing docum ents,
and itisexpected thatthiswillreducetheinitiallistingcostsfor
SMEs.378 Table2 providesan overview ofkeycapitalm arketlaw
reform saim ed atSMEs. Asdiscussed below, theseincludeanew
regim eforECF andP2PL vialicensedinterm ediaries.
TABLE 2:NEW ZEALAND SME CAPITAL MARKET LAW REFORMS

FINANCIAL REPORTING

LEGISLATION
SUMMARY
Financial Reporting Act Requirem entsare sim plified
2013
for SMEs under FRA 2013.
SMEs have the option of
preparing special purpose financial reports for tax purposes.379

Id. ats3.
Id.
374 Id.
375 See Fi
nancialMarketsAuthority, SecuritiesAct(VentureCapitalSchem es)
Exem ption Am endm ent Notice 2012 (N.Z.); Financial Markets Authority,
SecuritiesAct(VentureCapitalSchem es)Exem ption Notice2008 (N.Z.).
376 NXT, GUIDANCE NOTE:KEY OPERATING MILESTONES (
Feb. 2015).
377 Id. at3.
378 See NXT, GUIDANCE NOTE:LISTING AS A NXT COMPANY 7 (
Feb. 2015).
379 Fi
nancialReportingAct2013, ss15, 19 (N.Z.).
372
373
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EXEMPTIONS FROM
PROSPECTUS
REQUIREMENTS

NEW ZEALAND STOCK
EXCHANGE:NEW HIGH
GROWTH MARKET
SEGMENT (NXT)

380
381

405

LEGISLATION
SUMMARY
FinancialMarketConduct Key exem ptions include the
Act2013
following:
Sm allscaleoffers:This
exclusion follows the
cognate Australian 20/
12 rule. Itenablesissuers ofdebt and equity
securitiestoraisefunds
up to AU$2 m illion in
any twelve-m onth period from 20 investors;
Offers to wholesale
investors: this covers
investm ent businesses,
persons engaged in investm ent activities, eligible investors, and
persons m aking an investm ent of $750,000
orm ore;
Offers for persons in
closerelationships:this
categorycom prisesclose
businessassociatesand
relatives;
Offersthrough licensed
interm ediaries:ECF and
P2PL.
NXT is aim ed at SMEs. 380
The key elem ents of the
NXT disclosureregim eare:
the setting by the firm
of key operating m ilestones by which investors can m easure and
m onitor business perform ance;
a quarterlybusinessupdate;and
asetlistofeventsrequiringim m ediatedisclosure
to the m arket between
businessupdates.381
KOMs will replace prospective financial inform ation
currently required in listing

See NXT, supra note378, at4.
NXT, supra note376, at3, 710.
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LEGISLATION

VENTURE CAPITAL
SCHEMES

Securities Act
(Venture Capital
Schemes) Exemption
Amendment Notice
2012 and
Securities Act
(Venture Capital
Schemes) Exemption
Notice 2008

SUMMARY
docum ents, and it is hoped
thatthiswillreduce the initiallistingcostsforSMEs.382
Note that the London
Stock Exchange has developed a m arket segm ent for high-growth
com panies, such asinternetand technology com paniesthatareexpected
to, in tim e, seek a listing
on them ain board.383
This new high-growth
segm ent was developed
jointly by the U.K. Governm ent and London
Stock Exchange. Itisin
addition to the second
board called AIM, High
Growth Segm ent.384
Com panies can raise
funds with substantial
exem ptions from the
usualsecurities law requirem ents(such asprospectus requirem ents),
but under the supervision of an independent
venture capital schem e
adm inistrator.385
TheNew Zealand Financial Markets Authority
(FMA)hasdesignated 10
organizations, including
Powerhouse Ventures
Limited, toadministerthe
venturecapitalschem e.

See NXT, supra note378, at7.
LONDON STOCK EXCH., HIGH GROWTH SEGMENT, http:/
/www.lseg.com /sites
/
default/
files/content/
docum ents/HGS_flyer.pdf[https://perm a.cc/FY8Z-A2FK].
384 LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM, ht
tp://www.londonstockexchange.com /com
panies-and-advisors/m ain-m arket/com panies/hgs/hgs.htm [https://
perm a.cc/
425V
-CGFK].
385 See Securi
ties Act(Venture CapitalSchem es)Exem ption Am endm ent
Notice2012, 34 (N.Z.);SecuritiesAct(VentureCapitalSchem es)Exem ption
Notice2008 (N.Z.).
382
383
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SUMMARY
The schem e adm inistrators operate under a
Code of Practice and are
exem pt from various securities law requirem ents.386
A businessthatwantsto
raisefundsfrom thepublic for a project or venturem ayapplytobecom e
a Registered Business
underanyschem e.387
A Registered Business
that m akes an offer of
equity securities orparticipatory securities in
com pliancewith theCode
m ay rely on the exem ptions stated in the Exem ptionNotice, including
exem ption from the requirem enttohavea registered prospectus and
exem ption from certain
advertising requirem ents
ofthelaw.388
A com pany can raise no
m ore than NZD $5 m illion.389
Callaghan Innovation
s
Incubator Support Program m e390
R&D Grants391

386 Securi
ties Act (Venture Capital Schem es) Exem ption Am endm ent
Notice2012, at4(N.Z.).
387 Id. at2.
388 Id.;see also Sec
uritiesAct(Venture CapitalSchem es)Exem ption Notice
2008, 7 (N.Z.).
389 Securi
ties Act (Venture Capital Schem es) Exem ption Am endm ent
Notice2012, at5 (N.Z.).
390 CALLAHAN INNOVATION, INCUBATORS, ht
tps://www.callaghaninnovation
.govt.nz/incubators[https://perm a.cc/UK5C-EC4B].
391 CALLAHAN INNOVATION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GRANTS, ht
tps://
www.callaghaninnovation.govt.nz/sites/all/files/rd-grants-brochure-07-2015.pdf
[https://perm a.cc/HYL8-XZPE].
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Underthenow-repealed New Zealand SecuritiesAct1978, issuerswererequiredtom akefull, tim ely, andaccuratedisclosureof
relevantinform ation to potentialinvestors.392 UnderSection 33
ofthe Act, no securities could be offered to the public for subscription by oron behalfofan issuerunlesstheofferwasm adein
an investm entstatem ent, aspartofan authorized advertisem ent,
orm ade in oraccom panied by a registered prospectus.393 Thus,
the Actim posed variousrestrictionson offersto the public. Excluded from these restrictionswere certain offereeswho were not
considered m em bersofthepublic, such asrelativesandclosebusinessassociatesoftheissuer.394 In addition, theActexcludedoffers
to professionalorhabituallarge investors, aswellaseligible persons, i.e., wealthy and experienced investors, from its am bit.395
There was no crowdfunding regim e per se. Crowdfunding was
technicallypossibleunderthe1978 regim e, butonlytothelim ited
extentprovided by the exclusionsto the prospectusrequirem ents
contained in Section 3 ofthe Securities Act1978.396 The sam e
position holdstruein Australia asofJuly 2015;ECF ispossible
but only via the exclusions or carveouts to the prospectus requirem entsin theCorporationsAct2001.397
1. Crowdfunding Under the Financial Markets Conduct
Act 2013
TheFinancialMarketsConductAct2013 (FMC Act)and the
FinancialMarkets ConductRegulations 2014 (FMC Regulations)
provide fortwo new form sofcapitalraising:crowdfunding and

392 TheNew Zeal
and m odelwasfollowed by Papua New Guinea and Sam oa.
SecuritiesAct1978, s54(N.Z.).
393 See Securi
tiesAct1978, s 33 (N.Z.). The offer to the publicrequirem ent
alsoappearsin therelevantHongKonglegislation:see Com panies(WindingUp
andMiscellaneousProvisions)Ordinance(2012)Cap. 32, §1 (H.K.). Thereareno
specificcrowdfundingprovisionsin theHongKonglegislation.
394 Securi
tiesAct1978, s3 (N.Z.).
395 Id. ats2c.
396 Id. ats3.
397 See Wong, supra not
e 362, fora discussion ofECF in Australia in the
absence ofspecificlegislative provisions. Foran exam ple ofhow ECF works
in Australiain such acontext, see Powell, supra note369.
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P2PL.398 UndertheFMC Act, financialproductsoffered through
licensed interm ediaries are not subjectto the standard disclosure obligations for financialproducts thatapply under the financialm arketconductlegislation.399 Forthispurpose, licensed
interm ediaries are persons licensed to provide crowdfunding or
P2PL servicesunderPart6 oftheFMC Act.400
Prior to the enactm entofthe FMC Act, providers ofcrowdfunding and peer-to-peerservicesran therisk ofcontravening the
SecuritiesAct1978.401 TheFMC rem oved thisrisk by creatinga
licensingregim ethatenablesprovidersofcrowdfundingand peerto-peerservicestoprovidelicensed servicesunderthesupervision
ofthe regulator, the FinancialMarkets Authority (FMA).402 Licensed crowdfunding and peer-to-peerservice providers are not
subjectto the disclosure obligations foroffersoffinancialproductsunderPart3 oftheFMC Act.403 Thisisa directresultofan
exclusion contained in Clause 6 ofSchedule 1 ofthe FMC Act,
which statesthata person providing a prescribed interm ediary
serviceisexcluded from the disclosure obligationsunderPart3.404
Crowdfunding and peer-to-peer services are designated as prescribed interm ediaryservices.405
Accordingly, theprotection ofinvestorsisderived from thelicensing regim e in Part6 ofthe FMC Actratherthan Part3 of
theAct.406 Licensed providersrem ain subjecttovariousrequirem ents, including disclosing to clients the nature ofthe services
provided. 407 They are also subject to FMA supervision. 408 As
398 Thi
s section draws on Alm a Pekm ezovic & Gordon Walker, Equity
Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 33(1)CO. & SEC. L.J. 63, 6369 (2015).
399 Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct2013, s6 (N.Z.).
400 Id. ats390.
401 Pekm ezovi
c& Walker, supra note398, at63.
402 See Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct2013;Who needs a license?, FIN. MKTS.
AUTH., https://fm a.govt.nz/com pliance/
licensing-and-registration/who-needs-a-li
cence/[https://perm a.cc/9EDR-CPEJ].
403 Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct2013, pt3 (N.Z.).
404 Id. atss 3940, schedul
e 1, cl6. Note thatthe exclusionscontained in
Schedule1, Part1 oftheActaresim ilartothecarveoutsin Section 708 ofthe
Australian CorporationsAct2001.
405 Fi
nancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg184(N.Z.).
406 Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct2013, pts3, 6 (N.Z.)
407 Id. atss42228.
408 Id. atss41415, 41821.
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indicated, the benefitofobtaining a m arketservice license for
crowdfunding underPart6 ofthe FMC Actisthatthe disclosure
obligations under Part3 are inapplicable, and m odified disclosurerequirem entsapplyinstead.409
Generally, thedisclosureobligationsim posed on ECF providersarefewerthan thosethatapply on a registered exchange.410
A com pany issuing securities through crowdfunding services is
subjectto less disclosure than a com pany listed on the NZX.411
Thus, com paniescan raisefundsthrough licensed crowdfunding
and peer-to-peer interm ediariesfacilities without having to com ply with public offer disclosure docum ents under securities or
financialm arketslegislation.412 Such exclusionsfrom disclosure
areintended tom akeiteasierforSMEstoraisecapital.413
Regulation 185 oftheFMC Regulations2014definestheterm s
crowd funding serviceand peer-to-peer lending services.414 A
person provides a crowd funding service if the following two
elem entsarem et:
the person provides a facility by m eans of which
offersofsharesin acom panyarem ade;and
the principalpurpose ... isto facilitate the m atching
ofcom panies who wish to raise funds with m any
investorswhoareseeking toinvestrelatively sm all
am ounts.415
A person providesaP2P if:
the person provides a facility by m eans of which
offersofdebtsecuritiesarem ade;and
the principalpurpose ... isto facilitate the m atching
oflenderswith borrowerswhoareseekingloansfor
personal, charitable, orsm allbusinesspurposes.416
Id. atss5052, 42228.
See generally id.
411 Id.
412 Id.;see also Pekm ezovi
c& Walker, supra note398, at63.
413 Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct, ss34 (N.Z.).
414 Fi
nancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg185 (N.Z.).
415 Id.
416 Id.
409
410
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2. Part 6 of the FMC Regulations 2014
Part6 oftheFMC Regulations2014containsprovisionsthat
allow crowdfunding services and P2PL services
providerstobelicensed(Reg. 184);417
provide additional eligibility criteria, such as adequatesystem sand procedurestoensurethatissuers
donotraisem orethan $2 m illion inanytwelve-m onth
period(Reg. 186);418 and
setoutadequate disclosure arrangem ents applicabletocrowdfunding providers, disclosure statem ents
for retailinvestors, conditions (including warning
statem ents for investors), and client agreem ents
(Reg. 186).419
Theserequirem entsarediscussed below.
3. Licensing Requirements
Equity-based crowdfunding facilitiesand P2PL service facilitiesm ustapplytobelicensed bytheFMA.420 TheFMA issued the
firstequity crowdfunding licenseson July31, 2014, toPledgeMe
and SnowballEffect.421 Thecriteria forobtaining a licenseto provide a crowdfunding service are set out in Section 396 ofthe
FMC Act422 and additionaleligibility criteria apply underRegulation 186 oftheFMC Regulations2014.423 Theeligibility criteria
fora crowdfunding serviceunderSection 396(a)oftheFMC Act
areasfollows:
theproviderhasfair, orderly, and transparentsystem sand proceduresforprovidingtheservice;
FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg184(N.Z.).
Id. atreg186.
419 Id.
420 FIN. MKTS. AUTH., supra not
e402.
421 See FMA Issues First Equity Crowd Funding Licences, FMA, MR No.
2014-25 (July31, 2014)(N.Z.).
422 Fi
nancialMarketsConductAct2013, s396 (N.Z.).
423 Fi
nancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg186 (N.Z.).
417
418
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theserviceisdesigned prim arilyforoffersbypersons
otherthan theproviderand itsassociatedpersons;
the providerhasan adequate policy foridentifying
and m anagingtherisk offraud byissuersusingthe
service(an anti-fraudpolicy);
theproviderhasadequatedisclosurearrangem ents
to give investors, or to enable investors to readily
obtain, tim ely and understandable inform ation to
assist investors to decide whether to acquire the
shares (for exam ple, through initialdisclosure, or
question and answer forum s, or other inform ation
thatism adeavailable);
the providerhasan adequate policy (a fairdealing
policy)forexcluding an issuerfrom using theservice
ifthe provider has inform ation (for exam ple, from
checks or assessm ents itcarries out(ifany))that
givesitreason tobelievethattheissuer, in relation
to any dealing in sharesusing the service, hasengaged in conductthatism isleading ordeceptiveor
is likely to m islead ordeceive orhas m ade an unsubstantiated representation.424
Upon registration, licensed crowdfunding service providers
have to m eetand m aintain certain m inim um standards, as set
outbytheFMC Actand anyapplicableregulations.425
4. Required Disclosure Statements
Regulation 215 providesthatadisclosurestatem entforacrowdfunding service orpeer-to-peerservice m ustcontain a description
ofthefollowingm atters:
thenatureoftheserviceprovided;
how investors apply for, and obtain, access to the
facilityandtheeligibilitycriteriathatapply;
how issuers apply for, and obtain, access to the
facilityandtheeligibilitycriteriathatapply;
atreg186.
FIN. MKTS. AUTH., CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS, https:/
/fm a.govt.nz/com pli
ance/role/
crowdfunding-platform s/[https://perm a.cc/CS4G-MD9P].
424 Id.
425
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how investm ents are m ade and financialproducts
areissued undertheservice;and
how investorm oneyisreceived and dealtwith.426
In addition, theproviderm ustdiscloseinform ation aboutthe
nature and extentofthe checks and assessm ents m ade by the
providerofeach issuerthatoffers financialproducts underthe
service;427 the directorsand seniorm anagersofthose issuers;428
the risksinvolved in those financialproducts;429 the nature and
extentofthe disclosure arrangem ents thatapply in relation to
the financialproducts offered under the service;430 the charges
that m ay be payable to the provider by an investor (or by an
issuer);431 therightsoftheprovider;432 thenatureofany restrictionsorprohibitions;433 and thenatureand extentofanyinterest
held by orin theproviderthatm ay m aterially adversely im pact
on the providersability to have fair, orderly and transparent
system s and procedures for providing the service. 434 Further,
investors m ustreceive inform ation aboutthe contactdetails of
theproviderand how theinvestorsm ay com plain abouttheservicetotheproviderand toany disputeresolution schem ethatis
available.435 Regulation 196 im poses an obligation to m ake a
warning statem ent available. 436 The required statem ent is as
follows:
Equity crowdfunding isrisky. Issuersusing thisfacility include
new orrapidlygrowingventures. Investm entin thesetypesof
businessesisveryspeculativeand carrieshigh risks. You m ay
loseyourentireinvestm ent, and m ustbein a position tobear
thisrisk withoutunduehardship. New Zealand law norm ally
requires people who offer financialproducts to give inform ation to investorsbefore they invest. Thisrequiresthoseoffering
FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg215(1)(N.Z.).
Id. atreg215(1)(f)(i).
428 Id. atreg215(
1)(f)(ii).
429 Id.
430 Id. atreg215(
1)(g).
431 Id. atreg215(
1)(h).
432 Id. atreg215(
1)(i).
433 Id. atreg215(
1)(k).
434 Id. atreg215(
1)(l).
435 Id. atreg 215(
1)(m )(n).
436 Id. atreg196(
1).
426
427
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financialproducts to have disclosed inform ation thatis im portantforinvestorstom akean inform ed decision. Theusualrules
donotapply to offersby issuersusing thisfacility. Asa result,
you m aynotbegiven alltheinform ation usuallyrequired. You
willalsohavefewerotherlegalprotectionsforthisinvestm ent.
Ask questions, read allinform ation given carefully, and seek
independentfinancialadvicebeforecom m ittingyourself.437

5. Requirement to Obtain Investor Confirmation
Regulation 197(1)requirescrowdfunding serviceprovidersto
obtain a confirm ation from an investorto the effectthatthe investorhasseen the warning statem entaboutcrowdfunding and
understands the risks involved. 438 This confirm ation m ust be
obtainedin writingin aseparatedocum ent.439
6. Issuers Must Not Breach $2 Million Aggregate Limit
The regulations lim itcom panies using crowdfunding, P2PL
services, or the sm alloffers exclusion under Schedule 1 ofthe
FMC Actto a NZ$2 m illion aggregate lim it.440 Thism eansthat
issuers m ay notraise m ore than $2 m illion from the public in
any twelve-m onth period.441 Atfirstglance, thisappearsto bea
variation of the so-called 20/12 exclusion to the prospectus
requirem ents ofthe cognate Australian legislation.442 The key
differenceisthatwhilethem onetary lim itisthesam e, theNew
Zealand provisionshave no lim iton the num berofinvestors.443
Further, thoseinvestorsneed notbe sophisticated orhave a high
networth.444
New Zealand was the firstofthe form erBritish enclaves in
the Southern Hem isphere (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore,
Australia, and New Zealand)to introduce a discrete regim e for
Id. atreg196(2).
Id. atreg197(1).
439 Id. atreg197(
2).
440 Id. atreg186(
1)(g).
441 Id.
442 See supra not
es33839 and accom panying text.
443 Fi
nancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg186(1)(g)(N.Z.).
444 Compare Fi
nancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, reg 186 (N.Z.),
with Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.)ss708(1)(7)(Austl.).
437
438
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crowdfunding. 445 The regim e introduces relaxed disclosure requirem ents, while also introducing a form ofm erit regulation
via the ability ofthe licensed interm ediaries to choose and vet
thefirm stheyplaceon theirplatform s.446
C. Crowdfunding in the United States: The New Registration
Exemption
Thesecuritiesfram ework in theUnited Statesisbased on the
Securities Act of1933 (Securities Act).447 This Act operates in
conjunction with theSecuritiesExchangeActof1934 (Exchange
Act), which created the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com m ission (SEC).448 TheActswereenacted in responsetothe1929 stock
m arketcrash.449 TheSEC isresponsibleforenforcingthesecuritieslawsand prom oting publicconfidence in capitalm arkets.450
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof2002 (SOX Act)im poses
variouscorporategovernance, accounting, and financialreporting
requirem entson com panies.451
Underthe Exchange Act, com paniesare required to register
the distribution ofsecuritieswith the SEC priorto engaging in
the interstate sale of securities. 452 This requirem ent pertains
unless one ofthree exem ptions applies under Regulation D.453
Theseexem ptionscorrespond toRules504, 505, and 506 respectively, with Rule506 havingthem ostim pact.454
445 New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 1st Year in Review, CROWDREADY,
http://www.crowdready.com .au/updates/[https://perm a.cc/9W98-KMBA].
446 Id.
447 Securi
tiesAct1933, Pub L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as15 U.S.C.A.
§77a(West2015)).
448 SEC, SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEC:A GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
ON RAISING CAPITAL AND COMPLYING WITH THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
(Oct. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/info/sm allbus/qasbsec.htm #regd [https://perm a
.cc/4ZGV-R8LK].
449 Id.
450 SEC, HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY, AND FACILITATES CAPITAL FORMATION, http:
//www.sec.gov/about/whatwe
do.shtm l[https://perm a.cc/R65L-8SP4].
451 Sarbanes-Oxl
eyActof2002, PubL. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
452 SEC, supra not
e448.
453 Id.
454 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.504506 (
2015).
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TheSEC adopted Regulation D in 1982 with theaim ofestablishing certain exem ptions for com panies that issue securities.455
The m ain purpose ofthe exem ptions is to allow com panies to
issuesecuritieswithouthavingtoregisterthem with theSEC.456
Regulation D extends to accredited investors and uses incom e
criteria fordeterm ining when theregistration requirem entdoes
notapply.457 Forexam ple, an accreditedinvestorisdefinedassom eonewho, atthetim eofthe purchase ofthe securities, hasa net
worth of$1 m illion orm ore, notincludingthevalueofhisorher
prim ary residence.458 Thisistheso-called networth testapplied
under Regulation D. 459 Alternatively, using an incom e-based
definition, an accredited investorm ay also be defined asan individualwith incom eexceeding$200,000 duringthetwom ostrecent
yearsorwith jointincom e(with a spouse)above$300,000 in each
ofthe two m ostrecentyears.460 Accredited investorstypically includebanks, financialinstitutions, variousinvestm entfunds, directors, and executive officersofan issuer;and individualssatisfying
thenetworth orincom e-baseddefinitionsappliedundertheAct.461
Section 4(a)(5)oftheSecuritiesActexem ptsa com pany from
registeringoffersand salesofsecuritieswith theSEC wherethe
totaloffering priceislessthan $5 m illion and theoffersorsales
are m ade to accredited investors.462 The com pany m ay m ake an
offeringtoan unlim ited num berofaccredited investors, butonly
up tothirty-fiveunaccredited investors.463 Therequirem entunder
Rule 506, however, is thatan unaccredited investorm usthave
such knowledge and experience in financialand businessm attersthathe iscapable ofevaluating the m eritsand risksofthe
prospective investm entorthe issuerreasonably believes im m ediatelypriortom akinganysalethatsuch purchasercom eswithin
Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present
Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings under the Securities Act of 1933, 33
AM. U. L. REV. 355, 358 (1984).
456 Id.
457 Id. at36869.
458 Id. at369;15 U.S.C.A. §77b(
a)(15)(ii)(West2015).
459 Warren, supra not
e455, at382.
460 SEC, INVESTOR BULLETIN:ACCREDITED INVESTORS, ht
tp://www.sec.gov
/investor/alerts/ib_accreditedinvestors.pdf[https://perm a.cc/5WL9-FEF9].
461 Id.
462 15 U.S.C.A §77d(
a)(5)(West2015).
463 SEC, supra not
e448.
455
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this description.464 This usually lim its offerings to accredited
investorsonly.465 Furtherm ore, the issued securitiesare regarded
as restricted securities generally offered to friends and fam ily
and purchasers m ay notresellthem withoutregistration or an
applicable exem ption.466 Accordingly, an issueris obliged to determ ine thattheinvestorispurchasing therestricted securities
forinvestm entpurposesonly, ratherthan resale.467
Asa resultofthisregulatory structure, sm allinvestorswere
generally unable to participate in investing in startups, while
startups were unable to attract funds from sm allinvestors.468
Regulation D, therefore, effectively precluded the em ergence of
crowdfundingprojectsonline, asthisinvolvestheraisingofcapitalwith publicsolicitation from unaccredited investors.469
Todate, websitessuch asKickstarterin theUnitedStateshave
notbeen used to sellsecurities.470 Thiswasintended to change
with thepassageoftheJum pstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)
Act.471 TheJOBS Actwaspassedon April5, 2012, anditwasoriginallyexpected thattheActwould beim plem ented bytheSEC by
January 1, 2013.472 PresidentObam a described the JOBS Actfor
startups and sm allbusinesses as a potentialgam e changer.473
Theprim aryaim ofthelegislation istoprom otetheform ation of
new com paniesand spurjobgrowth.474 TheActintroducesanew
term  an em erging growth com pany(EGC) and deals with
464 17

C.F.R. §230.506 (2015).
Id.
466 Warren, supra not
e455, at366 n.63.
467 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at151.
468 Cl
audia Buck, Personal Finance: Crowdfunding Helps Creative People
Raise Money for Their Projects, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www
.sacbee.com /news/local/article2577111.htm l[https://perm a.cc/A9YC-HAXK].
469 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at10.
470 Brad Ham i
lton, The Colorado Crowdfunding ActThe Online Intermediary (Part 2 of 2), BUS. FIN. & SEC. L. BLOG (May 16, 2015), https://bradh
ham ilton.wordpress.com /
2015/05/16/[https:/
/perm a.cc/X9CC-2LX9].
471 Id.
472 Id.
473 Jean Eagl
esham , Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2013, C1.
474 Thom asA. Mart
in, TheJobsActof2012:BalancingFundam entalSecurities Law Principleswith the Dem andsofthe Crowd 2 (Apr. 12, 2012)(unpublished m anuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=2040953
[https://perm a.cc/ET32-VWFP].
465
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crowdfundingaswellassm allissues.475 Thereissignificantoverlap here, asan EGC m ay issuesecuritiestoa crowd via a crowdfunding platform referred toasa funding portalin thelegislation
while also relying on the sm allissuesexem ption.476 Title I ofthe
Actisdevoted to EGCs, whileTitlesII and III dealwith crowdfundingand sm allissues.477 TitleII perm itsstartupstogenerally
solicitaccredited investors, whileTitleIII oftheJOBS Actallows
startupsand sm allbusinessesto use SEC-registered websites to
raisedebtorequitycapital, effectivelylegalizingcrowdfunding.478
TheSEC hasstated:
To theextentthatcrowdfunding rulesare successfully utilized,
the crowdfunding provisions ofthe JOBS Actshould provide
startupsand sm allbusinesseswith them eanstoraiserelatively
m odestam ountsofcapital, from a broad crosssection ofpotentialinvestors, through securities offerings that are exem pt
from registration under the Securities Act. They also should
perm itsm allinvestorstoparticipatein a widerrange ofsecuritiesofferingsthan m aybeavailablecurrently.479

Earlyeuphoria surroundingtheJOBS Actdim inished during
the rulem aking phase. Title II was im plem ented in Septem ber
2013;proposed rules under Title III cam e outin October 2013
butthen stalled, and rulesunderTitleIV (Sm allCom panyCapitalForm ation)were prom ulgated in March 2015. Itwasnotuntil
October30, 2015 thattheSEC issued revised rulesforTitleIII.480
ThespecificprovisionsoftheJOBS Actareexplored below.
Id. at8, 1314.
Jum pstartOurBusiness Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
304(h)(2012).
477 Id.
478 Ti
tle II rem ovesthe prohibition on generalsolicitation in Rule 506 (17
C.F.R. §230.506 (2015))offerings. Startupsm ay solicitaccredited investorsprovided they undertake reasonable steps to verifythe accredited statusofthe
investors. Som e notable exam plesofTitle II sitesare AngelList, FundersClub,
and CircleUp. Fordiscussion, seeIbrahim , supra note5, at11416.
479 Proposed Crowdf
undingRules, supra note253, at344.
480 See PressRel
ease, SEC, SEC AdoptsRulesto Facilitate Sm allerCom paniesAccesstoCapital(Mar. 25, 2015);PressRelease, SEC, SEC AdoptsRules
toPerm itCrowdfunding(Oct. 30, 2015). Thelatterruleswillnotcom eintoforce
until2016. Forcom m ent, seeJ.D. Harrison, SEC finalizes key JOBS Act rules
for small businesses, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com /news/on-sm all-business/wp/2015/03/25/sec-finalizes-key-jobs-act-rules-for
-sm all-businesses/[https://perm a.cc/BH78-Y95N](discussing theTitleIV rules)
475
476
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1. The Crowdfunding Exemption Under Title III of the
JOBS Act
TitleIII oftheActintroducesa new exem ption from theregistration requirem entsunderSection 5 oftheSecuritiesActof1933
in orderto facilitatecertain crowdfunding transactions.481 Thisexem ption isaddedasacrowdfundingtransactionalexem ption under
Section 4(a)(6)oftheSecuritiesAct.482 In responsetotheseam endm ents, theSEC published proposed RuleS7-09-13 in ordertoestablish a fram ework for the im plem entation ofthe exem ption.
Undertheproposed rule, acrowdfundingofferingwillfallwithin
theexem ption undertheJOBS Actifthecriteria outlined below
arem et.483
a. Limits on Maximum Funds that an Issuer Can Raise
First, thetotalam ountraised m ustnotexceed $1 m illion in a
twelve-m onth period.484 Forexam ple, astartupm ayraise$500,000
in a firstcrowdfunding and raise another$500,000 in a second
crowdfundingwithin ayear. However, when thestartuphasraised
$1 m illion in thepasttwelvem onths, itwillbeunabletoutilize
crowdfunding.485 This restriction, therefore, places the focus of
the JOBS Acton new, very early-stage com panies, ratherthan
com paniesthathavealreadyreceived crowdfunding. TheSEC has
noted in thiscontextthat
[t]helim itation on theam ountthatm ay beraised could benefit
investorsbyreducingthepotentialfordilution orfraud. However, werecognizethatthecap on them axim um am ountthat
m ay be sold also could preventcertain issuersfrom raising
allthecapitaltheyneed tom aketheirbusinessesviable.486
and Stacey Cowley, SEC puts Wall St. Spin on crowdfunding model, INT
L
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at15.
481 Jum pst
artOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, §302,
126 Stat. 306 (2012)(am ending15 U.S.C.A. §77d(6)(West2015)).
482 Id. §302(
a). Foradiscussion ofTitleIII crowdfunding, seeIbrahim , supra
note5, at136. Ibrahim arguesthatTitleIII providesfortrueequitycrowdfunding
in theUnitedStatesandrepresentsaparadigm shiftinentrepreneurialfinance.
483 Proposed Crowdf
undingRules, supra note253, at14.
484 Jum pst
artOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
485 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at83.
486 Proposed Crowdf
undingRules, supra note253, at353.
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b. Investment Caps
Second, individualinvestm entsin a twelve-m onth period are
lim ited to the greaterof$2,000 or 5 percentofan investor
s annualincom e ornetworth ifannualincom e or networth ofthe
investorislessthan $100,000, or10 percentofannualincom eor
networth (notto exceed an am ountsold of$100,000)ifannual
incom eornetworth oftheinvestoris$100,000 orm ore.487 Under
theproposedSEC rules, itisenvisagedthatan issuerwillbeableto
relyon theeffortsofaninterm ediarytodeterm inethatan investor
has notexceeded the investm entlim its.488 To rely on an interm ediary, however, theissuerm ustnothaveknowledgethatthe
investorhasexceeded orwould exceed theinvestm entlim its.489
c. Registration Requirement: Channeling ECF Through
Registered Brokers or Funding Portals
Third, transactions m ustbe conducted through a registered
brokerdealeroranew typeofregistered entity called a funding
portal.490 In thiscontext, theSEC Com m issionerhasnoted:
Undertheproposed rules, thecrowdfunding interm ediary isrequired tokeepan eyeoutforfraudandtohaveareasonablebasis
forbelieving thattheissuerhascom plied with therequirem ents
oftheexem ption. Thecrowdfunding interm ediary willalsoprovideaforum forinform ation sharing, with com m unicationsbyan
issuerorpaidprom oterclearlyidentifiedassuch.491

d. Disclosure Requirements
Com panieswishingtoconductacrowdfundingofferingwould
berequired todisclose, in an offeringdocum ent, certain inform ation, including:
Jum pstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
Proposed CrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at28.
489 Id.
490 Jum pst
artOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
491 Lui
sA. Aguilar, Com m 
r, SEC, Rem arksatSEC Open Meeting:HarnessingtheInternettoProm oteAccesstoCapitalforSm allBusinesses, WhileProtecting theInterestsofInvestors(Oct. 23, 2013)(transcriptavailableathttp://
clsbluesky.law.colum bia.edu/2013/11/19/sec-com m issioner-aguilar-discusses-the
-secs-crowdfunding-proposal/[https://perm a.cc/Z6CA-MEB9]). Fora discussion,
seeIbrahim , supra note5, at156. Ibrahim arguesthatfunding portalsought
to be redefined to function as reputational interm ediaries to prevent the
lem onsproblem sin theequitycrowdfundingm arket.
487
488
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basicinform ation abouttheissuer;492
inform ation about officers and directors and each
person owning 20 percentorm ore ofthe shares of
theissuer;493
a description ofthe business ofthe issuer and the
anticipatedbusinessplan;494
adescription ofthefinancialcondition oftheissuer...
and [the] intended use of the proceeds of the
offering;495
the targetoffering am ount... and updatesregarding
progressin m eetingthetargetofferingam ount;496
thepricetothepublicofthesecurities... ;497
certain related-party transactions;498 and
financialstatem ents ofthe issuer that, depending
on the am ount offered and sold during a twelvem onth period, would have to be accom panied by a
copy of the issuer
s tax returns or reviewed or
audited byan independentpublicaccountant.499
Theobjectiveofdisclosurein thiscontextistoallow investors
to better evaluate the quality ofthe offerings and the issuing
firm .500 Disclosure is intended to reduce inform ation asym m etry
between investors and entrepreneurs and enhance both the
transparency and efficiency ofthe [crowdfunding]m arket.501
Issuerswhoseek agreatertargetofferingam ountarerequired
to disclose m ore inform ation than those issuers who seek less
capital.502 Thelaw takesa slidingscaleapproach tothequestion
Proposed CrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at41.
Id.
494 Id.
495 Id.
496 Id.
497 Id.
498 Id. at59.
499 Id. at65.
500 Id. at391.
501 Id. at 39192. The di
sclosure rules are based on an assum ption that
crowd investorswillread the disclosure statem ents. Fora discussion on the
lim its ofdisclosure and the efficient m arkets hypothesis in the context of
crowdfunding, see Ibrahim , supra note5, at146.
502 Jum pst
art Our Business Startups (JOBS)Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105,
§302(b), 126 Stat. 306 (2012)(am ending15 U.S.C.A. §77d(6)(West2015)).
492
493
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ofthe issuer
s financialcondition.503 Forexam ple, an issuerseeking$100,000 orlessm ustonlydiscloseitsincom etaxreturnsfor
them ostrecentlycom pleted year, ifany, and financialstatem ents
certified by the principalexecutive officer.504 Conversely, where
theissuerisseeking a targetoffering am ountbetween $100,000
and $500,000, there is an obligation to disclose financialstatem ents reviewed by an independentpublic accountantin accordancewith anyapplicablestandardsand regulationspublished by
theSEC.505 Audited financialstatem entsm ustonly bedisclosed
iftheissuerisseekingan am ountabove$500,000.506
Asfarasdescribing the financialcondition ofthe issuer, the
rulesdonotprovidespecificrequirem entsasofyet.507 However,
this would likely include a discussion ofliquidity and capital
resources, aswellasrevenuesand expenses, ifapplicable.508 This
requirem entis particularly im portantfor drawing attention to
thecash needsoftheenterpriseand thelikelysourcesofcapital.
The JOBS Actalso requires a description ofthe stated purpose and intended use ofthe proceedsofthe offering,aswellas
thetargetofferingam ount.509 Thekeyrestriction here, asstated
above, isthatstartupscannotraisem orethan $1 m illion a year
using crowdfunding.510 Furtherm ore, startupsm ay choosetoraise
below $500,000 in order to avoid having to prepare financial
statem entsthatareaudited by an independentaccounting firm .
The Actdoes notcontain specific requirem ents with respectto
how the use of the proceeds section is to be described, with
firm slikely to delineate such item sasm arketing, research and
developm ent, and othercorporatepurposes.511
2. Regulation of Funding Portals or Intermediaries
A funding portalisdefined asany person acting asan interm ediary in a transaction involving the offerorsaleofsecurities
503

Id.

see also DRESNER, supra note92, at88.
Jum pstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302(b).
506 Id.
507 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at88.
508 Id.
509 Jum pst
artOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302(b).
510 Id. §302(
a)(6)(A).
511 Id. §302(
b)(1)(E)-(F).
504 Id.;
505
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forthe accountofothers, solely pursuantto Section 4(6)ofthe
Securities Act of 1933.512 The funding portal or registered
brokerisresponsiblefor, am ongotherthings, facilitating crowdfunding transactions and providing educationalinform ation to
potentialinvestors.513 TheSEC describesthefunction offunding
portalsasfollows:[t]he use ofa registered interm ediary to m atch
issuersand investorswould requirethattheyincurcertain transactions costs necessary to support the interm ediation activity,
butalso would provide centralized venues forcrowdfunding activitiesthatshould lowerinvestorand issuersearch costs.514
Further, the SEC has stated the requirem ent [to conduct
crowdfunding cam paignsthrough online portals]should help issuersgain exposure to a wide range ofpotentialinvestors, who
alsom aybenefitfrom havingnum erousinvestm entopportunities
aggregated in one place, resulting in lowersearch costs orburdensrelated to identifying suitable investm entopportunities.515
A portalcannotengage in soliciting purchases, sales, or offerstobuysecuritiesoffered ordisplayed on itswebsiteorportal,
and itm usttake various m easures to reduce fraud risk.516 For
exam ple, an interm ediary m ust register with applicable selfregulatory organizationsand conductduediligencem easures.517
The portalis prohibited from holding, m anaging, or otherwise
handlinginvestorfundsorsecurities, andcannotofferinvestm ent
adviceorrecom m endations.518 Theserestrictionsaredesigned to
protectinvestors.519 Com m enting on the latterrequirem ent, the
SEC notes the requirem ent that the [bank] account in which
funds are deposited be exclusively for the benefit ofinvestors
15 U.S.C.A. §78c(a)(West2015).
Proposed CrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at378.
514 Id. For di
scussion, see Ibrahim , supra note 5, at 15455. The author
arguesthatfunding portalsshould notbe envisioned aspassive entities, but
as active reputational interm ediaries whose role is not sim ply to m atch
buyersand sellersbutto serveassignalsofstartup quality. Funding portals
should beprim arily tied tostartups, notinvestors. See Joan Macleod Heminway,
The New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the Crowdfund
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2013).
515 Proposed Crowdf
undingRules, supra note253, at388.
516 Jum pst
artOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
517 Id.
518 15 U.S.C.A. §78c(
h)(2015).
519 Proposed Crowdf
undingRules, supra note253, at401.
512
513
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and theissuerwould help preventtheinterm ediaryorotherpartiesfrom claim ing orotherwiseunlawfully taking fundsfrom that
account.520 The restriction on offering investm ent advice correspondstosim ilarprohibitionson broker-dealers.521
Congress placed specialem phasis on the educationalrole of
the funding portal, requiring portals to ensure that investors
havereviewed any relevantinform ation.522 Interm ediariesm ust
therefore am ong other things provide general disclosure to
investorsabouttheinherentrisksinvolved in equity crowdfunding.523 Further, investorsm ustpositivelyaffirm thattheyunderstand they risk losingtheentireinvestm entand m ustbeableto
bearsuch loss.524 Investorsm ustanswerquestionswith theaim
ofdem onstrating an understanding ofthelevelofrisk generally
applicabletoinvestm entsin startups, em erging businesses, and
sm allissuers;an understanding oftherisk ofilliquidity;and an
understanding ofsuch other m atters as the Com m ission determ ines appropriate.525 It is unclear how these requirem ents,
particularly the latter, are to be im plem ented and whetherthe
insertion ofsuch m atters into a websitesterm s and conditions
would suffice for the interm ediary to ensure thatinvestors are
awareoftherisksinvolved.
a. Electronic Bulletin Boards
Crowdfunding interm ediariesm ay include an electronicbulletin board thatallowspotentialinvestorstocom m unicateabout
an offering.526 This is nota legalrequirem entunder the JOBS
Act, although itwasincluded in an earlierversion ofthe House
crowdfunding bill.527 The SEC m ay adoptsuch a bulletin board
requirem entforfundingportalsaspartofitsadditionalrules.528
The bulletin board would function as an open forum , allowing
Id.
Jum pstartOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
522 Id.
523 Id. Wi
th this view, funding portalsprim ary relationship is that with
investors. See Ibrahim , supra note5, at15658.
524 Jum pst
artOurBusinessStartups(JOBS)Act§302.
525 Id.
526 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at119.
527 Ent
repreneurAccesstoCapitalActof2011, 112 H.R. 2930 §2(b)(2011).
528 See Proposed Crowdf
undingRules, supra note253, at34.
520
521
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thepublictoshareknowledgeaboutinvestm entrisks, businesses,
and particular entrepreneurs. 529 The SEC has stated that a
prem iseofcrowdfunding isthatinvestorswould rely, atleastin
part, on the collective wisdom ofthe crowd to m ake better inform ed investm entdecisions.530
b. Material Misstatements and Omissions
TitleIII oftheJOBS Actintroducesacauseofaction underthe
newlycreated section 4a(c)oftheSecuritiesAct.531 Thiscauseof
action is specifically targeted atcrowdfunding offerings.532 Pursuantto Section 4(a)(c), issuersare subjectto liability form aterialm isstatem entsorfailing to com ply with relevantdisclosure
obligations.533 Liability willattach regardless ofthe issuer
s knowl534
edge or intent. Section 4(a)(c)operates alongside the general
anti-fraudprovisionsofSection 10(b)oftheSecuritiesExchangeAct
andRule10b-5. Theserulesalsoapplytocrowdfundingofferings.535
c. EGCs
An EGC is defined as an issuer thathad totalannualgross
revenues of less than $1,000,000 ... during its m ost recently
com pleted financialyear.536 Thisdefinition isintended to cover
startup com panies. 537 EGC status confers special benefits on
DRESNER, supra note92, at120.
Proposed CrowdfundingRules, supra note253, at376. However, asthe
rules presently stand, itis unclear whether a funding portalcould hostan
online discussion am ong investors aboutthe quality ofthe startups. For a
critique, see Ibrahim , supra note 5, at15657. Ibrahim argues thatTitle III
should beam ended toallow funding portalstofunction astruereputationalinterm ediariesforthestartupstheylist. Thiswould entailgreaterduediligence
on partofthe interm ediaries and allow interm ediaries to signala com pany
s
quality, and thus, reduceinform ation asym m etriestosuch an extentastopreventtheem ergenceofam arketforlem ons.
531 Jum pst
art Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, 15 U.S.C.A.
§77d-1(c)(West2012).
532 Id. §77d-1.
533 Id. §77d-1(
c)(2)(A).
534 Id. §77d-1(
c)(2).
535 See generally id. §77d-1.
536 Id. §77b(
a)(19).
537 Id.
529
530
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com panies, including an exem ption from certain executive pay
disclosurerequirem entsand accountdisclosurerequirem ents.538
There isa wholesale exem ption from Section 404(b)ofthe SOX
Act, which im posesinternalcontrolsand auditing requirem ents,
and EGCs are also exem ptfrom m andatory auditfirm rotation
rules.539 Asfarasinvestorcom m unicationsareconcerned, EGCs
arefreetocom m unicateopenly with qualified institutionalbuyersand accredited institutionalinvestors.540 Forexam ple, EGCs
can engagein generalsolicitation and generaladvertising when
m aking offeringsto accredited investors. The JOBS ActspecificallyinstructstheSEC tom odifyitsrulesin thiscontextand lift
anysuch banswith respecttoEGCs.541
d. Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemptions
Dissatisfaction with theslow im plem entation ofruleson crowdfundingundertheJOBsActhasresulted in statesenactingtheir
own intrastatecrowdfunding exem ptions.542 Onereportm aintains
thatthirteen stateshaveintrastatecrowdfundingexem ptionsin
place, while fourteen other states are considering such exem ptions.543 Com pliancecostsaresaid tobem uch lowerunderintrastateexem ptionsascom pared with thefederalrules.544 Exam ples
ofintrastateexem ptionsaretheKansasExem ption (effectivesince
August 2011),545 the InvestGeorgia Exem ption (effective since
Decem ber 2012),546 as wellas the Michigan547 and Wisconsin548
exem ptions. However, according tostatesecuritiesregulators, few
firm shavetakenadvantageofthenew fundraisingexem ptions.549
Id. §7262(b).
Id.
540 Id. §77e(
d).
541 Id.
542 See State of the StatesList of Current Active and Proposed Intrastate
Crowdfunding Exemptions (Updated), CROWDFUNDINGLEGALHUB, http://crowd
fundinglegalhub.com /[https://perm a.cc/D62A-UQP4].
543 Id.
544 See Crowdfunding exemption movement, WIKIPEDIA, ht
tps://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/
Crowdfunding_exem ption_m ovem ent[https://perm a.cc/T8DU-MGQA].
545 K AN. ADMIN. REGS. §81-5-21 (
2011).
546 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-08 (
2012).
547 2013 Mi
ch. Pub. Acts167.
548 WIS. STAT. ANN. §551.202 (
West2014).
549 Lot
en & Sim on, supra note1, atB5.
538
539
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D. Crowdfunding in the European Union
Crowdfunding plays an im portant role as an alternative
source of financing in the European Union. 550 It is estim ated
that in 2012, about 735 m illlion was raised for all form s of
crowdfunding in Europe.551 The figure is ratherm arginalwhen
com pared to traditionalretail bank-lending and non-financial
institutions (6 trillion in 2011), butrelatively significantwhen
com pared to the financing provided by business angels (visible
m arket segm ent estim ated at 660 m illion in 2010)or venture
capitalists in seed, startup, later, and growth stages (7 billion
in 2012).552
A survey conducted by the European Com m ission in 2014
found thatm ore than 75 percentofprojectowners saw crowdfunding as a viable m eans to reduce dependence on banks and
othertraditionalm eansoffinance.553 Moreover, theprojectownerssaw crowdfundingasa usefulwaytotestm arketdem and for
theirproductsand services.554 Therespondentssaw theprim ary
benefits ofcrowdfunding as being com m unity involvem ent, engagem entin innovation, thedem ocratization offinance, and the
em powerm entofentrepreneurs.555 Thus, crowdfunding hasbeen
likened toangelinvestingforthem asses.556
In June 2014, the European Com m ission set up an Expert
Group the European Crowdfunding Stakeholders Forum  to
exam ine the potentialand risksofcrowdfunding.557 The task of
See EUR. COMM
N, CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU EXPLORING THE ADDED
VALUE OF POTENTIAL EU ACTION (
Oct. 2013), http://clientebancario.bportugal
550

.pt/pt-PT/Publicacoes/Organism osInternacionais/Docum ents/CE_Consultation
_Crowd funding.pdf[https://perm a.cc/N7B8-WU5B].
551 EUR. COMM
N, UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CROWDFUNDING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_m arket/finances
/
docs/crowdfunding/
140327-com m unication_en.pdf[https:
/
/
perm a.cc/
Q4YC-YF65].
552 Id.
553 EUR. COMM
N, SUMMARY RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON
CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU (Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_m arket
/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/sum m ary-of-responses_en.pdf [https://
perm a.cc/5F9F-DA32].
554 Id.
555 Id.
556 See Hornuf& Schwi
enbacher, supra note232, at11.
557 EUR. COMM
N, CROWDFUNDING, http:
//ec.europa.eu/internal_m arket/fi
nances/crowdfunding/index_en.htm [https://perm a.cc/J52A-GE57].
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theGroup isto assistthe Com m ission in developing policiesfor
crowdfundingand, m oregenerally, toraiseawarenesswith respect
tocrowdfundingin thewiderfinancialecosystem .558 Furtherm ore,
theGroupwillassesswhetherregulatoryintervention isnecessary
attheE.U. level, asthereiscurrentlynocoherentfram ework in
place. 559 Earlier, in March of2014, the European Com m ission
adopted a com m unication on crowdfunding.560 The com m unication expressly identifiessom eofthechallengestocrowdfunding,
including lack ofawareness and understanding am ongstentrepreneurs, challengesrelated tothe protection ofintellectualproperty, fraud, legaluncertainty, andconsum erprotectionconcerns.561
However, the Com m ission also recognizesthe high potential
benefits that crowdfunding m ay yield, including innovation,
research and developm ent, econom icgrowth, com m unity developm ent, and job creation.562 Supporting crowdfunding, therefore, is
seen asan im portantaspectofdrivingeconom icdevelopm ent.563 In
its Entrepreneurship 2020 Action PlanReigniting the Entrepreneurial Spirit in Europe, theUnion noted thatitseekstoincrease
the levelofem ploym entby reinforcing entrepreneurship.564 Accordingly, the European Union invites m em ber states to [a]ssess
theneed ofam ending currentnationalfinanciallegislation with
the aim offacilitating new, alternative form s offinancing for
startupsand SMEs[sm alltom edium enterprises]in general, in
particular as regards platform s for crowd funding ....565 In its
Consultation Paper on Crowdfunding, theCom m ission observed:
In the context of SME
s finance ecosystem , it appears that
crowdfunding m ay respond to the needsofm any sm allstartupsthatdonotm anagetoaccessbank finance, venturecapital
558 EUR. COMM
N, CROWDFUNDING FOR THE CULTURAL AND CREATIVE SECTORS:
KICK-STARTING THE CULTURAL ECONOMY (Mar. 2015), http://ec.europa.eu
/culture/calls/general/0315/reference_en.pdf[https://perm a.cc/J9LB-S3C4].
559 EUR. COMM
N, UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CROWDFUNDING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Mar. 2014), http://
ec.europa.eu/
internal_m arket/
finances/docs
/crowdfunding/140327-com m unication_en.pdf[https://perm a.cc/Q4YC-YF65].
560 Id.
561 Id.
562 Id.
563 See id.
564 EUR. COMM
N, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2020 ACTION PLAN REIGNITING THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IN EUROPE (Oct. 2013), http://eur-lex.europa.eu
[https://perm a.cc/C4M7-556G].
565 Id.
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or reach the stage of initial public offering (IPO). Crowdfunding could thuscontribute to bridging the finance gap for
sm all firm s and innovative projects. It could com plem ent
other sources offinance. Better access to finance for sm all
businesses would prom ote entrepreneurship and ultim ately
contribute to growth and job creation. Crowdfunding creates
opportunities to turn larger groups ofpeople, who otherwise
would nothave access to traditionalchannels offinance, into
sm all-scaleentrepreneurs.566

1. The Development of Crowdfunding in the European Union
Crowdfundinghasbeen abletodevelop in theEuropean Union
asa resultofa num beroffactors, including prospectusrules.567
The relevantE.U. regulatory fram ework presently applying to
financialreturn crowdfunding(i.e., crowdinvestingandcrowdlending)includestheDirectiveson Prospectus,568 Paym entServices,569
Markets in FinancialInstrum ents,570 CapitalRequirem ents,571
Alternative Investm entFund Managers,572 Consum erCredit,573
DistanceMarketing ofFinancialServices;574 and theRegulations
on Capital Requirem ents, 575 European Venture Capital,576 and
European Social Entrepreneurship Funds. 577 No specific crowdfundingrules, however, applyattheE.U. level.578 Thus, thereisno
com prehensive E.U. crowdfunding legislation, and m em berstates
arefreetodevisetheirowncrowdfunding-specificlawsandrules.579
EUR. COMM
N, CONSULTATION PAPER:CROWDFUNDING IN THE EU EXPLORING THE ADDED VALUE OF POTENTIAL EU ACTION 7 (
Oct. 2013), http://
566

ec.europa.eu/internal_m arket/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/consulta
tion-docum ent_en.pdf[https://perm a.cc/93E9-MUYA].
567 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at20405.
568 See Counci
lDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345)64(E.U.).
569 See Counci
lDirective2007/64, art. 1, 2007 O.J. (L 319)1, 12 (E.U.).
570 See Counci
lDirective2004/39, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 145)(E.U.). ThePaym entServicesDirective m ightapply also to crowd sponsoring, where the businessm odeladopted issuch thatitfallsunderthescopeofthisinstrum ent.
571 Id.
572 See Counci
lDirective2011/61, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 174)1, 14(E.U.).
573 See Counci
lDirective2008/48, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 133)66, 71 (E.U.).
574 Counci
lDirective2002/65, 2002 O.J. (L 271)16 (E.U.).
575 Com m i
ssion Regulation 575/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 176)1 (E.U.).
576 Com m i
ssion Regulation 345/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 115)1, 8 (E.U.).
577 Com m i
ssion Regulation 346/2013, art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L 115)18, 26 (E.U.).
578 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at203, 206.
579 Id. at20405.
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Turning toprospectusrequirem ents, however, itisclearthat
the E.U. Prospectus Directive hasdirectly facilitated the developm entofcrowdfunding.580 The Directive was am ended by Directive 2010/73/EU of Novem ber 24, 2010, which establishes
exem ptions from the obligation to publish a prospectus.581 For
exam ple, ifan offer is solely addressed to qualified investors,
there is no need to publish a prospectus.582 The Directive also
m andates thatofferings of5 m illion or m ore m ustbe m ade in
accordance with an approved prospectus.583 Where an offering,
however, falls below 5 m illion, it is subject to prospectus requirem entsm adebyindividualE.U. m em berstates.584 Thus, the
E.U. fram ework allowsm em berstatestosettheirown prospectus requirem ents with respectto offerings below 5 m illion.585
Mem ber states cannotrequire publication ofa prospectus with
respect to offerings below 100,000.586 Accordingly, offerings of
less than 100,000 are exem pt from the obligation to publish a
prospectus and crowdfunders are able to raise capitalwithout
beingsubjecttosuch arequirem ent.587
Itrem ains to be seen whetherspecificcrowdfunding legislation willbeadoptedattheE.U. level. Obviously, oneofthedangers
ofhavingdivergentregulatoryapproachesin placein each m em berstateisthatthism ayresultin afragm ented internalm arket
and, ultim ately, a lack ofgrowth ofEuropean crowdfunding in
the long term . Som e statistics indicate that the lack ofinform ation aboutapplicable rules prevents som e equity crowdfunding platform s from operating in m ore than one E.U. country.588
Moreover, thecostofobtainingauthorization tooperatein another
CouncilDirective 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345)64, 71 (E.U.)(regarding the
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or adm itted totradingand am endingDirective2001/34/EC).
581 Counci
lDirective2010/73, 2010 O.J. (L 327)1, 6 (E.U.).
582 Id. at6.
583 Id. at5;see also Counci
lDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345)(E.U.).
584 Counci
lDirective2003/71, 2003 O.J. (345)(E.U.); see CouncilDirective
2010/73, 2010 O.J. (L 327)5 (E.U.).
585 Counci
lDirective2003/71, supra note584;see CouncilDirective2010/73,
supra note584, at5.
586 Counci
lDirective2010/73, supra note584, at2, 7.
587 Id.
588 EUR. COMM
N, CROWDFUNDING INNOVATIVE VENTURES IN EUROPE:THE
FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEM AND REGULATORY LANDSCAPE (
2014).
580
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m em ber state m ay be prohibitive, and crowdfunding platform s
m ay foregothebenefitsofoperating beyond thebordersoftheir
m em berstate.589
Ifim plem ented properly, E.U.-levelcrowdfunding rulesm ay
prom ote the em ergence ofcross-bordercrowdfunding platform s.
Thedelaysaround theim plem entation oftheJOBS Act, however,
would seem to suggestthatthisprocessin the European Union
m ay, asin theUnitedStates, belongandprotected.590 Accordingly,
an alternative to adopting crowdfunding-specific rules at the
E.U. levelisim plem entinga m utualrecognition regim ewhereby
each m em berstate would be required to perm ita crowdfunding
platform tooperatewithin itsborderssolong astheplatform is
properly regulated in its hom e jurisdiction.591 The advantage of
adopting thisapproach isthatitwould allow m em berstatesto
adopttheirown rules with respectto crowdfunding.592 Alternatively, theEuropean Union m ayoptforaclear, unified approach
tocrowdfundingbyadoptingasetofcom prehensiverulesthatset
m inim um requirem entsand apply tocrowdfunding platform sin
allm em berstates.
2. The United Kingdom as a European Example
TheUnitedKingdom possessesoneofthem ostdevelopedcrowdfundingm arketsin theEuropean Union.593 A reportpublished in
2013 indicated thatloan-based crowdfundingplatform sraised 480
m illion poundssterling in 2013, ofwhich 287 m illion wasloaned
to individuals an increase of126 percentcom pared to 2012.594
589 See Yong Li& ShakerA. Zahra, Formal institutions, culture, and venture
capital activity: A cross-country analysis, 27 J. OF BUS. VENTURING 95 (2012).
590 Kendal
lAlm erico, SEC Delays Equity Crowdfunding Piece of JOBS Act
for Another Year, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur
.com /article/240558 [https://perm a.cc/G9Y9-HXSB].
591 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at210.
592 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at211.
593 See generally AndyDavi
s, Beyond the Banks: Innovative Ways to Finance
Britains Small Businesses, NAT
L ENDOWMENT FOR SCI. TECH. AND THE ARTS
(Sept. 2011), https://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/beyond_the_banks
_innovative_ways_to_finance_britains_sm all_businesses.pdf [https://perm a.cc
/57AQ-DV9X].
594 NAT
L ENDOWMENT FOR SCI. TECH. AND THE ARTS, THE RISE OF FUTURE
FINANCE, THE UK ALTERNATIVE FINANCING BENCHMARKING REPORT 44 (Dec.
2013), cited in FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., POLICY STATEMENT 2014(2014), http://
www

432 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:347
A totalof193 m illion poundssterling wasloaned tobusinesses,
an increase of211 percentcom pared to 2012;investm ent-based
crowdfundingplatform sraised 28 m illion poundssterlingin 2013,
an increaseof618 percentcom pared to2012.595
a. The First U.K. Platforms
Investm ent-based crowdfunding in the United Kingdom tends
to be dom inated by two platform s:Crowdcube and Seedrs. 596
Launched in February of2011, Crowdcube wasthe firstBritish
equity platform and, atthe tim e ofits com m encem ent, lacked
authorization by the FinancialServices Authority (FSA) which
has since been split into the PrudentialRegulation Authority
and theFinancialConductAuthority(FCA).597
Crowdcube relied on the so-called intragroup offering exem ption when launching its platform .598 This exem ption allows
a group com pany toissuesharessolely toshareholdersofanother
m em berofthe sam e corporate group and, thereby, bypasssecuritiesregulations.599 Utilizingthisexem ption, Crowdcubeallowed
investorstobecom enom inalshareholdersofa Crowdcubegroup
com pany and investin startup com paniesseeking capital, which
were also Crowdcube group com panies, with Crowdcube typically
takingm orethan 50 percentofthesharecapitalin a startup and
handing back the shares to the originalowners after attracting
capitalfrom investors. 600 In February of2013, Crowdcube obtained FSA authorization and now sim plyinterm ediatesa direct
shareissuancefrom thestartup toinvestors.601
Crowdcubeoperatesasa pureinterm ediary only. Thism odel
m ay be com pared to thatofSeedrs, which launched in 2012.602
UnlikeCrowdcube, Seedrstakesanum berofstepsin each crowdfundingtransaction, includingapprovingeach listingasafinancial
.fca.org.uk/static/docum ents/policy-statem ents/ps14-04.pdf [https:/
/perm a.cc/ZU
9S-87A9].
595 Id.
596 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at52.
597 Id. at206.
598 Id.
599 Id.
600 Id. at20607.
601 Id. at207.
602 Id.
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prom otion and conducting due diligence on each startup. Other
platform s thathave em erged are CrowdBnk, FundtheGap, and
BanktotheFuture.603 These platform s are now subjectto regulation bytheFCA, assuccessortotheFSA, and thecodeofpractice
published by the U.K. Crowdfunding Association. 604 The FCA
regulations are considered first, followed by a discussion ofthe
codeofpractice.
b. FCA Regulation
In theUnited Kingdom , crowdfunding fallswithin theregulatoryscopeoftheFCA.605 Broadly speaking, them ain aim softhe
FCA includeconsum erprotection and theprom otion ofeffective
com petition in consum er m arkets. 606 In October of 2013, the
FCA published a consultation paperoutlining itsproposaltoregulate both the loan-based and investm ent-based crowdfunding
industries.607 Following consultation, in March of2014, theFCA
publishedasetofrulestoregulatethecrowdfundingindustry.608
Theserulescam eintoforcein April2014 butaresubjecttocertain transitionalprovisions.609 The FCA has stated thatits aim s
in regulatingthecrowdfundingindustryare, on theonehand, to
m ake crowdfunding m ore accessible to a wider, butrestricted,
audienceofinvestorsand, on the otherhand, to ensure thatonly
those retailinvestorswho can understand and bearthe various
risks involved are invited to invest in unlisted shares or debt
securities.610 Further, the FCA observes: If [interm ediaries]
targetthiswiderbutstillrestricted audience ofretailinvestors
appropriately, thism ayresultin greateraccesstoalternative(nonbank)finance options for businesses seeking finance.611 Hence,
thekeyprem iseunderpinningtheU.K. approach toequitycrowdfundingistom akecrowdfundingavailabletoarestrictedaudience
Id.
See UK CROWDFUNDING ASS
N, CODE OF PRACTICE, http:
//www.ukcfa
.org.uk/code-of-practice-2 [https://perm a.cc/DB8U-ULQQ].
605 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra not
e2, at1015.
606 Id. §1.22.
607 Id. at10.
608 Id. at9.
609 Id. at12.
610 Id. at36.
611 Id.
603
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ofinvestors, thereby lim iting thoseinvestorswhocan participate
in ECF cam paigns.612
Thenew FCA rulesapplytotwocategoriesoffinancing:loanbased crowdfunding thatextendsto peer-to-peerplatform s(these
coverloansfrom individualinvestorstootherindividuals), peerto-businesslendingplatform s(coveringloansfrom individualsto
businesses), ora com bination ofthese m odels, and investm entbasedcrowdfundingplatform sbywhich consum erspurchaseshares
or debt securities in new or em erging com panies.613 The m ain
policy rationales underpinning the rules are the protection of
retailinvestorswho, owingtoalack ofknowledge, experience, or
resources, m ay incursignificantfinanciallosses;and theeffective
prom otion ofcom petition within thecrowdfundingm arkets.614 The
rules do notextend to donation-based or rewards-based crowdfunding. 615 Accordingly, som e crowdfunding activities rem ain
unregulated in theUnited Kingdom .616
Interestingly, the FCA regards loan-based crowdfunding as
involving fewer risks than investm ent-based crowdfunding. 617
Them ain thrustoftherulesistorequireloan-based crowdfundingplatform stofollow certain capitalrequirem entsrules, describe
risksaccurately, and haveresolution plansin placetoadm inister
loansin casetheplatform fails.618 Forexam ple, therulesexpressly
statethat
[a]n operator ofan electronic system in relation to lending
m usttake reasonable stepsto ensure thatarrangem entsare
in place to ensure thatP2P agreem ents facilitated by itwill
continue to be m anaged and adm inistered, in accordance
with the contractterm s, ifatany tim e itceases to carry on
the activity ofoperating an electronic system in relation to
lending.619

Id.
Id. at4.
614 Id. at5.
615 Id. at11.
616 Id.
617 Id. at6.
618 See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK:SYSC AVAILABLE,
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SYSC/4/1.pdf[https://
perm a.cc/HA
2D-WLC4].
619 Id. atRul
e4.1.8A (em phasisrem oved).
612
613
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Such arrangem entsm ay includeentering intoan agreem entwith
anotherfirm totakeoverthem anagem entand adm inistration of
the P2P agreem ent;holding sufficientcollateralin a segregated
accounttocoverthecostsofm anagem entand adm inistration in
the eventofplatform failure;and m anaging the loan book in a
m anner thatensures thatincom e from P2P agreem ents facilitated bythefirm issufficienttocoverthecostsofm anagingand
adm inistering loans during the winding down process. 620 The
FCA referstoloan agreem entsasP2P agreem ents.621
The m inim um financialresourcesto be held by a loan-based
crowdfunding platform are the higher ofthe following:£20,000
(increasingto£50,000 from 1 April2017);orthesum of:
(1)0.3% ofthevolum eofloanedfundsupto£50 m illion;
(2)0.2% ofthevolum eofloaned fundsabove£50 m illion
upto£500 m illion;and
(3)0.1% thevolum eofloanedfundsabove£500 m illion.622
Thetotalvalueofloaned fundsoutstanding isdefined asthe
totalam ountoffunds thatare currently being provided to borrowersunderP2P agreem entsthrough an operatorofan electronic
system in relation tolending.623
Asfarasdisclosureisconcerned, exam plesofthetypesofinform ation firm s are expected to disclose to explain the specific
natureand risksofaP2P agreem entincludethefollowing:
expectedand actualdefaultrates;
a sum m aryoftheassum ptionsused in determ ining
expected futuredefaultrates;
a description ofhow loan risk isassessed, including
adescription ofthecriteriathatm ustbem etbythe
borrowerbeforethefirm considerstheborrowereligibleforaP2P agreem ent;
the creditworthiness assessm ent of the borrower
carried out;whethertheP2P agreem entbenefitsfrom
any security and, ifso, what;a fair description of
Id. atRule4.1.8C.
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note594, at5.
622 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra not
e2, at21.
623 Id. app. 1 at9.
620
621
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thelikelyactualreturn, takingintoaccountdefault
ratesand taxation;
an explanation ofhow any tax liability forlenders
arising from investm ents into P2P agreem ents
would becalculated;
an explanation of the firm 
s procedure for dealing
with lateloan paym entsand loansin default;
theprocedurefora lendertoaccesstheirm oneybeforetheP2P agreem enthasexpired;and,
lastly, an explanation ofwhatwould happen ifthe
firm fails.624
c. Authorization Requirements for P2PL Platforms
The rules require firm s running loan-based crowdfunding
platform sasofApril1, 2014, toapplyforfullauthorization from
the FCA.625 Transitionalarrangem entsapply to firm sthathold
a consum er credit license from the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT).626 The FCA assum ed responsibility for the regulation of
consum er creditm arkets from the OFT on April1, 2014.627 All
firm s are required to becom e fully authorized by March 31,
2017.628 However, OFT-regulatedloan-basedcrowdfundingfirm s
are notsubjectto the new prudentialstandards untilthey becom efullyFCA-authorized.629 Firm swith avalid OFT licenseon
March 31, 2014 are granted interim perm ission and will be
able to continue carrying on the consum ercreditactivitiesthey
arelicensed foruntilthey becom eauthorized.630 Upon becom ing
fully FCA-authorized, firm s m ustsubm itfinancialand prudentialreporting returns. 631 The FCA requires loan-based crowdfunding firm stocom ply with regularreporting requirem ents.632
In addition, therulesprovideinvestorswith a righttocom plain,
624 FIN.

CONDUCT AUTH., supra note2, app. 1 at32.
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note2, at12.
626 Id.
627 Id. at4.
628 Id. at21.
629 Id.
630 Id. at12.
631 Id. at12, 34.
632 Id. at3435.
625
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in thefirstinstance, tothefirm runningtheplatform , and in the
second instance, totheFinancialOm budsm an Service.633
d. Restricting the Category of Investors Participating in
ECF Campaigns
Asstated, thenew rulesalsoextend tofirm sthatoperateinvestm ent-based crowdfunding platform son which consum erscan
investintoequity ordebtsecuritiesthatarenotlisted ortraded
on recognized stock exchanges.634 In thiscontext, the FCA is of
the view that, given the significant risks investors face when
investingin unlisted securitiesthatarehard topriceorsellon a
secondary m arket, firm s offering investm ents on crowdfunding
platform s (or other m edia)m ay only m ake a directoffer financialprom otionto a restricted category ofinvestors.635 Theseare
professionalclients, retailclientswho are advised, retailclients
classified as corporate finance contracts orventure capitalcontracts, sophisticated or high net worth retailclients, or retail
clientswhoconfirm thattheywillnotinvestm orethan 10 percent
of their net investible assets into these products. 636 A direct
offerfinancialprom otionisdefined as(a)an offerbythefirm or
anotherperson to enterinto a controlled agreem ent with any
person who respondsto the com m unication, or(b)an invitation
to any person who responds to the com m unication to m ake an
offer to the firm or another person to enter into a controlled
agreem ent, and which specifies the m anner ofresponse or includesa form by which a responsem ay bem ade.637 Accordingly,
theFCA seekstorestrictdirectofferfinancialprom otionsbutnot
allprom otions. Forexam ple, ifa com m unication only givesgeneralm arketinginform ation aboutthefirm , itdoesnotfallwithin
thisdefinition. Conversely, therestriction willapplyifinform ation
isprovidedaboutaspecifiedinvestm entopportunity.638
Therestriction described aboveisintended toprotectretailinvestorswhoaresubjecttospecialrisks. Such risksin thecontext
Id. at33.
at36.
635 Id. at7.
636 Id. at67.
637 Id. at31.
638 Id. at37.
633

634 Id.
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ofinvestm ent-basedcrowdfundingincludetherisk ofcapitalloss,
which isexacerbated ifthepriceofthesecurityisover-valued or
where the security is a long-term debtsecurity which willnot
return capitalforuptotwentytotwenty-fiveyears.639 Additionally,
investorsfacethe risk ofdilution ofshareholdervalue, illiquidity
risks, and therisk thatdividendsm aynotbedeclared.640 Illiquidity risks arise because there m ay not be a secondary m arket
through which shares or debtsecurities acquired through ECF
orP2PL platform sm aybesold.641 Asa result, theprofitableexit
routeislikelytobethesaleoftheventuretoathird party.
The FCA considerslonger-term illiquid unlisted debtsecurities offered by com panies to carry m ore risk ofcapitalloss for
investorsvis-à-visshort-term P2P agreem ents.642 Consequently,
theFCA m aintainsa cleardistinction in itsregulatoryapproach
between P2P agreem entsand non-readily realizable securities.643
Thus, ifan individualsignsaRestrictedInvestorStatem ent, firm s
can com m unicate directofferfinancialprom otionsfornon-readily
realizable securities to thatindividualfor twelve m onths after
thedateofthestatem ent.644 Firm shaveanobligationtosatisfythat
therearevalid statem entsin placeatthetim etheycom m unicate
aprom otion, butfirm sarenotrequiredtoensurethatindividuals
qualify asrestricted investorson an ongoing basis.645
e. The U.K. Crowdfunding Association Code of Practice
Crowdfunding platform s wishing to obtain m em bership in
theU.K. CrowdfundingAssociation m ustadheretotheprinciples
setoutin the United Kingdom Crowdfunding Association Code
ofPractice.646 The principles apply to both FCA authorized and
non-authorized platform s.647 The key principles can be sum m arized asfollows:
See id.
Id. at15.
641 Id.
642 Id. at37.
643 Id. at66.
644 Id. app. 1 at17.
645 Id. app. 1 at1617.
646 UK CROWDFUNDING ASS
N, CODE OF PRACTICE (
2014), http://www
.ukcfa.org.uk/code-of-practice-2 [https://perm a.cc/U932-47H3].
647 Id.
639
640
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Investm entsand donationsare to be keptseparate
from thebusiness, in clientaccountsorsim ilarsegregatedm oney-handlingstructures.
Transparency isregarded asparam ount. Investors
and donors m ust be able to see inform ation on
where their m oney is keptas wellas the am ount
andanytransactions.
Firm s m ustput processes in place to ensure that
investm entholdingsare accessible in the eventthat
thefirm ceasestooperate.
Firm s agree to provide a cooling-offperiod in case
investorsordonorschangetheirm ind afterm aking
an investm entordonation.
Term sandconditionsm ustbeclearlywritten andset
outand explain exactlyhow theinvestm entprocess
works, whatthedutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheplatform sare, whatduediligencehasbeen undertaken,
andwhatfeesand chargeswillapplyandwhen.
Executive Directors details will be published on
theU.K. CrowdfundingAssociation website.
Firm s m ustensure their IT system s and business
processesare secure, reliable, and proportionate to
thenature, scale, and com plexityofthebusinessand
are sufficiently robustto facilitate com pliance with
applicablelaw, regulations, andtheCodeofConduct.
Firm s m ustcom ply with the laws and regulations
applicable to their sales and m arketing activity,
and ensurethatallU.K. Crowdfunding Association
m em berscom m unications are fair, clear, and not
m isleading;thatrisksand potentialreturnsarepresented in a balanced way;and thatinvestors and
donorsaretreated fairly.
Ifinvestorsordonorsare unhappy aboutany aspect
of a m em ber
s service, they are able to com plain,
and firm s willpublish their perform ance on com plaintson theU.K. CrowdfundingAssociation website
everyyear.648

648

Id.
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3. The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and France
TheNetherlandsisgenerallyranked highlyin term sofnum berofcrowdfunding platform s.649 Theleadingequity platform in
the Netherlands is Sym bid. 650 Sym bid operates in a m anner
wherebyso-calledcooperativeshold sharesoftheunderlyingstartups, and investorscan acquirem em bership unitsin thecooperatives. 651 Cooperatives allow an interm ediary to m anage the
shares ofthe underlying com pany.652 Adopting this cooperative
structurehasallowedSym bidtobypasstherequirem entofseekingauthorization from aregulatoryauthority.653
In Germ any, thereareanum berofcrowdfundingplatform s, includingBankless24, Bergfürst, Berlin Crowd, BestBC, Com panisto,
Crowdrange, DeutscheMikroinvest, Devexo, Fundsters, Gründerplus, Innovestm ent, MyBusinessBacker, Power4Projects, Seedm atch, StartkapitalOnline, and United Equity.654 One portal
Com panisto has setup a specialpurpose vehicle Com panisto
Venture CapitalGm bH to poolinvestm ents from the crowd.655
Crowd investorsbuy securitiesfrom thisspecialpurposevehicle,
which then invests on their behalfin the startup.656 Com panisto
operatesin a sim ilarm annerto the Dutch Sym bid, allowing for
investm entstobepooled.657 Thetotalam ountraisedbetween 2011
and July 1, 2014 was27.7 m illion.658 In thisperiod, 140 successfulECF cam paignswerecarried out.659
A com m on structure adopted in Germ any by equity crowdfunding platform sisthesilentpartnership (StilleBeteiligung).660
Thisstructureallowsinvestorstoacquiresilentpartnershipunits
WORLD BANK, supra note63, at18.
DRESNER, supra note92, at207.
651 Id. at20708.
652 Id. at208.
653 Id.
654 LarsHornuf& Arm i
n Schwienbacher, The Emergence of Crowdinvesting in Europe 16 (2015), http://ssrn.com /abstract=2481994 [https://perm a.cc
/KH43-6Z43].
655 Id. at14.
656 Id. at10.
657 Id. at14.
658 LMU FORSCHUNGSDATENBANK , CROWDINVESTING (
July1, 2014).
659 Id.
660 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at208.
649
650
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from an investeecom pany.661 Such unitsarecom parabletoequitylikesharesin acom pany. Theygiveinvestorsa pre-defined share
ofprofits, butno voting rights.662 Hence, voting rights cannotbe
sold via ECF platform sin Germ any, butthe sale ofsilentpartnership units is perm issible.663 The advantage ofutilizing this
structureisthatsilentpartnershipshavebeneficialtaxtreatm ent
in Germ any.664 Germ any hasnotpassed specificlawsregulating
crowdfunding. 665 Crowdfunding, therefore, takes place within
the existing paradigm ofsecuritieslaws.666 However, in Novem ber 2014, Germ any passed a draft law on crowdfunding titled
Gesetzentwurffür ein Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz.667 Under the
proposed law, com panies willbe able to raise up to 1 m illion
withouthaving to registera prospectus.668 Moreover, individual
investorswillbeableto investup to 10,000 perproject.669
Italy has opted for crowdfunding-specific legislation by
am ending itsexistingsecuritieslaw, theTUF (TestoUnicodella
Finanza).670 The aim ofthe legislation is to legalize crowdfunding, and CONSOB (Com m issione Nazionale per le Società e la
Borsa), Italy
sregulatorand the equivalentoftheSEC, istasked
with im plem enting the legislation.671 The legislation went into
forceon Decem ber17, 2012, and isavailabletoinnovativestartups so-called startup innovativa.672 TheActm akesitpossible
forinnovative startupsto offersecuritiesup to 5 m illion without
Id.
Id.
663 Id.
664 Id. at20809.
665 RossS. Wei
nstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect
When Youre Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT
L L.J. 427, 447 (
2013).
666 Id.
667 BUNDESFINANZMINISTERIUM, GESETZENTWURF FÜR EIN KLEINANLEGER
SCHUTZGESETZ (
Nov. 10, 2014), http:
//
dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/18/039/1803
994.pdf[https://perm a.cc/82PD-V7RE](Ger.).
668 Id.
669 Id.
670 Decret
o Legge 18 ottobre 2012, n. 179 artt. 30, http://www.altalex.com
/docum ents/leggi/2014/04/02/decreto-crescita-2-0-ricerca-assicurazioni-start-up
-innovative#sezione9 [https://perm a.cc/S94Z-2P67](It.).
671 CONSOB, DELIBERA N. 18592 (
26 giugno 2013), http://www.consob.it
/
m ain/
docum enti/bollettino2013/d18592.htm [https:
//
perm a.cc/8QNY-K9GS](It.).
672 Id.
661
662
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having to register a prospectus.673 The definition ofinnovative
startups focuses on firm s whose sole or m ain purpose is to develop, produce, and sellinnovativeproductsand serviceswith a
high technological value. 674 Non-innovative startups, however,
cannottakeadvantageofthisexem ption and continuetobebound
byEuropean Directive2010/73, and areonlyabletoraisecapital
up to 100,000 withoutthe obligation toregistera prospectus.675
This, in ourview, representsa significantlim itation. Moreover,
startupsm ustbelessthan fouryearsoldin ordertotakeadvantage
of the ECF exem ption. 676 The crowdfunding exem ption im plem ented in Italy, therefore, results in a very narrow exem ption
from generallyapplicableprospectusrequirem ents.
In France, thecurrentlegislativefram ework perm itscom panies to offer securities up to 1 m illion withouthaving to registeraprospectus.677 Moreover, thereisalicensingrequirem entin
place. Crowdfunding platform sm ustbelicensed by thesupervisoryauthority.678
E. Crowdfunding in the Developing World
Crowdfundingisa wayofextendingaccesstocapitalforSMEs
bym ergingthesocialweb with entrepreneurialfinance.679 Accordingly, crowdfunding m ay beseen asa substitutefortraditionalfinancingchannels(banks, businessangels, andventurecapitalists).
Thefunction ofcrowdfunding portalsistofacilitatetheinform ation flow from early-stageenterprisestopotentialinvestors. The
673

Id.

674 Ant
onioColetti, Isabella Porchia,

Filippo Benintendi& Sim ona Borm ida,
Boosting Innovative Start-Ups in Italy: The New Framework (Dec. 20, 2012)
https:
//
www.lw.com /
thoughtLeadership/
boosting-innovative-start-ups-italy[https:
//
perm a.cc/2NRK-9AR7].
675 2010 O.J. (
L 327)7 (E.U.).
676 Col
ettietal., supra note674.
677 Ordonnance 2014-559 du 30 m ai2014 rel
ative au financem entparticipative [Ordinance 2014-559 ofMay 30, 2014 on crowdfunding], LEGIFRANCE,
May 30, 2008 (Fr.), http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte
=JORFTEXT000029008408&categorieLien=id[https://perm a.cc/JQH9-C529].
678 Andrew Conway, Crowd Funding: A Policy Response 1820, INST. OF
PUB. ACCOUNTANTS (2015).
679 Pet
erLee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5758 (2014).
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extensive reliance on crowdfunding in the developed world suggeststhatcrowdfundingcould becom eausefultoolin developing
countries. Although crowdfunding isstillin itsinfancy in developingcountries, thepotentialofthem arketissignificant.
1. Economic Growth, Democratization of Finance, and
Women Entrepreneurs
One ofthe m ain advantagesofutilizing crowdfunding in the
developing world is thatitallows developing countries to spur
entrepreneurship, econom ic growth, and innovation. A related
advantageofcrowdfundingisthatitdem ocratizesaccesstocapital. Entrepreneurscan raisefundswithoutbeingpartofabusiness
angelor venture capitalnetwork and can targetinvestors dispersedacrossthecountry.680
A key finding in a study published by Mollick isthatcrowdfundingin developed countriesislessconcentrated than venture
capitalfunding, which often leadstothe riseofstartup clusters
in a particular geographic location or region. 681 By contrast,
crowdfunding has the potential to prom ote startups in rural
areasorsm alltowns, wherelocalinvestorscan engagein investing and supporttheirlocalcom m unities.682 Forexam ple, Agrawal
etal. show thatgeographicproxim ity isnotan overriding criterion forcrowdfunding investorsand thatcrowdfunding elim inates
distance-related econom ic frictions. 683 These characteristics of
crowdfundinghaveanenorm ouspotentialfordevelopingcountries.
In addition, crowdfunding isassociated with lessgenderbias
than venture capital.684 Venture capitalists prim arily investin
technology-intensive types offirm s, which are less likely to be
funded by wom en.685 Moreover, wom en raise significantly lower
Mollick, supra note31, at9.
Id.
682 Id.
683 Id. See Ji
sun An et al., Recommending Investors for Crowdfunding
Projects 2 (2014), http://researchswinger.org/publications/an14recom m ending
.pdf[https://perm a.cc/MT2A-QU4P].
684 See generally Dan Mar
om etal., Gender Dynamics in Crowdfunding: Evidence on Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Deals from Kickstarter (2015), http://
ssrn.com /abstract=2442954[https://perm a.cc/XE3L-8TH4].
685 Id. at41.
680
681
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am ounts ofequity than m en during the startup stage and less
equity and debtatlaterstages ofa firm 
s developm entcycle.686 In
fact, severalstudiespointtowom en entrepreneursbeing ableto
raiselesscapitalthan m en, regardlessofthesourceofcapital.687
Asaresult, wom en launch firm swith significantlysm alleram ounts
ofcapitalthan m en.688 Theadvantagesofcrowdfundingarethatit
hasthepotentialtodem ocratizetheprivateequity m arket, reduce
genderbias, and em powertheeconom icdevelopm entofwom en.
In thenextsection, wehighlightsom ekey platform sthathave
em erged in developing countriesand discussthe m ain enabling
factors that allow crowdfunding to develop. These factors are
technologicalinfrastructure, entrepreneurialculture, institutional
andregulatoryinfrastructure, andcom m unityengagem ent.
2. Emerging Platforms
In sub-Saharan Africa, one exam ple ofa crowdfunding platform isHom estrings.689 Thiswebsite waslaunched between 2011
and 2013 and hasthusfarm obilized about$25 m illion in funds,
covering thirteen countries in Africa.690 The platform allows investors, particularly diaspora investors, to invest in projects,
funds, bonds, and public-private partnership opportunities supported bythegovernm entsofKenya, Ghana, and Nigeria, aswell
asFirstQuantum Mineralsand Afren plc.691 Anotherexam pleof
a platform is Startm e, which focuses on traditionalentrepreneurialcam paigns.692
The MENA (Middle Eastand North Africa)region has seen
the rise of online platform s such as the Lebanon-based Zoom aal.693 This site offers both cause-related and entrepreneurial
686 See S. Col
em an & A. Robb, New Firm Financing for Women-Owned Firms:
Evidence from the Kauffmann Firm Survey Data at23, 6 (2008), http://sbaer
.uca.edu/research/usasbe/2009/PaperID82.pdf[https://perm a.cc/V6Q4-SFK4].
687 Id. at8.
688 Id. at9.
689 See HOMESTRINGS, ht
tps://www.hom estrings.com / [https://perm a.cc/
EY
8V-PWA6].
690 WORLD BANK , supra not
e63, at32.
691 Id.
692 See STARTME, ht
tp://www.startm e.co.za/[https://perm a.cc/2922-SG6B].
693 See ZOOMAAL, ht
tp://www.zoom aal.com [https://perm a.cc/WB5B-9KQF].
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cam paigns.694 Anothersuccessfulequitycrowdfundingplatform is
Eureeca, which, during itsfirstcam paign, raised $100,000 from
twenty-threeinvestors.695
TheLatin Am erican and theCaribbean regionshavealsoseen
a substantialgrowth in crowdfunding platform s since 2010. In
Brazil, Catarse hasraised over$4.1 m illion in overonethousand
cam paigns. 696 Another popular platform is Ideam e, which has
cam paigns in six countries in the region:Argentina, Mexico,
Chile, Brazil, Colom bia, and Uruguay. 697 In Southeast Asia,
notable platform s include Ignite Intent,698 the HotStart,699 and
Ideasplatform .700
3. Key Enabling Factors
A keyenablingfactorin developingcountriesistheim plem entation ofthenecessary technologicalinfrastructuretosupportcrowdfunding. Whethera developing country can m ovetocrowdfunding
structures depends on its ability to em brace new technologies
and m ethodologiesforcapitalform ation. Crowdfunding can only
work ifindividuals have access to reliable broadband Internet
and m obiledata networks. Thepresenceofonlinesocialnetworks
thatallow investorsto com m unicate with entrepreneursand vice
versa isalsoa crucialprerequisiteforcrowdfunding.701 Hence, a
reportby the World Bank notesthatthe single m ostpredictive
factorfortherateofcrowdfunding em ergenceistherateofsocial
m edia penetration.702 Thelatterisstrongly positively correlated
with theriseofcrowdfundingplatform s.703
694 Id.

See EUREECA, http://www.eureeca.com [https://perm a.cc/UE87-56BP].
WORLD BANK, supra note 63, at33. See CATARSE, http://www.catarse
.m e[https://perm a.cc/V69F-9ZRM].
697 See IDEAME, ht
tp://idea.m e[https://perm a.cc/GPD2-SPE8].
698 See IGNITEINTENT, ht
tp://www.igniteintent.com [https://perm a.cc/9S
RE-PVQL].
699 See HOTSTART, ht
tp:/
/
www.thehotstart.com [https:
//
perm a.cc/
RC2B-LLNY].
700 See Ideaspl
atform Com pany Page, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/ideasplatform [https://perm a.cc/QL95-XWYM](notethattheoriginalideasplat
form .in isnolongeran operatingwebsite).
701 John S. Wrol
dsen, The Crowdfund Acts Strange Bedfellows: Democracy
and Start-Up Company Investing, 72 U. K AN. L. REV. 357, 361 (2013).
702 WORLD BANK , supra not
e63, at40.
703 Id.
695
696
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Theinstitutionalfram eworksin developing countriesm ustbe
designed in a way tofacilitateaccesstocapitaland thedevelopm entofcrowdfundingplatform s.704 Crowdfundingrelieson theexistenceofan entrepreneurialculturein acountry. Entrepreneurial
culturecan beconstrained, however, by factorssuch asred tape,
bureaucracy, andlack ofeconom icincentives.705 Accordingly, countrieswishingtoprom otecrowdfundingand P2P lendingm ustaddress policies and regulations that raise transaction costs and
m aketheentryandconductofbusinessoperationsburdensom e.706
In addition, education cam paigns, incubators, accelerators, startup
weekends, andm entorshipprogram ssponsoredbythegovernm ent
orNGOscanplayakeyrolein fosteringentrepreneurialculture.707
VI. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND GLOBAL CROWDFUNDING
Thevariousregulatorym odelsconsideredabovearein com petition with oneanother. Based on thesem odels, wecan extrapolate
thefollowingregulatoryoptionsavailabletonationalregulators:
noregulatorychange;
creating a specific regulatory fram ework for ECF
and P2PL;708
enacting carveoutsorsecuritiesexem ptionsfrom the
preexisting securitieslawstoexem ptfundraisingvia
704 Id.
705 C. St
even Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws,
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5859 (2012).
706 A recentem pi
ricalstudyofm obilem oneyschem esfound thatheavyregulation isfataltothesuccessofsuch schem es. Thestudyusesm ulti-sidedplatform
econom icsandtheroleofignition andcriticalm asstoexplorethesuccessorfailure
ofm obilem oney. See DavidEvans& AlexisPirchio, An Empirical Examination of
Why Mobile Money Schemes Ignite in Some Developing Countries but Flounder in
Most (U. Chic. L. Sch., Coase-SandorInst. forL. and Econ., WorkingPaperNo.
723, Mar. 2015), http:
//
ssrn.com /
abstract=257 8312 [https:/
/
perm a.cc/
8X4C-V86P].
707 Id. at89.
708 See, e.g., Br
adford, supra note 705, at8;Joan MacLeod Hem inway, How
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J.
865, 887 (2014);Marco Figliom eni, Note, Grassroots Capitalism or: How I
Learned to Stop Worrying About Financial Risks in the Exempt Market and Love
Equity Crowdfunding, 23 DAHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106 (2014).
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ECF platform sfrom generalprospectus, registration
and otherrequirem ents;709
lim iting such exem ptions, ifany, to accredited, or
sophisticated, high networth investors(theapproach
taken in the United States prior to the enactm ent
oftheJOBS Act);710
m akingECF availabletoallinvestors, includingretail
investors subjectto caps on the am ountofcapital
that retailinvestors can contribute to ECF cam paigns(theapproach in theUnited Statesafterthe
im plem entation oftheJOBS Act);711
im posing various investm ent-related caps, such as
lim iting thenum berofissuersinvestorscan invest
in orlim itingtheam ountofm oneyan investorm ay
investperyear(thelim itm aybedeterm ined byreference to a person
s incom e or net worth;or arbitrary lim itsm ay besetregardlessofa person
sincom e
712
ornetworth);
m aking ECF available to retailinvestors without
anyrestrictionsorinvestm entcaps;713
lim iting ECF to certain types ofissuers, such as
innovativecom panies(theapproachtakeninItaly).714
Theoptionsforinvestorprotection safeguardsinclude:
establishing a licensing fram ework forcrowdfunding
interm ediaries(theapproach taken in New Zealand;
other exam ples include the FCA authorizations in
the United Kingdom for CrowdCube and Seedrs)
and enablingaform ofm eritregulation;715
im posingvariousdisclosurerequirem entson issuers;
709 See St
uartR. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption:
Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 143637 (2012);Filgiom eni,
supra note708, at11516.
710 See Cohn, supra not
e709, at1436.
711 See Bradf
ord, supra note705, at12326.
712 Id. at124.
713 Id. at12426.
714 Garry A. Gabi
son, Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated But Not Equal,
13 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 359, 39091 (2014).
715 Bradf
ord, supra note705, at136;Figliom eni, supra note708, at116.
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requiring offerings to be conducted online and not
through other m eans (the approach in the United
States);
requiring issuersto conductofferingsthrough only
oneinterm ediary;716
im posingcapsonthem axim um am ountofcapitalthat
an issuer can raise in a given year (the approach
taken in New ZealandandtheUnited States);717
prohibitinginterm ediariesfrom directlyholdingfunds
and requiring them todepositfundsintoan escrow
account(theapproach taken in theUnitedStates);718
risk acknowledgm entby the investorand the provision ofeducationalm aterialstoinvestorspriorto
investing;719
providingcancellation rightsand cooling-offperiods
(wherebyan investorm aywithdraw theinvestm ent
up untilacertain pointintim eoruntilthecrowdfundingcam paign isclosed);720
addressingtheholdingofclientm oneyand conflicts
ofinterest;721
providing m echanism s to handle com plaints and
alternativedisputeresolution;722
providing guidelines on socialm edia com m entary
(see, forexam ple, U.S. electronicbulletin recom m endations);723 and
Wroldsen, supra note701, at367.
Bradford, supra note705, at95;Van S. Wiltz, Will the JOBS Act JumpStart the Video Game Industry? Crowdfunding Start-Up Captial, 16 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 141, 160 (2013).
718 Cohn, supra not
e709, at1442;Joan MacLeod Hem inway& Sheldon Ryan
Hoffm an, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933,
78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 92324 (2010).
719 Fi
gliom eni, supra note708, at11516.
720 Cohn, supra not
e709, at1440, 42;Wiltz, supra note717, at16869.
721 Bradf
ord, supra note705, at13637;Wiltz, supra note717, at16667.
722 GeorgeH. Fr
iedm an, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Emerging Online
Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
695, 71115 (1997);AnjanetteH. Raym ond & Abby Stem ler, Trusting Strangers:
Dispute Resolution in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 357,
37374 (2014).
723 Thom asG. Jam es, Far From the Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act
716
717
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establishing rulesorm echanism stodealwith platform failureorclosure(thegreatestrisk hereisthat
a platform m ay close withoutany data leftbehind
on existingcontracts).724
BecausetheECF industryisstillrelativelyyoung, itrem ains
to be seen which m odelwillbecom e dom inant internationally.
There is no doubt that any future regulation willneed to be
adapted to crowdfunding platform swith differentpurposes. Obviously, a clear distinction can be m ade between crowdfunding
platform s with non-financialrewards and those with financial
rewards.725 Regulation for crowdfunding should differ based on
the goals ofthe funders and the purposes ofthe crowdfunding
projects. Burdensom e regulation m ay have the effectofstym ieing the developm entofcrowdfunding. The principalreason why
entrepreneurs utilize ECF is precisely because itis less expensivethan raisingcapitalthrough apublicoffering, which involves
costly prospectusobligations, orrelying on banksorprivate equity channels.726 On the other hand, a lax regulatory approach
m ayresultin lossestoinvestorsand lack ofconfidencein capital
m arketsand crowdfundingin particular. Topreventfraud, som e
jurisdictions, such astheUnited Kingdom , haverequired crowdfundingplatform storegisterwith an oversightbodyandregularly
reporttothatbody.727 In othercountries, such asGerm any, there
isnorequirem entforplatform stoberegistered, and crowdfunding
platform s operate without any specific license. 728 The requirem entthatcrowdfunding platform sberegistered with a national
oversightbody leadsto highercom pliance costs, butalso an increasein investorprotection.
Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for Securities Fraud in Connection with Crowdfunding Offerings, 54B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1782 (2013).
724 Bradf
ord, supra note 705, at 14445, 145 n.700;Gabison, supra note
714, at369.
725 Joan MacLeod Hem i
nway, What is a Security in the Era of Crowdfunding?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 335, 359 (2012);Hem inway &
Hoffm an, supra note718, at899900.
726 See supra not
es2122, 247, and accom panying text.
727 See supra PartV.D.2.c.
728 Lars Hornuf & Arm i
n Schwienbacher, Should Securities Regulation
Prom ote Crowdinvesting?16, 37 (June 11, 2015)(unpublished m anuscript)(on
filewith theLudwig-Maxim ilians-UniversitätMünchen Library).
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Itis up to each individualjurisdiction to determ ine the extenttowhich securitiesregulation oughttoapply toand overlap
with crowdfunding regulation. The basic starting pointis that
securitiesregulation appliesto crowdfunding to the extentthat
crowdfundinginvolvestheofferand saleofequityordebtsecurities, which are regulated activitiesin m ostjurisdictions.729 This
m ay triggera range ofrequirem ents, including m andatory disclosure and reporting requirem ents. The objective ofim posing
such requirem entshashistorically been the prevention offraud
and investorprotection, aswellasthereduction ofagency costs
and inform ation asym m etries.730 A failure to com ply with such
requirem entscan resultin m isstatem ents, om issionstostatem aterialfacts, and claim sofsecuritiesfraud.731
Thekey problem with applying existing securitiesregulation
lawstocrowdfunding, however, isthatsuch lawswerenotcrafted
foronlinefundraising. Com pliancewith existingsecuritiesregulations i.e., disclosure and prospectusrequirem ents resultsin
fixed com pliance coststhatincrease the costsofobtaining capitalforfirm s.732 An advantage ofsuch requirem entsisthatthey
reduceagencycosts. Owingtogreatertransparencyand lessinform ation asym m etry, entrepreneurs have fewer opportunities to
engagein self-dealingorextractprivatebenefits.733
Optim alregulation involves a tradeoffbetween the costs of
ensuring an appropriate levelofinvestor protection and broadening accesstocapitalforsm alland m edium -sized firm sthatare
disproportionately affected by com pliancecosts.734 Theupshotof
aregulatoryapproach thatistoofocused on investorprotection is
lim ited accesstocapitalforsm allfirm s, whereasregulation that
perm itsextensiveaccesstocapitalm ay resultin weakerinvestor
protection.735 Furtherm ore, ifthe costs associated with investor
DRESNER, supra note92, at165, 169.
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION
CASES AND MATERIALS 96 (12th ed. 2012).
731 Id. at96
732 Id. at97.
733 See Mark Mi
lian, Kickstarters Funded Projects See Some Stumbles,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012), http:/
/www.bloom berg.com /news/
articles/2012-08-21
/
kickstarter-s-funded-projects-see-som e-stum bles[https:/
/perm a.cc/
HF7D-3PFD].
734 See DRESNER, supra not
e92, at171.
735 ONTARIO SEC. COMM
N, OCS STAFF CONSULTATION PAPER 45-710, CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEW CAPITAL RAISING PROSPECTUS EXEMPTIONS 23 (
2012),
729
730
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protection are excessive, crowdfunding m ay cease to be a viable
cost-effectivem eanstoraisecapitalforSMEs.736 Regulatorsm ust,
therefore, ensurethatsm allfirm scan utilizeECF andP2PL in the
firstplace, while setting the investorprotection baratan appropriatelevel. Indeed, Cum m ing and Johan pointtoem piricalevidence thatsuggeststhatcrowd investorsdo seek a certain level
ofinvestorprotection.737
Investorprotection isa particularly im portantconsideration
ifthe creation ofa m arketfor lem ons where only low-quality
ventures would eventually choose ECF while high-quality ventureswould continuetorely on venturecapitalorangelinvestor
financing is to be avoided.738 The upshot would be a crowdfunding m arketfullofunrealistic, and likely fraudulent, sales
pitches.739 A high levelofinvestor dissatisfaction and adverse
publicityaboutECF asaform ofcorporatefundraisingcould eventuallyresultin thecollapseofthecrowdfunding m arketitself.740
Thisistheworstcasescenarioasenvisaged byAkerlof.741
Forcrowdfunding to have a positive econom icim pactin the
long run, theregulatory fram ework m ustbedesigned in a m annerthatworksforboth investorsand entrepreneursalike.742 As
observed by the U.S. Investor Advisory Com m ittee:[a]lthough
these goals are som etim es seen as operating atcross purposes,
https:
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en/
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736 Id. at5152.
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crowdfunding ultim ately cannot succeed unless investors perceivethem arketplaceasfairand believetheyhavea reasonable
chance ofprofiting on theirinvestm ents.743 Theregulatorychallenge, therefore, isto design a fairand cost-effective m arketplace
thatfacilitatessm allcapitalform ation, while providing reasonableinvestorprotection.744
Thefocusofregulatorsin som ejurisdictionshasbeen theprotection of the retailinvestor involved in crowdfunding. 745 The
approach taken underthe JOBS Actin the United States, forexam ple, isregulatingnotonlythecrowdfundingplatform s, butalso
theinvestm entopportunitiesofthecrowd. Thisisdoneby im posing lim its on the extentto which investors can assum e risk.746
Nonaccreditedinvestorscan onlyinvestviacrowdfundingplatform s
up to a certain am ountoftheirannualnetincom e orwealth.747
This represents a significant lim itation on investorsinvestm ent
opportunities. In the U.S. setting, this is consistent with the
historicalfocus ofthe SEC on the protection ofnonaccredited
investors.748 The definition ofaccredited investorwilltherefore
continuetobesignificantin thefuture, andcrowdfundinginterm ediaries m ustclosely m onitor any relevantam endm ents in this
regard. The Dodd-Frank Actof2010 im poses an obligation on
theSEC toreview thedefinition in itsentiretyand toam end the
definition as deem ed necessary every four years, beginning in
2014.749 Accordingly, questions as to the distinctions between retailinvestorsand accredited orsophisticated investorswillarise
in thefuture.
An alternative regulatory approach is to focus on the corporategovernancefram eworksofthecrowdfunded enterprisesand
SEC INV
R ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE:CROWDFUNDING REGULATIONS 1 (
Apr. 10, 2014), http://www
743

.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-com m ittee-2012/investm ent-adviser-crowd
funding-recom m endation.pdf[https://perm a.cc/99WM-5JPZ].
744 Id.
745 See supra Part
sV.B, V.C.1, V.D.2.b.
746 See supra PartV.C.1.
747 See Am endm ent
s for Sm alland AdditionalIssues Exem ptions Under
theSecuritiesAct(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,81617 (Apr. 20, 2015).
748 DRESNER, supra not
e92, at117.
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the interm ediaries.750 The key pillars ofa good corporate governance crowdfunding fram ework m ay be sum m arized asfollows:
transparency, inform ation disclosure, investorand consum erprotection, and appropriate regulation ofthe crowdfunding interm ediaries i.e., the operators of the websites through which
crowdfunding activitiesareconducted.751 Regulation m ustensure,
am ong otherthings, security ofpaym entand platform functionality. In addition, interm ediaries m ay have to com ply with certain capitalrequirem ents, asisthecasein theUnited Kingdom .
Regulatory authorities m ustbe able to controland m onitorthe
activities ofcrowdfunding interm ediaries.752 This is im portant
because crowd investorstypically lack the controlrightsand ex
antecontractualprotectionsavailabletobusinessangelsand venture capitalists as part of their shareholder agreem ents with
investeecom panies.753
Within the ECF context, regulatory authorities m ustfind a
balance between facilitating access to capitalfor SMEs and reducing the risksofsecuritiesfraud. Thekey regulatory objectives
herearecapitalform ation, investorprotection, andthem aintenance
offairand orderly capitalm arkets.754 Investorsm ustbe able to
assessinvestm entopportunitieswhilehavingrecoursetoadequate
disclosure. While ECF willnever be risk-free in the sense that
investors m ay always m ake perfectly bad investm entdecisions
notwithstanding having access to adequate disclosure investors
m ustbeprotected from fraud, m isleading statem ents, and other
m isleading and deceptivepractices. A crucialdifferencebetween
trading sharesin publicly listed com paniesand investing in sm all
businessesisthelack ofresearch analystcoverage.755 Privatecom panies, bydefinition, operateinam oreopaqueinform ationsetting.
In addition, thepublicofferingrulesm ustbedesignedin away
astoallow offeringstobeconductedwithoutaprospectus. Thelack
ofonerousprospectusrequirem ents, aswesaw in theEuropean
setting, isfundam entalto the em ergence ofcrowdfunding. Public
See supra PartV.C.2.
See discussion supra PartIV.
752 See supra PartV.D.2.b.
753 See supra t
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754 See supra t
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offering rules, therefore, m ay beviewed asan im portantregulatorydriverofcrowdfunding. Sim plified disclosurerequirem entsare
needed forSMEsseekingtoutilizeequitycrowdfunding.
Therearevariouscapsthatm ay beim posed on them axim um
am ountofcapitalthatcan beraised via ECF by issuersand the
m axim um am ount ofcapitalthat investors m ay invest.756 The
rationalebehind investm entcapsisto lim itthe potentiallosses
thatretailinvestorsm ay incurasa resultofparticipating in ECF
cam paigns. Asstated, in theUnited States, theapproach under
the JOBS Acthasbeen tolim itthetotalm onetary am ountthat
an investorm ayinvestin allissuersin a given yearaccordingto
the person
s incom e or networth.757 Thisrequirem entisintended
todeterretailinvestorsfrom concentrating theirinvestm entsin
theECF m arket(aform ofm andatoryportfoliodiversification).
In ourview, however, ECF and P2PL differsubstantially from
otherfundraising m echanism s, whetherpublicorprivate(angel
investing and venture capital), and require a speciallegislative
response. Adopting a specificregulatory fram ework to coverECF
and P2PL appears to be the appropriate solution to regulating
ECF and P2PL becausepreexistingsecuritieslaw fram eworksare
inadequate. Indeed, a lack oflegislative action in this field m ay
disadvantagefirm sin som ejurisdictionsvis-à-visfirm sthatoperatein jurisdictionswheretherehasalreadybeen som eregulatory
accom m odation forequitycrowdfunding. An option hereistom ake
ECF available, butonlytotheextentthatitappliestoarestricted
group ofinvestors(seetheapproach in theUnited Kingdom , for
exam ple). The focus in the United Kingdom , as we saw, is on
sophisticated, experienced, and professionalinvestors, aswellas
investors who certify they fallinto the restricted investorcategory. Anotherapproach m aybetolim itECF tocertain classesof
issuer. ECF in Italyisconfinedtoinnovativestartupsonly.758
Questionsalso arise in relation to pooled investm entarrangem entsthatareused by som eplatform sasan investm entm odel.
Should regulatory distinctionsbe m ade between investorsholding legal, as opposed to beneficial, interests in the equity ofan
See supra PartsV.C.1.ab.
See supra PartV.C.1.b.
758 See supra PartV.D.3.
756
757
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issuer?In particular, towhatextentdosuch arrangem entsalter
the disclosure obligations ofissuers to investors? In principle,
investorsinvesting indirectly into an issue via a SPV should be
entitled to the sam e inform ation disclosure as those investors
investing directly. Addressing theseissueswillrequirea consideration ofhow tofitany new ECF regulation within thepreexistingcorporatelaw fram ework.
Finally, nationalregulatorswillneedtoconsidertowhatextent,
ifany, oversightofECF andP2PL platform sshouldbesharedwith
self-regulatory organizations. In the United Kingdom , the UK
Crowdfunding Association has assum ed a role by prom ulgating
regulatory standards and rules affecting both non-FCA and
FCA-authorized ECF providers. British P2PL providers have
also launched a peer-to-peer finance association(P2PFA). The
em ergenceofsuch self-regulatorybodiesislikelytoprom otegreater
responsivenessand regulatoryinnovation.
Som ejurisdictions, such asNew Zealand, havegranted crowdfunding interm ediaries an im portantsupervisory role, allowing
interm ediariesto deny issuersaccessto theirplatform sifthere
isreason tobelievethattheissuerhasengaged in, orislikelyto
engage in, m isleading and deceptive conduct.759 Furtherm ore,
interm ediariesareexpected tocarryoutduediligenceand check
theidentity oftheissuerand thatofitsdirectorsand seniorm anagers.760 Theyarealsotaskedwith educatinginvestorsaboutthe
risksofcrowdfunding. Where investorsare subjectto investm ent
caps, interm ediariesm ustalso ensure thatany investm entlim its
im posedon theinvestorsarenotbreached.761 In addition, interm ediariesm usthaveprocessesin placetoensurethattheanti-m oney
laundering requirem entsare notbreached. The crowdfunding interm ediaries, therefore, playa criticalrolein investorprotection.
To an extent, we are witnessing a form of m erit regulation,
wheretheroleofthelicensedinterm ediaryisakin tothatofagovernm entagency deciding on the m erits ofthe offer. Indeed, we
could characterize the New Zealand m odelasa hybrid ofm erit
and disclosureregulation.
FinancialMarketsConductRegulations2014, s195 (N.Z.).
Id.
761 Id.
759
760
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CONCLUSION
Accessto finance isa pressing concern forSMEsaround the
globe, particularlyin theafterm ath oftheGFC. In thisArticle, we
explored the potentialofcrowdfunding and P2PL to foster econom icgrowth and innovation and bridge the financing gap that
m anystartupsand SMEsface. Asshown, crowdfundingprovides
a novelm ethod for entrepreneurs to obtain financing without
having to rely on traditionalfunding m echanism s, such asdebt
finance, venturecapital, orbusinessangels.762
Technological innovation and the financial crisis of 2008
2009 are the key drivers behind crowdfunding. By harnessing
Internettechnology, crowdfundingand P2PL havealtered thespectrum ofcapitalraising optionsby allowing entrepreneursusing
socialm edia websitesoronlinecrowdfunding platform stoattract
sm allam ounts ofcapitalfrom a large num berofindividuals to
finance new ventures orsupportexisting businesses. The m ain
fundersofearly startup ventureshave traditionally been venture
capitalistsand angelinvestors. Thiswillchange with the em ergenceofECF andP2PL. Attheveryleast, ECF andP2PL arelikely
to increase com petition am ong suppliersofcapitaltoSMEsand
earlystartups.
Wehaveconsidered a varietyofdifferentcrowdfundingm odels
thatcan beused tosupportavarietyofpurposes, includingcrowdfundingwith financialrewards(crowdinvestingandcrowdlending)
and crowdfundingwithoutfinancialrewards(crowd sponsoring).
Our conclusion is thatdifferentform s ofcrowdfunding require
differentregulatory fram eworks, astheyareassociated with differentrisks, differentlevelsofcom plexity, aswellasdifferentuser
groups and purposes. For exam ple, donation-based crowdfundingism ostapplicabletocom m unity-related and art-related projects, whileECF isapplicabletostartupsthathaveahigh-growth,
sale, m erger, or IPO strategy. 763 This m ay be contrasted with
P2PL, which ism ostrelevantto businesses seeking to im prove
theircash flow.
Thefocusofourdiscussion hasbeen on the financialreward
m odelofcrowdfunding. In particular, weexam ined theregulatory
762
763
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approach taken tocrowdinvestingand crowdlendingin anum ber
ofjurisdictions, including theUnited States, theUnited Kingdom ,
Germ any, Italy, and New Zealand. Although crowdfundingisincreasinglygainingprom inenceintheEuropeancontext, particularly
in jurisdictionssuch astheUnited Kingdom , nounified regulatory
fram ework has been adopted atthe E.U. level.764 The European
Com m ission hasexploredthepotentialofcrowdfunding, andin the
United States, the JOBS Acthas been enacted with the aim of
introducing a crowdfunding exem ption tofacilitate capitalraising
from thepublic.765 Them ain thrustoftheregulatoryinterventions
surveyedhasbeen toextendECF tonon-accreditedinvestors, with
regulation structured in a way thatfocuseson the crowdfunded
enterprises, theinterm ediaries, orthecrowd. Therearem arked
differencesbetween countriesastohow theseactorsareregulated.
This, in turn, involves certain tradeoffs between fostering capitalaccessand protectinginvestors.
Weconsidered thepotentialofcrowdfunding in thedeveloping
world. Whilecrowdfunding m arketshavebeen operating in m any
countriesofthedevelopedworld, thedevelopingworldm aybeable
tocapitalizeon thisnew form offunding. Them ain prerequisites
for crowdfunding to em erge are access to technology, entrepreneurialactivity, and the presence oflightregulatory structures,
which facilitatethenecessarym arketconditionsforinvestm entin
thestartup ecosystem .
Crowdfunding isalready a well-established financing instrum ent. The Internet and crowdfunding have revolutionized the
waysin which fundsareraised in thesm allbusinesscontext.766
Nevertheless, thebulk ofcrowdfundingisdirectedtowardsphilanthropicprojectsand thecreativeindustries, whereartisticcom m unitiesplayan im portantrolein supportingcrowdfundingprojects.
Equity crowdfunding, on the otherhand, playsa sm allerrole in
thecrowdfunding m arket. Thisisduetoa num beroffactors, includingthecom plexity offinancingyoungand innovativestartups
and a legalcontextthatm ay constrain orinhibitECF. Thereis,
therefore, considerable scope forim provem entin thisarea. The
m ain points for regulators to address are securities regulation
supra PartV.D.1.
See supra PartV.C.1.
766 See supra t
extaccom panying notes2224.
764 See
765
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carveouts, prospectusrequirem ents, investorprotection, and the
regulation ofECF andP2PL platform s.767
Thecrowdfunding m arketforproviding seed and early-stage
financing can be furtherdeveloped to ensure thatcrowdfunding
becom esa valid alternativetotraditionalfinancing channelsfor
firm s. In fact, given thelim ited num berofinstitutionalinvestors
willingtofinanceSMEs, and theeffectsoftheGFC on thebanking sector, crowdfunding m ay betheonly viablem eansforsom e
firm stoobtain early-stagefinancing. Thisisparticularlythecase
in m arketswherethereisashortageofseed capitaloran undersupplyofprojectsthathavethelevelofm aturitytobefunded by
thetraditionalbanking sector. Accordingly, com pared todebtfinanceand privateequity, crowdfundingm ayenablea largernum beroffirm s to obtain financing. In addition, firm s m ay benefit
from otheradvantagesassociated with crowdfunding, including
m arket testing and crowdsourcing. Although nota panacea to
SME financing problem s, P2P and crowdfunding platform sm ay
im provetheSME-financing m arketin thelongterm , and m aybe
viewedasasourceofcom petition tobanksorasafinancingalternativethatincreasesconsum erchoice, prom otesinnovation, and
facilitatesentrepreneurship and econom icgrowth. Crowdfunding
isnotintended todisplacetheroleofthebanks, angelinvestors,
orventurecapitalsin providinglater-stagefunding.768 Rather, the
potentialofcrowdfundingliesin pluggingexistingfinancinggaps
in theearlystagefundingcycle.
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